POLICING DISASTERS : LESSONS FROM THE UK CIVIL PROTECTION

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The Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which underpins UK emergency (disaster) management, has established a consistent level of civil protection across the UK. Based on Integrated Emergency Management (IEM), UK emergency management is integrated both within and between responding organisations such as the police, the fire brigade, ambulance service, and local authorities. In contrast, the police response at a disaster scene in Republic of Korea is limited. Their roles tend to be confined to cordonning, managing traffic, and criminal investigation isolated from the wider context of disaster management. Although the above roles are key factors of policing, it is the lack of partnership working that is most apparent here. With this in mind, this paper aims to make some practical suggestions for the future of the Korean emergency management (also the role of the police at disaster scenes), based on lessons learned in the UK and their response to disaster management.

In the UK, major incidents are managed by local responders such as emergency services and local authorities without direct involvement from central government (Cabinet Office, 2005a). In particular, the local police traditionally coordinate all of the response activities at the scene of a disaster. However, their duties and plans are required to be discharged in liaison with other agencies after being prearranged and pre-agreed through the mechanism of the Local Resilience Forum. In contrast, the role of the Korean police, especially in terms of emergency planning and response, tend to be overlooked in Korea (e.g. although crime investigation is a facet of disaster management, it is viewed in isolation from the context of disaster management) (KNPU, 2008). One of the reasons is that the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), which is in charge of overall coordination of disaster management in Korea, seems to emphasise fire and rescue service functions.

1) An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 10th annual conference of Asian Association of Police Studies,
only (KNPU, 2008). Hence, the Korean police force\(^2\) has dedicated little of its resources and efforts to disaster planning and responses. Under these circumstances, it has been the case that the National Police Agency (NPA) seldom makes emergency or disaster plans but if it does, it is without consultation with other key responding organisations.

Table 1: Selected Key Legislation and Reviews

| * The Civil Defence Act 1948 |
| * The Local Government Act 1972, Section 138 |
| * The Control of Industrial Major Accidents Hazard (CIMAH) Regulations 1984 |
| * The Civil Protection in Peacetime Act 1986 |
| * The Local Government and Housing Act 1989 |
| * The Civil Defence (General Local Authority Functions) Regulations 1993 |
| * The 2001 to 2002 Emergency Review |
| * The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 |

Such a current Korean disaster management framework might be inappropriate to manage newly emerging risks in a ‘Risk Society (Beck, 1992)’. Best practice differs from nation to nation, and thus UK emergency system should not be taken an ideal framework. Nonetheless, there is still much to share and learn from other nations’ systems (Toft & Reynolds, 1999) including the UK, although there exist social, cultural and political differences. The main purpose of this paper is to suggest generically applicable suggestions for the future direction of Korean emergency management as well as the role of the police at disaster scenes, grounded on lessons learned from UK emergency management development. With this aim in mind, this paper firstly identifies principal acts, regulations and government reviews, which have shaped the framework in UK (especially England) emergency management history. Secondly, it attempts to sketch out the development process around the selected pieces of legislation.

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\(^2\) A national (centralised) police force. The National Police Agency (NPA) has legislative power to direct all police organisations.
CIVIL DEFENCE

Inception of Civil Defence

Modern emergency management in the UK started from the concept of ‘civil defence’ (Coles, 1998). Civil Defence first became a key factor of wartime survival in 1939 during the Second World War (Walker & Broderick, 2006). Since 1935 after the First World War ended and aerial bombardment emerged as a new threat to the general public in the UK, the UK government began to implement various civil defence measures. These measures entailed passing Acts of Parliament such as the Air Raid Precaution Act 1938 and the Civil Defence Act 1939. However, when the War ended in 1945, those civil defence activities were suspended by the Civil Defence (Suspension of Powers) Act 1945.

