A Comparative Analysis of Democracy, Respect For Human Rights, and Democratic Policing Reforms in Turkey and Fourteen Nations

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This study is a cross-national exploration of the relation between democratic policing reforms and assessments of democracy and respect for human rights in Turkey and fourteen nations. It is based on the rich qualitative case studies of police organizational structures in these 15 countries, unique data made available in Turkey, comparative analyses of different types of regimes, reports of governmental and non-governmental international organizations, and other secondary data analyses. The research seeks an understanding of two research questions: (1) To what degree are democratic policing reforms associated with the level of democracy and respect for human rights in a given country? (2) Which specific democratic policing reforms are most likely to be associated with higher levels of democracy and respect for human rights? With Turkey and each of 14 other countries, we find a significant role in the rise of democratic policing reforms and assessments of the level of democracy and respect for human rights.

Comparative analyses of democracy have given insufficient attention to police and policing organizations (Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007; Marenin, 2000; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). Analyses of democracy by international organizations, scholars, and human rights activists have become sophisticated and shrewdly look beyond proclamations of democracy, to reflect on the reality of daily life. These realities include obvious, ordinary daily actions of police in citizen’s lives, such as arresting or detaining individuals, protecting voting and speech rights, protecting elected officials from violence, and so forth (e.g., Bayley, 1997, 2006). But little attention has been given to police and policing organizations and their role in promoting democracy, ignoring the police as an obvious coercive power of the state (Das, 2000).

Similarly, analyses of police and democratic policing reforms by criminal justice scholars have given far too little attention to cross-national analyses of the relation of police practices to democracy and respect for human rights. Scholars
have come to define “democratic policing reforms” as a variety of policing reforms intended to lower crime rates, diminish bribery and corruption, end brutality, and maximize community satisfaction with organizational reforms such as problem-oriented and community-oriented policing. These scholars have identified basic tenets of democratic policing, such as an emphasis on the rule of law, public accountability, open and public decision-making, minimal use of force, public involvement, respect for human rights, and internal organizational democracy (e.g., Das, 2000). While rich case studies of individual countries has emerged (e.g., Das, 2000; Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007; Kratcoski, 2000; Marenin, 2000; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006; Stone & Ward, 2000), the analyses leave as untested their assumption that democratic policing reforms may help to improve the respect for human rights and democracy.

This study is a cross-national exploration of the relation between democratic policing reforms and assessments of levels of democracy and respect for human rights. It is based on many case studies of police organizational structures in 15 countries, with some emphasis on Turkey with unique data made available to these researchers. But while some case studies are more historical (e.g., pre-democratic policing in Turkey in Caglar, 2004; Cao & Burton, 2006; Mutlu, 2000), we sought out case studies detailing democratic policing organizations. This analysis also builds on comparative analyses of different types of regimes, reports of governmental and non-governmental international organizations, and other secondary data analyses by Freedom House and others. The research seeks an understanding of two research questions: (1) To what degree are democratic policing reforms associated with assessments of the level of democracy and respect for human rights? (2) Which specific democratic policing reforms are most likely to be associated with higher assessed levels of democracy and respect for human rights? Our analysis reveals a significant role in the rise of democratic policing reforms and the assessed levels of democracy and respect for human rights.

We are limited in our analysis by the secondary data employed, as well as the definitions of democracy, democratic policing, and operationalized variables that are culled from the literature. For example, the secondary data we use was not designed specifically for our study, thus, we can only use the data to help general arguments or shed light on commonly accepted perspectives. Our use of “democracy” is limited by the hegemony of political scientists that has emerged surrounding the ideas of Robert Dahl (e.g., 1989) and a 3-part definition including: competition (popular election), participation (open accountability of government), and political liberties (freedom to vote, dissent, associate, move, and to due process of law). Similarly, our use of “democratic policing” is limited by the hegemony of criminal justice scholars noted above (e.g., Das, 2000). The ambiguities of “democratic policing” also limit our operational definitions of the variables. This analysis does not seek to produce some perfect model to meet the conflicting expecta-
tions of all scholars and readers. Further, we recognize that police organizations can only be transformed when the society it serves is transformed as well (e.g., Goldsmith, 1999). With these limits in mind, we hope to shed light on police organizational characteristics that relate to democratic, human rights-oriented societies.