Civil Defence Act 1948

The era of the Cold war and Iron Curtain soon revived the notion of civil defence in the form of the Civil Defence Act 1948, coupled with growing fears of a possible nuclear attack (O’Brien & Read, 2005). According to the Civil Defence Act 1948, ‘civil defence’ included ‘any measures not amounting to actual combat for affording defence against any form of hostile attack by a foreign power or for depriving any form of hostile attack by a foreign power of the whole or part of its effect, whether measures are taken before, at or after the time of the attack’. The Act imposed a mandatory duty on local authorities to make provision for the protection of civilians in the event of a wartime attack, permitting the Home Secretary to introduce ‘Regulations’ regarding civil defence (Norman & Coles, 2003). The Act also provided for a central government grant to give financial support to local authorities for civil defence policies (Coles, 1998).
EVOLUTION FROM CIVIL DEFENCE

Local Government Act 1972

The Local Government Act 1972 (Section 138), of which most provisions came into force on 1 April 1974, afforded local councils (in England & Wales only) ‘permissive powers’ to incur expenditure to manage urgent situations, where an emergency or disaster involving destruction of, or danger to life and property occurs, or is imminent, or there is reasonable ground for expecting such an event to occur (Parker, 1992).

CIMAH Regulations 1984

The Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH) Regulations 1984 was introduced as a response to the EU Directive 82/501/EEC, also known as the Seveso Directive (Parker, 1992). The Directive was prompted by the Seveso disaster in 1976, in which the accidental release of dioxins at one small chemical manufacturing plant in Seveso, Italy caused widespread contamination and health hazards. The CIMAH Regulations 1984 required local authorities to make off-site contingency plans in partnership with the site operators and emergency services for the protection of civil population in event of a major incident (Norman & Coles, 2003). Emergency planning off-site became part of emergency management in the UK by virtue of the CIMAH Regulations 1984. The Regulations was later superseded by the Control of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) Regulations 1999.

Civil Protection in Peacetime Act 1986

During the early 1980s the UK suffered from a spate of quasi-natural, social, technological, and transportation accidents (Handmer & Parker, 1991). Propelled by rising public and media concerns about the disaster prevention and response systems, the Civil Protection in Peacetime Act 1986 was enacted, permitting local authorities to use their civil defence resources (e.g. the civil defence grant) to prevent peacetime disasters or minimise their consequences. Section 2 of the Act 1986 also encouraged local authorities to plan for an emergency or disaster as well (Walker & Broderick, 2006). Noticeably, the Act 1986 was evaluated to reinforce the peacetime planning abilities of local authorities by allowing them to use civil
defence resources to deal with natural or civilian disasters. However, the Act was still affected by the Cold war context and military arrangements (Smith, 2003), as peacetime emergency planning through using civil defence resources was permitted only when the civil defence plans were judged to meet the Home Office’s requirements (Rockett, 1994). Besides, the Act also failed to impose a statutory duty on local authorities to plan for natural disasters or major incidents in peacetime.

Local Government and Housing Act 1989

The Local Government and Housing Act 1989 amended Section 138 of the Local Government Act 1972, and consequently widened the permissive powers of local authorities by allowing them to incur public expenditure on making contingency plans for a potential disaster, which might involve destruction of, or danger to life and property, and might influence the entire or part of their areas (Sibson, 1990). Put simply, the alternation allowed local councils to incur expenditure not only for coping with emergencies in their areas but also on preparing contingency plans.

EMERGENCY PLANNING REVIEWS & RESTRUCTURING

Emergency Planning Review of 1989

In the late 1980s, an unprecedented series of civilian disasters and violent street disorders in the UK such the Bradford City Stadium Fire (1985), the Brixton Riot (1985), the Zeebrugge Ferry Disaster (1987), and the Clapham Junction Railway Accident (1988) had compelled central government to review their peacetime emergency planning again (Handmer & Parker, 1992). In April 1988, the then Home Secretary3) proposed a critical review of current emergency management to cope with peacetime emergencies. In June 1988, the Home Office released and circulated a discussion paper to ‘draw out the main elements involved in current civil emergency planning, to explore any possible gaps in present provisions, and to consider what practical means could be found to meet any deficiencies’ (Home Office, 1988). The Home Office received approximately 70 full responses. To discuss the issues, the Civil Emergencies Seminar was organised at the Civil

3) During this period, the Home Office was the principal central government department of emergency management in England & Wales.
Defence College (now the Emergency Planning College) between 23 and 25 November 1988. The Home Office finally reported the conclusions of the seminar as follows (Home Office, 1989):

- Any idea of a ‘national disaster team’ is rejected because the system is not only expensive to maintain, but also slow to respond to disasters.
- The arrangements for dealing with civil emergencies should be decentralised at a local level and for this, more coordination between the various services encouraged and developed.
- It is viewed as unnecessary to place a statutory duty on local authorities to plan for peacetime emergencies since they have already undertaken a planning activity without such legislation.
- The ‘lead government’ concepts remain valid, which conducts co-ordination of central government departments.

This Review subsequently resulted in the appointment of a Civil Emergencies Adviser to implement the conclusions. The Adviser reported directly to the Home Secretary, and was supported by not only a Secretariat within the Home Office (in conjunction with the Cabinet Office) but also the Emergency Planning College4) (Pine, 1995). The Civil Emergencies Adviser’s task was to assist all organisations having operational responsibilities to help accomplish the highest standards of coordination and compatibility between their contingency plans and arrangements (Handmer & Parker, 1991, 1992).

**Emergency Planning Review of 1991**

In addition to an unprecedented series of civilian disasters in the late 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet Union (the end of the Cold War) and greatly improved East-West relations in Europe in the early 1990s also promoted another review, removing the immediate threat of military conflict and nuclear war. In particular, there was also a long standing (re-ignited) debate over placing a statutory duty on local authorities to deal with civil emergencies. The Civil Contingencies Adviser published his first report regarding such an issue. However, the Home Secretary did not implement the recommendations of his adviser. Instead, he required a closer relationship between contingency arrangements for civil defence and peacetime emergencies, and further argued that this could be best achieved by

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4) After the Review of 1989, the name of the Civil Defence College was changed into the Emergency Planning College to embody the new realm of peacetime emergency planning.
adopting an integrated approach to emergency management (Coles, 1998).

The 1991 review finally led to the promulgation of the concept of Integrated Emergency Management (IEM), and this concept was made explicit by the first edition of the Home Office official guidance, ‘Dealing with Disasters (1992)’ (Hills, 1998). The driving forces behind the 1989 and 1991 reviews was to secure best value for money through integrating contingency plans for civil defence and peacetime emergencies into all-hazard approach regardless of the cause. This drive led to the adoption of the Civil Defence (General Local Authority Functions) Regulations 1993, which removed the need for local authorities to plan specifically for nuclear war.

Emergency Planning Review of 1997

In 1997, the change of government from Conservative to Labour and the Comprehensive Spending Review precipitated the third review (Coles, 1998). The 1997 review was started by a Home Office consultation document entitled ‘The Future Role and Funding of Local Civil Protection in England and Wales’ (Home Office, 1997). The consultation document was also sent to all local authorities in England and Wales, but resulted in little conspicuous change (Norman & Coles, 1998). With the end of the Cold war and the increasing number of civilian disasters, civil defence increasingly became a marginal preoccupation. However, the permissive powers (in contrast to a statutory duty), and the general and moral responsibility of care that local authorities owed to their residents were still considered an adequate legislative framework for peacetime emergency planning.

Emergency Planning Review of 2001 to 2002

A major review of the legislative basis of emergency management was reinitiated in February 2001, which was promoted by the four major events (O’Brien, 2006). The first was the Millennium Bug problem, which demonstrated that the British Government lacked formal powers to require private organisations to test their computers within the existing legislative framework. The second was the flood events in 1999 and 2000, which showed there was a lack of coordination and integration of emergency planning between major utility operators and transportation bodies. The third was the fuel crisis in 2000, which proved that the UK fuel infrastructure was vulnerable to disruptive actions. For example, local authorities found themselves implementing ‘essential user’ rationing at petrol station without a clear statutory basis for doing so (Hennessy, 2001). The final and most serious one
was the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak of 2001, which demonstrated that contingency plans of the government departments in charge were inadequate to deal with this scale and intensity of the crisis. The Epidemic caused approximately six million animals to be culled at a cost of over £3bn.