LITERATURE, DATA & METHODOLOGY

Our research seeks to explore two questions: First, to what degree are democratic policing practices correlated with democracy in a given country? Second, which specific policing applications are most likely to be correlated to high levels of democracy, especially with respect to human rights? Measurement was based on a mixture of secondary data analysis, content analysis and a literature review. To answer the first question, three steps were followed: (a) the data on democratic countries was collected from Freedom House, The Survey of Freedom; (b) data on democratic policing practices were compiled into a literature review, and a data set based on cross-national comparative research, field studies, and so forth were designed by using simple content analysis techniques; and (c) data on democracy and data on democratic policing were compared in a scatter plot diagram. To answer the second question, data sets on democratic policing will be compared with data imported from The Political Terror Scale of Purdue University.

Data and Conceptualization of Democracy

According to Sorensen (1998), eight institutions or conditions are physical manifestations of the different ideological characteristics of democracies: competition, participation, and civil and political liberties as human rights. The concept of human rights includes civil and political rights, as well as, according to Western thought, economic, social and cultural rights. In order to measure democracy, Sorensen believed that given the framework of the criteria listed above, the best instrument to measure democracy today lies in the Freedom House Index. He asserted that this index is very useful because it uses one dimension to measure competition and participation, and one dimension for civil liberties. Consequently it addresses all three of ideological characteristics of democracy (Sorensen, 1998).

Further, since the purpose of this research is to discover whether a correlation exists between democratic policing and democracy, we believe that the Freedom House Index is best used to represent the reality of daily life. That daily life includes an interaction between police, and the community, for it is the police who protect and defend the civil and political rights of the people.
Measurement of Democracy

The Freedom House Index is a product of The Survey of Freedom designed by Freedom House, a non-governmental international organization. Since 1955, Freedom House has monitored the progress and decline of the political rights and liberties of 192 nations and several major related and disputed territories. The Survey of Freedom evaluates political rights and civil liberties around the world, and reviews a country’s freedom by examining its record in the areas of political rights and civil liberties. The survey is based on the principle that a country grants its citizens political rights when it permits them to form political parties that represent a significant portion of the range of voter choice, and when the leaders of those parties can openly compete for and be elected to positions of power of government. The survey is also based on the principle that a country upholds its citizens’ civil liberties when it respects and protects their religious, ethnic, economic, linguistic, and other rights. These also include gender and family rights, personal reforms, and freedoms of the press, of belief and of association (Freedom in the World 2001-2002, p.10).

The survey rates each country on a seven-point scale for both political rights and civil liberties. One on the scale represents a high degree of freedom, and seven a low degree of freedom, these scores are combined to form three more general categories. “Free” countries are those, which receive a rating of less than three. “Partly Free” countries are rated from three to just less than five. “Not Free” countries have a rating of below three.

The Freedom House Index utilizes a seven-point scale to represent the level of democracy a country has achieved, which we also used. However, for the purpose of this study, the Freedom House scale was inverted so that "7," the highest number on the scale, corresponds to the highest level of democracy a country can achieve. The lowest level of democracy a country can achieve was represented as "1." By recoding the Freedom House scale, we sought a more meaningful visual presentation of our comparisons between the Freedom House Index and other measures of democracy. Hereafter, this index will be presented as the "Inverted Freedom House Index."

Reliability and Validity of Data

According to the Freedom House “Freedom in the World 2001-2002” report, these ratings are not only reviews of the conduct of governments, but they are also intended to reflect the reality of life. It is also said that by compiling these ratings, a
country with a benign government that faces violent forces that oppose open society will be graded on the basis of the actual on-the-ground conditions that indicate whether the population is able to exercise its freedoms. It is also asserted that this survey enables scholars and policy makers both to assess the direction of global change annually, and to examine trends in freedom over time. Scholars can also make comparisons across regions with varying political systems (Freedom in the World 2001-2002, p.10).

In our study, fifteen countries were selected from among the 192 countries included in the Freedom House Index. We were limited, in part, by the availability of case studies of police and policing organizations in representative countries. Data on policing and democratic practices in policing were collected from case studies focused on democratic police practices in each respective country as well as the available comparative studies on major criminal justice systems, policing, law enforcement, and social control. Case studies on civilian oversight systems were also used in addition to a European Survey of Selected Police Organizations (Becker, 1980), and the available annual country reports of Amnesty International (Amnesty International Country Reports 1999-2000-2001).