The 2001 review resulted in a consultation document, named ‘Emergency Planning Review: the Future of Emergency Planning in England and Wales in August 2001’ (Cabinet Office, 2001). In this document, central government finally admitted hat the Civil Defence Act 1948, which underpinned UK’s emergency management, did not provide adequate legislation framework any more for contemporary emergency management in England and Wales (Walker & Broderick, 2006). The consultation period commenced on the eve of 9/11, and thus, the 9/11 terrorist attack in the USA also added strong impetus to the review process. The consultation period ended in October 2001, and in February 2002, the results of the consultation, ‘The Future of Emergency Planning in England and Wales: Results of the Consultation’, were published under the leadership of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (Cabinet Office, 2002a). Responses firmly supported the clean sweep of the consultation paper. Consequently, the Blair government declared that a new Civil Contingencies Bill would be introduced, replacing the old civil defence-based legislation with a far-reaching legislative framework. The Bill was also anticipated to combine all of the types of civil emergency including terrorist attacks (Smith, 2003).

**Civil Contingencies Secretariat**

In July 2001, during the consultation period, the lead responsibility has been transferred from the Home Office to the newly established Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) within the Cabinet Office. The main purpose of the CCS (still in existence under the current Civil Contingencies Act 2004) is to ‘ensure that the UK and its communities remain a safe and secure place to live and work, by effectively identifying and managing the risk of emergencies, and maintaining world-class capabilities to respond to and recover from emergencies’ (UK Resilience, 2008a), through combining responsibilities diffused over different government departments. At present, the EPC, the leading centre in the UK for emergency management and civil protection training with a multi-agency focus, is under oversight of the Director of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (UK Resilience, 2008b).

The Civil Contingencies Secretariat, staffed by approximately 123 members (House of Commons, 19 April 2002), supports the Prime Minister and the Cabinet
Office with regard to civil protection issues. The Director is responsible for the
day-to-day management of the organisation, and reports directly to the Permanent
Secretary, Intelligence, Security and Resilience within the Cabinet Office, which
was also newly created in June 2002. As its title suggests, the role of this office
is to advise the Prime Minister as the Security Adviser on security, intelligence
and emergency related matters, and secure effective coordination between
government departments and with other international and domestic partners.

CIVIL CONTINGENCIES ACT 2004

Overview

The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) is currently the legal framework for UK
emergency management, repealing outdated legislation such as the Emergency Powers
Act 1920, and the Civil Defence Act 1948 (For details, refer to Schedule 3 -
Repeals and Revocations of the Civil Contingencies Act). The Civil Contingencies
Act 2004 is basically founded on the concept of Integrated Emergency Managemen
t5), which comprises six interconnected activities: ‘anticipation’, ‘assessment’,
‘prevention’, ‘preparation’, ‘response’, and ‘recovery’. The first four activities are
covered by the official guidance, ‘Emergency Preparedness (Cabinet Office 2005a)’. The
last two ones are handled by the official guidance, ‘Emergency Response and
Recovery (Cabinet Office, 2005b)’.

The Civil Contingencies Act consists of three parts. Part I of the Act covers
‘local arrangements for civil protection against emergency’, and defines ‘emergency’
as follows:

- An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a
  place in the United Kingdom, which involves, causes or may cause: a) loss of
  human life, b) human illness or injury, c) homelessness, d) damage to property,
  e) disruption of a supply of money, food, water, emergency or fuel, f) disruption
  of a system of communication, g) disruption of facilities for
  transport, or h) disruption of services relating to health.
- An event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a
  place in the United Kingdom, which involves, causes or may cause: a)

5) In the UK, IEM has been already adopted since emergency planning review of 1991 as mentioned
above.
contamination of land, water or air with biological, chemical or radioactive matter, or b) disruption of destruction of plant life or animal life.

- War, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK.

Part I establishes a clear set of roles and responsibilities for those involved (local responders) in emergency preparation and response at the local level. The Civil Contingencies Act categorises local responders into two types: Category 1 and 2 Responders, imposing a different set of direct duties on each. Here, there are the two root and branch reforms (Walker & Broderick, 2006); the British government firstly recognises the involvement of the general public as essential to the validity and reliability of the civil protection process from the perspective of two-way risk communication\(^6\). Secondly, the duty of promoting business continuity management (BCM) for not only Category 1 responders but also local businesses is also acknowledged and enacted.