Conceptualization of Democratic Policing

Following the hegemony of the criminal justice literature (e.g., Bayley, 2006; Das, 2000; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006; Stone & Ward, 2001), democratic policing was characterized by the institutionalization of the rule of law; accountability to the public (accountability); transparency of decision making (responsiveness); popular participation in policing (representativeness); minimum use of force; creating an organization that facilitates the learning of human rights (responsiveness); and internal democracy of the organization. These concepts were outlined by Das in evaluation of the findings of the symposium, “Theme of Challenges of Policing Democracies,” held at the Institute of Sociology of Law, Spain, May 17-20, 1995. In this symposium, officials from the field and scholars from thirteen countries participated in discussions on the definition and conceptualization of democratic policing (Das, 2000). Das’ conceptualization of democratic policing conforms to other literature in the field and is consistent with assertions found in the 2001 report of the Vera Institute of Justice (Stone and Ward, 2000).

These concepts of democratic policing were operationalized, according to a review of the literature. A total of twenty-four democratic policing practices were identified. However, while collecting data on the operational variables from the sources indicated above, the data regarding half of those variables was either not available for the countries selected for this research or was insufficient to evaluate.
Those variables were eliminated and, thus, fourteen variables were examined. These variables are: centralization/decentralization, representativeness, community policing, problem-oriented policing, ombudsman, oversight performed by legislatures, elected officials or the courts, civilian oversight by non-governmental organizations, civilian complaint boards, internal police control, effective disciplinary structure, use of advanced technology for the investigation of crime, unionism, use of force training, and human rights training.

In addition to those, media-police relations were evaluated separately to understand the degree to which the inner workings of police were visible to the public. This assessment was based in a general analysis of the tendency of police organizations to give detailed information about general operations (namely those that do not involve intelligence work) to the media. The degree to which police responded to media feedback in general was also evaluated. Responsiveness to the public was another democratic policing variable quoted by many scholars. At the beginning, we intended to add this variable and measure it with availability of 911 or similar emergency telephone systems. However, after the initial screening it was realized that every police agency has such systems but their effectiveness were not argued enough. Therefore, it was omitted.

Measurement of Democratic Policing

The operational variables of democratic policing were applied to a simple content analysis process as defined by Zito, who established a system to tally, or “count up,” how many variables are present in a given policing system (Zito, 1974). These variables are defined later in this work. Suffice it to say that the absence of a particular variable will result in a count of “0.” A “1” will be given if it is present, while analyzing the variables for the purposes of this research, it was idealized that the presence of each variable would be verified using at least three different sources. However, very obvious and easy to identify variables will be counted based on one source. These include centralization/decentralization, unionism, internal police control and the presence of ombudsman. On the other hand, in two countries, data sources were inconsistent regarding one of the variables. In these cases, majority reports will be assumed as final. In terms of the meaning and the scope of these operational variables, the most commonly accepted definitions of each variable are enclosed at the end of this work.

Comparing Democratic Policing with Democracy

To cross-tabulate democratic policing with democracy and respect for human
rights, measurements were based on the reports of non-governmental organizations like Freedom House, Transparency International, and World Bank, as well as governmental agencies like the U.S. State Department, European Commission, and European Parliament. These sources have been proven by researchers to be relatively unbiased in their reports (e.g., Poe, et al, 2001).

Additionally, based on the Political Terror Scale (PTS) of Purdue University, countries were coded on a scale of 1-5 according to the level of certain variables in the previous year, according to Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department Reports. “Level 1” countries had a secure rule of law, no political imprisonment, and torture was extremely rare. “Level 2” countries had a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity, torture was unusual, and political murder was rare. “Level 3” countries had widespread political imprisonment, torture and brutality was common, and there was unlimited detention with or without trial for political views. “Level 4” countries experienced murders, disappearances, and torture as a common way of life. “Level 5” countries had an extended level of violence among all populations (Gibney & Dalton, 1996). Note that there were some problems in use of this scale, e.g., several countries, including Sweden, Australia, Netherlands, and USA, were not added to the scale. But their exclusion from the PTS was that reports on these countries did not reveal violations enough to code, thus, we assumed their scores of “level 1.”

Reliability and Generalizability

Multiple sources were used in the analysis. Whenever possible, information was verified using three different sources on the same variable. Coding and scoring was controlled and corrected by at least two of the authors, with discussion over any disagreement, resulting in a 100% inter-rater reliability in scoring. The generalizability of the study is enhanced by the cross-nationality of analyses, based on the rich field studies, case analyses, and comparative studies prepared by the experts in the field and reputable scholars.

ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION

Democracy Ratings in Fifteen Selected Countries

First, for our “snapshot picture” and analysis of fifteen countries, we used the Freedom House Index Classification of Free Countries for 2002, classifying the fifteen countries selected for this study in Table 1 by measures of freedom.
Table 1: Comparative Measures of Freedom (Inverted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political Rights</th>
<th>Civil Rights</th>
<th>Freedom Rating</th>
<th>Freedom Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United-Kingdom</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY (2002)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY (2005)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data are excerpted from Freedom House, *Freedom In the World 2001-2002* [inverted], and *Freedom In the World Country Ratings 1972-2006, Freedom House Index (2006)* [inverted].

According to Table 1, four countries were classified as democratic countries with the top rating of “7” (Australia, Netherlands, Sweden, and USA). Six countries were classified as democratic countries with a rating of “6.5,” including France, Hungary, Japan, Slovenia, South Africa and the United Kingdom. One country, Brazil, was classified as partly democratic with a rating of “5.” Columbia was classified as partly democratic with a rating of “4.” Russia was classified as partly democratic with a rating of “3.” China was classified as not democratic with a rating of “1.5,” and Saudi Arabia was also classified as not democratic with a rating of “1.”

Of course, our “snapshot” analysis of country measure of freedom is subject to change, as we note in Table 1 with Turkey in 2002 and 2006. Compared with its ratings in 2002, Turkey improved “1.5” points in its 2006 Freedom House ratings even though the country is still rated as “partly free.” According to Freedom House,
Freedom in the World: Country Report: Turkey (2005), the ratings of human rights in Turkey improved from 2002 to 2006 as a result of major reforms, including: (1) the first-time-ever change in a 78-year old penal code; (2) civilian control of the military; (3) minority language broadcasts in mass-media; and (4) a decrease in torture cases. Recent human rights reforms in Turkey were also expressly welcomed by the European Union (EU). Turkey’s commitment to reforms and to membership in the EU seems to be a driving force behind human rights reforms, which ensures greater success in transforming all layers of the state including the Turkish National Police. For example, Turkey’s new “zero-tolerance” policy concerning torture seems to work; reports of cases of torture have decreased. But some human rights groups claim that torture still occurs. Yet, even the critics agree that respect towards human rights in Turkey is much improved, and they look forward to continued improvement. Further, although the Turkish press is attentive to the opinions of military leaders, military intervention in Turkish government is noticeably reduced. For example, the once military-dominated National Security Council is now headed by a civilian, with new additional civilian members, and downgraded from a policy mandating institution to an advisory role.

Decentralization and Centralization of Police Organizations

Second, we analyzed the correlation between democracy and democratic policing, looking separately at centralization and decentralization measures. We must note that there was no clear consensus in the literature on democratic policing regarding the promotion of centralization or decentralization of policing. While some scholars argue that centralization is essential to democratic policing, others accept decentralization as a key concept of democratic policing. Consequently, the correlation between democratic policing and democracy was explored considering both centralization and decentralization.

Centralized police departments exist in countries of every level of democracy (see Figure 1, below). For example, France, Hungary and Sweden are highly democratic countries with centralized police organizations. Brazil, Columbia and Russia are partly democratic countries with that type of structure, and both China and Saudi Arabia, non-democratic countries, have centralized police organizations. In contrast, decentralized police departments are found only in highly democratic countries such as Australia, Japan, The Netherlands, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

For example, the form of democracy in Turkey and the style of democratic policing by the Turkish National Police seem in congruence with one another. The centralized Turkish National Police (TNP) seems to reflect the policies of a
Figure 1: Correlation between Democracy and Democratic Policing for 15 Nations.