Category 1 responders are listed in Schedule 1 to the Act, and usually those local organisations at the core of emergency response such as ‘Local authorities’, ‘Police forces’, ‘British Transport Police’, ‘Fire and rescue authorities’, ‘Ambulance services’, etc. Their common duties are (Cabinet Office, 2005b: 82):

- To assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform emergency planning and business continuity planning;
- To put in place emergency plans;
- To put in place business continuity plans;
- To put in place arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency;
- To share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination;
- To cooperate with other local responders to enhance coordination and efficiency; and
- To provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about business continuity management (local authorities only, but they are also required to work with other Category 1 and 2 responders in discharging this duty\(^7\)).

\(^6\) This is based on recommendations from public inquiries by Lords Phillips (BSE) and Cullen (Ladbroke Grove rail crash), which emphasised improvement of risk management and communication with the public (Cabinet Office, 2002b). Similarly, Korea suffered from the BSE conflict in 2008 and thus, this view is likely to be relevant to a Korean context as well.

\(^7\) For instance, the police will give advice and assistance in relation to crime and security issues,
Category 2 responders are also listed in Schedule 1. They are coordinating organisations such as ‘Electricity distributors and transmitters’, ‘Gas distributors’, ‘Water and sewerage undertakers’, ‘Telephone service providers, fixed and mobile’, ‘Railway operators’, ‘Airport operators’, etc. Their duties are to cooperate and share pertinent information with other Category 1 and 2 responders.


Emergency Preparedness Arrangements under the Civil Contingencies Act

Local Level

Category 1 and 2 responders are required to cooperate and share information with other Category 1 and 2 responders and relevant organisations under the Civil Contingencies Act. The principal mechanism for this multi-agency cooperation and information sharing at the stage of preparedness is the Local Resilience Forum (LRF). LRF is not a statutory body, but a process by which responders with duties under the Act cooperate with one another. Therefore, LRF does not have any powers to direct its members. Each LRF (with the exception of London) is formed on a police area basis, and thus there are 42 LRFs across England and Wales except London. Its principal goal is to ensure effective implementation of category 1 and 2 responders’ legal duties, through a combined and coordinated multi-agency approach. Also, Community Risk Register (CRR) in a local resilience area needs to be published by each LRF as a requirement of the CCA and its associated regulations. LRFs are traditionally chaired by the local police force8), and the task of providing secretariat to the LRF is decided locally by its members.

8) However, there is no requirement for the LRF to follow this tradition. The choice can be made by its members.
Regional Level

Another major change under the Civil Contingencies Act is that a new regional tier, an aspect of central movement, has been introduced with a focus on a regional role in terms of both planning and response with regard to civil protection. The key role of the regional tier is to provide a single line of coordination and communication between a local area and central government, or with other regions when an emergency could overwhelm any local level in the region. The principal mechanism for this multi-agency cooperation and information sharing at the regional level is the Regional Resilience Forum (RRF). Likewise, an RRF is not a statutory body, and it does not own any powers to direct its members. Membership of RRFs is drawn from representatives of category 1 and 2 responders at each local area in a region. They may also include representatives of central government departments including the CCS. However, the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) is not subordinate to the RRF, which in turn is not commanded or controlled by central government. The task of chairing the RRFs in England falls to the Regional Director of the Government Office (GO). Currently, the secretariat to RRFs is provided by the Regional Resilience Team9) (RRT), located within each Government Office in the nine English regions: North East, North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, East, East Midlands, West Midlands, Southeast, Southwest, and London.

Central Government Level

At a central government level, a Minister of the Crown is granted a range of powers under Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act, which are classified into three types (Cabinet Office, 2005a:163): ‘Legislative powers’, ‘Urgent direction powers’, and ‘Monitoring powers’. In most cases, those powers will be exercised by a Minister with lead responsibility for civil protection at the local level, namely a Minister of the Lead Government Department (LGD).

- Legislative powers; amending the Regulations which manage the main duties, requiring a Category 1 or 2 responder to perform a given function in an emergency, and amending the list of Category 1 and 2 responders (subject to the approval of the both Houses of Parliament);
- Urgent direction powers: issuing urgent directions10) to require action to be

9) Since April 2003, RRTs have been operational in each of the GOs.
10) An urgent direction must be in writing, though it could arrive by fax or e-mail. The direction
taken at the local level in case of urgency, where there is not sufficient time to make legislation;

- Monitoring powers\textsuperscript{11): requesting information about actions taken by Category 1 and 2 responders with regard to the implementation of their statutory duties, also demanding an explanation as to why local responders have not taken action to comply with their duties.