democratic, parliamentary government in Turkey. In other ways, such as the institutional history and uniformity of training of the Turkish National Police, the TNP seems responsive to the directives of the government and people of Turkey. Any changes in the policies, organizational structure and culture of the Turkish National Police appear to be in direct response to government reforms and commitment toward more democratic policing initiatives, yet within the centralized organizational structure of the TNP. Further, Turkey has more recently improved private security within its corporations, production plants and factories, airports, banks, and shopping malls. This successful initial experience in shared private/public policing by a highly bureaucratic and centralized national police force is remarkable. Perhaps Turkey, like other countries with centralized police organizations, has found this approach more valuable with their greater proximity to terrorism and the need for greater information sharing and flow (e.g., Özel
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Güvenlik Hizmetleri, 2006).

However, Bayley (e.g., 1985) has argued that centralized police departments have often been the tools of authoritarian, repressive and totalitarian regimes. Some countries, such as Japan, Finland, and France, may be exceptions to that rule, and scholars have added that such centralized police forces were the heritage of unique institutional and organizational backgrounds (Bayley, 1985).

On the other hand, Berkley (1969) claimed that Sweden, after experimenting with decentralized policing, returned to centralized systems in order to allow more powerful, strict, and public control of police. He found that Sweden, Finland, Japan and Spain were very successful with centralized organizations in controlling and bettering police practices (Berkley, 1969). It is clear that many countries with highly centralized police organizations have successfully upheld democratic values over the decades. Perhaps this is due to variables other than centralization, such as the existence of effective police discipline or the presence of an ombudsman.

Taken together, Table 1 and Figure 1 suggest that there may be many positive links between democracy and democratic policing reforms. However, some deviations may be found in the cases of Hungary, Slovenia, and Saudi Arabia. Hungary and Slovenia may be unique in their history as previously dominated by communist regimes. Richard Terrill (1996) has found that former “iron curtain” countries were transformed to full democracies very quickly, often without enough time to adopt their laws and police bureaucracy parallel to democratic culture. Transition to democratic application from authoritarian traditions may require additional time to build more democratic police organizations (e.g., Terrill, 1996).

However, the case of Saudi Arabia tends to disprove our hypothesis. Saudi Arabia implements many organizational features of democratic policing, yet has the lowest assessed score of democracy of all countries analyzed. Perhaps, this dilemma may be explained by the highly religious traditional civil culture of Saudi Arabia, but we are limited by the data in our measurement of this correlation. In addition, there is slight deviation from our hypothesized correlation in the case of South Africa. As Mokotedi and Koitsioe (1997) indicated in their research, this disparity may result from the historical fear of violence between whites and blacks. This fear may result in the need for a strict and highly-responsive police organization to prevent potential violence during a time of transition from apartheid to democracy (Mokotedi & Koitsioe, 1997).

Evaluation and Discussion of Individual Variables

Third, we compared each of the individualized conceptualization of democratic policing from the literature with scores under the Political Terror Scale of
Purdue University for rigorous cross-national analysis. The democratic policing concept of decentralization appears the preferred model of police organization within democracies. We analyzed relations between the presence of decentralization and centralization of police organizations and the Political Terrorism Scale (PTS) assessment of countries, with “level 1” being highest with a secure rule of law, down to “level 5” marked by extended levels of violence. We found that seven countries had decentralized police organizations, eight had centralized police organizations. Six of the fifteen countries with decentralized policing also had good PTS assessments, but one had a poor PTS assessment of “level 4.” Four countries with centralized policing organizations had good PTS scores, but three had poor PTS scores of “level 4” and one was scored at “level 5.”

In analyzing the relations between the Political Terror Scale and decentralization, South Africa appears as a unique case. South Africa was rated a democratic country in the Freedom House Index. But the Political Terror Scale (PTS) classifies South Africa as a “level 4” country in which murders, disappearances, and torture are common. This is because the PTS uses data from the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International focusing only upon human rights violations. New policing organizations and practices adopted by South African Police to end problems in the past with high crime rates are not reflected in their PTS score. Observers note that the future of policing in South Africa appears promising (e.g., Lever & Van derSpuy, 2000).