\textit{London}

London is unique and different from elsewhere. London has a ‘regional’ police force, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and hence, it is not appropriate to base LRFs on a police area. The London boroughs are grouped into six LRFs: Central London, North Central London, North East London, South East London, South West London, and West London. At a region level, London also has a London Regional Resilience Forum (LRRF). The LRRF is chaired by a Government Minister, and the London Mayor takes on the role of deputy chair (London Resilience, 2009). The London Resilience Team (LRT), based within the Government Office for London, is expected to give the secretariat support to LRRF. The relationship between the LRRF and the six Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) operates in a more hierarchical way in order to ensure that all of the LRFs operate consistently across London as whole, unlike the model elsewhere.

\textbf{Emergency Response \& Recovery Arrangements under the Civil Contingencies Act}

\textit{Local Level}

A majority of emergencies in the UK are managed by local responders at local level without interference by central government (Cabinet Office, 2005b). Emergency response and recovery phases at the local level are managed by the common protocol for all responding organisations, namely the Gold, Silver and Bronze model. This can be summarised as follows (Cabinet Office, 2005b):

\begin{itemize}
  \item [\textsuperscript{11)}] If the Minister thinks that they have failed to comply with their obligations under the CCA, he or she can file legal proceedings against them in the High Court. Likewise, Category 1 or 2 responders can take court action against another responder, who fails to reasonably carry out its main duties.
\end{itemize}
• Bronze (operational): At this level, command and control of task-level work is undertaken at the scene of an incident. The bronze arrangement will be usually enough to tackle most of the emergencies at the local level. In most cases at the bronze level, the police will assume the responsibility of coordinating the entire response operation.

• Silver (tactical): At this level, there is a need to ensure that the Bronze arrangements will be co-ordinated and supported to maximize their effectiveness. Each Silver commander has agency-specific responsibilities, and also must establish the overall multi-agency management of the incident in liaison with other silver commanders. Silver commanders might become involved in the detailed operational tasks delivered by a Bronze commander, only when there is an urgent need.

• Gold (strategic): At this level, a wide-area, high impact emergency is imminent, or happens. The Gold level will be implemented, in most cases, through the multi-agency ‘Strategic Co-ordinating Group’ (SCG), usually referred to as ‘Gold’. The SCG is chaired by the police, and does not have the power to command or control its members. Each member agency retains its own responsibility and takes control of its own operations. The role of the SGG is to ensure that the agreed strategic aims and objectives are effectively implemented at the Silver and Bronze levels.

The Role of the Police at the Local Level

The police coordinate most emergency response activities of other responding agencies. However, this does not mean that the police can direct other organisations’ activities. Each organisation remains autonomous and exercises command and control of its own resources and personnel. The police’s agency specific roles can be summarised as follows:

• Co-ordination12) of activities at the scene: the police coordinate the activities of other responding agencies.

• Evacuation of the area: the police will normally recommend evacuation, and define the area to be evacuated. Their recommendation will be made in conjunction with other responders. For instance, the police will be informed about risks or hazards associated with fire, explosion and contamination by the fire service.

• Facilitation of search and rescue: search and rescue is the primary role of fire

12) If terrorist action is suspected, the police will take on overall control of the scene instead.
and rescue services. However, survivors or casualties may not always be located in the close proximity of a disaster scene. They ought to search the surrounding area, and in this case, the police will normally coordinate search activities.

- Establishment of control cordons round the affected area: the police will set up the control cordons in consultation with other emergency services and specialists.
- Preservation of evidence at the scene of crime: when a criminal act is suspected, the police investigation\(^ {13} \) will commence, collecting criminal evidence at the disaster scene.
- Diversion of city traffic: the police will usually manage traffic around the scene.
- Establishment of a casualty bureau to deal with enquires; it is a police function to establish a casualty bureau. Family Liaison Officers, whose job is to provide information and support to the bereaved, will be also provided by the local police force.
- Media liaison: with regard to a particular type of emergency, a lead responder for warning, informing and advising the public is identified and arranged beforehand by the local responders. In many instances, the role of a lead responder is likely to fall on the police force on account of their coordinating role.

### Regional Level

At a regional level, Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) might be convened to promote and deliver multi-agency coordination in emergency response and recovery, when an emergency cannot be contained with a single locality (e.g. when several local Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (SCG) are set up within a region) (Cabinet Office, 2005b). RCCCs will observe the principle of subsidiarity, which means that a local decision should be first taken at the local level. Consequently RCCCs will not interfere with local command and control arrangements, unless specifically authorised to do so by emergency regulations. RCCCs are also chaired by the Regional Director of the GO. As with Regional Resilience Forums (RRF), the secretariat support will be given to RCCCs by the Regional Resilience Teams (RRT).

\(^ {13} \) Once life-saving activity is finished, the site will be preserved as a crime scene until demonstrated otherwise.
Central Government Level

At a central government level, where the dimensions of an emergency are so vast and complex that central government’s coordination and support are crucial a pre-designated Lead Government Department (LGD) will become responsible for the overall management and coordination of the central government response (Cabinet Office, 2005b). A pre-designated list of LGDs and their responsibilities is maintained and updated by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS). The CCS will designate one department as the LGD where the emergency is too far-reaching to be managed by a single department, or the LGD is unclear from the list. Again, the basic principle is that most of the emergencies in the UK are dealt with by local responders, and hence, central government does not replicate the role of Category 1 and 2 responders.

Three levels of LGD response requiring the involvement of the UK central government are identified as follows (Cabinet Office, 2004, 2005c):

- Level 1 (significant): The LGD remains responsible for leading the central government coordination.
- Level 2 (serious): The central government coordination will be led from the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR14) under the leadership of the LGD.
- Level 3 (catastrophic): The central government coordination will be led from the COBR under the leadership of the Prime Minister.

The central government’s crisis management machinery takes place in COBR. The Prime Minister, Home Secretary or another senior Minister will normally chair the COBR meetings involving other Ministers and senior officials from relevant government departments. When a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) has been set up and a UK central government response is critical, a Government Liaison Team (GLT) from the Government Office or the LGD will be placed within the SGG. For terrorist events, a Home Office-led GLT will be dispatched. The GLT15 will be the main communication channel between COBR and the scene.

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14) The term COBR is used both for the actual designated facilities within the Cabinet Office and for the Civil Contingencies Committee itself, which takes place there.
15) For emergencies without a police lead, or where there is a need to communicate more widely with other police forces, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) will be the communication channel between central government and local police forces.
In London, the SCG is nearly the same as the RCCC. In practice, in emergencies with a police lead (e.g. terrorist attacks), the group is usually called the SCG, whilst in non police-led events, it will be referred to as the RCCC. In a major emergency, the LRT will also give the secretariat support to the SCG or the RCCC.

SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSION

In the UK, contemporary emergency management received official recognition in the Civil Defence Act 1948, which focused on civil defence activity, preparing for hostile (nuclear) attacks from an enemy. However, with an increasing number of civilian disasters and the demise of the Cold war in the late 1980s and early 1990s, civil defence activity radically evolved into peacetime emergency planning. Nevertheless, there was still no statutory duty for that peacetime emergency planning, and the (outdated) Civil Defence Act 1948 had been the only funding source afforded by central government. Following the Millennium bug problem, the severe flooding, the fuel crisis, and the Foot and Mouth disease in the early 2000s, however central government officially acknowledged that the Act 1948 was not adequate to deal with newly-emerging threats including Chemical, Biological, Radiological, & Nuclear (CBRN) events. As a consequence, the Blair government introduced the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA), repealing the outdated pieces of legislation. Seven suggestions can be presented from UK civil protection development as below:

- Integration of legislation: the definition of ‘emergency’ under the CCA is far-reaching, and combines both civil defence emergency planning and peace-time emergency planning as Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) emphasises the response itself rather than the cause of the incident.
- Coordination and cooperation between responding agencies: Category 1 and 2 responders are required to work together at all of the stages of emergency preparedness and response (multi-agency planning\(^\text{16}\)), training, and exercising, and joint press briefings, etc). The mechanism between response agencies should be based on cooperation and coordination.

\(^{16}\) For example, the police must develop and exercise a multi-agency evacuation plan in partnership with local authorities, the fire brigade, the ambulance service, and transport organisations since the entire evacuation may be not feasible without their cooperation.
• Reinforcement of emergency response at the local level: Most emergencies are first managed by local responders at the local level, as they know the local geography, and thus, can respond easily and quickly. Only when the scale of an emergency’s consequences overwhelms them, aids from regional tier or central government will be provided.

• Public participation in civil protection activity: the CCA emphasises the significance of the public, as their involvement is essential to the validity and reliability of civil protection process in terms of two-way risk communication.

• Promotion of BCM: the CCA calls on Category 1 responders to maintain their own Business Continuity Plan (BCP) to ensure that they can reasonably carry out their duties in the event of an emergency. The CCA further places the duty of promoting BCM for local businesses on local authorities. However, this duty is also discharged in partnership with other category 1 and 2 responders.

• Interoperable response protocol: all of the responding organisations use the Gold, Silver, and Bronze model, keeping interoperability. In this case, the Gold commanders usually provide advice on strategy, and are not directly involved in operational level unless there is an urgent need.

• Multi-agency training facilities: the EPC, the only national training facility operated by the CCS, provides training courses and seminars concerning emergency planning and business continuity, noticeably with a multi-agency focus.

The best practice requires the cross-cultural synthesis of many national approaches to emergency management. In this context, the paper does not claim that UK emergency management system can be lifted from the UK and apply to threats and dangers face by South Korea. However, the aforementioned suggestions can be generally applied to Korean emergency management, especially when it comes to policing disaster; firstly, as the police’ role as a coordinator in social conflicts is also acknowledged in Korea, it might be appropriate that the police coordinate (not command and control) all of the response activities at the local level.

Secondly, the police need to combine their disaster preparedness and responses, for example, creation of a single emergency number; the response to terrorist

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17) During Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the New Orleans Police Department suffered from the destruction of essential elements of the police infrastructure, and the breakdown of police communication and transportation systems (Deflem & Sutphin, 2009). This clearly shows the importance of BCPs as key response agencies themselves.

18) The Korean emergency management system has also adopted IEM, but it still seems to lack key factors of IEM (SERI, 2005).

19) In Korea, the 112 emergency telephone number is for police and the 119 number for medical
attacks is treated as separate from disaster response in Korea, although the essence of the responses are exactly the same in the context of IEM. This change should be supported by other organisations such as Korea National Intelligence Service and Korea National Emergency Management Agency, but also with a change of legislation, if appropriate.

Thirdly, police investigation in Korea seems to be focused on applying Criminal Law to cases in order to charge and prosecute people and thus, does not provide a comprehensive approach to the underlying causes of disasters including organisational management failures (KNPU, 2008). It needs to move toward finding those underlying causes of disasters.

Fourthly, the Korea National Police Agency should have a better understanding of the needs of victims’ relatives, i.e. the rights of the bereaved. The introduction of a ‘family liaison officer’ and subsequent the ‘friends’ and relatives’ reception centre’ (LESLP, 2007) might be needed.

Fifthly, the police usually stress the importance of maintaining security, and combating crime around the disaster site. However, given that the priority of the police during disasters is to save and protect life, the police need to be functionally orientated toward protecting ‘public safety’ rather than just maintaining ‘public order’.

Finally, for emergency planning and response to be effective, there must be inter-organisational and inter-operable communication, planning, exercises, etc. between the responding organisations. The police should develop their emergency response plans or manuals, and conduct subsequent exercises in partnership with other organisations. One of the preconditions is that all of the responding organisations share the agreed command and control model (like the Gold, Silver, and Bronze model in the UK).

Emergency management can be compared with an ‘archipelago’ (Jones & Hood, 1996) where each island shows its own particular characteristics. Just as it is impossible to show the characteristics of the archipelago by explaining the island in isolation, it is unfeasible to manage entire emergency management system by one agency. In disaster preparedness, response, and recovery, all of the agencies go hand in hand, and their arrangements should be supported and coordinated by or with other agencies, based on the concept of coordination and cooperation. Therefore, emergency preparation and response arrangements should be integrated within and between responding organisations, consequently assimilating their roles and duties to some extent.

and fire emergencies.
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