Community policing has become widespread in today’s democratic world. And while countries such as France have not adopted a “community policing” policy, their historical policing practices have focused on community relations (Gleizal, 2000). Other countries, such as Hungary and Slovenia, have not adopted “community policing” policies, but feasibility studies are underway (e.g., Videtic, 2000). For example, like France, Turkey has a long history of policing practices that focused on community relations. “Watchmen” organizations, attached to the police, were hired from local people, worked as sworn officers, handled citizen requests near the entrances of police stations, and watched the neighborhoods at night. The Watchmen have been a component of the centralized Turkish National Police until very recent times. The use of Watchmen is currently being phased out and abolished due to complaints of unprofessional service. However, there are proposals for the Turkish National Police to generally adopt community policing. As of 2006, over 15,649 TNP personnel have been trained in community policing (Polislik hizmeti, 2006).

Police stations of the TNP in cities of Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Bursa, Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Izmir, Istanbul, Kayseri and Trabzon have individually launched community policing initiatives in conjunction with the European Union.
Adoption Project of the Turkish National Police. For example, in Adana, 33 university-graduated police officers were assigned to 10 different neighborhoods where they visited 95,000 houses and had contacts with more than 400,000 citizens. An increase was reported in “155” calls (similar to “911” calls), as citizens learned to watch crime in their neighborhoods and help reduce it (Scooter`l Polisler, 2006).

The Bursa police station has applied community policing to decrease crimes in specific neighborhoods by public-private cooperation, collaboration and co-production of order with citizens. Project “Denizyildizi” (starfish) has been an ongoing test of community policing in a Turkish neighborhood named Nilufer plagued with a high incidence of theft (Toplum Destekli Polislik, n.d.).

However, “problem oriented policing” does not find widespread support among democracies. This may be due in part to its complicated nature. Herman Goldstein (1990) has argued that problem-oriented policing requires more resources, highly educated personnel, and a long and difficult training that many countries cannot seem to afford. In addition, our close reading of the “snapshot” of case field studies in this study were limited and did not allow us to see all possible aspects of the application of problem-oriented policing. We analyzed relations between the presence of community-oriented policing and problem-oriented policing and the Political Terrorism Scale (PTS) assessment of countries, with “level 1” being highest with a secure rule of law, down to “level 5” marked by extended levels of violence. We found that nine countries had community-oriented policing reforms, six did not. Five countries had problem-oriented policing reforms, six did not, and four were unclear. Seven of the fifteen countries with community-policing reforms also had good PTS assessments, but two had poor PTS assessments of “level 4.” Three countries without community-oriented policing reforms had good PTS scores, but three had poor PTS scores of “level 4” or “level 5.” Similarly, five of the fifteen countries with problem-oriented policing reforms had good PTS assessments, with none having poor PTS assessments. Of the countries without problem-oriented policing reforms, one had a PTS score of “level 1,” while four had a poor PTS score of “level 4” and one was at “level 5.”

The use of ombudsmen and oversight by legislatures, elected officials, or the courts are widespread in all levels of democracies. However their efficacy and efficiency seem questionable based on the character of the local regime. According to Mendes (1999), countries recently converting to democracies and other non-democratic countries are using such policies as security valves to relieve pressures of mass protests. Since this study did not evaluate the efficacy or efficiency of such policies, the apparent availability of ombudsmen or oversight is assumed and accepted as sufficient. However, we recognize that the nature of the use of ombudsmen and oversight changes quickly within emerging democracies
We analyzed relations between the presence of ombudsmen and the Political Terrorism Scale (PTS) assessment of countries, with “level 1” being highest with a secure rule of law, down to “level 5” marked by extended levels of violence. We found that fourteen countries had ombudsmen, one did not. Thirteen countries had legislative, executive or judicial oversight of police, two did not. Ten of the fifteen countries with ombudsmen also had good PTS assessments, but three had poor PTS assessments of “level 4” and one was “level 5.” The one country without ombudsmen had a poor PTS score of “level 4.” Similarly, nine of the fifteen countries with legislative, executive or judicial oversight of police also had good PTS assessments, but three had poor PTS assessments of “level 4” and one was “level 5.”

Civilian complaint boards and oversight of the police by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was found in many of the case field studies of policing organizations, as well as other individual country reports. It appears that a wide range of governments, even conversion democracies and non-democratic countries, tend to adopt these democratic applications in response to pressures placed on them by the international community. Such provisions are often required within international political, trade, and security agreements (e.g., Kratcoski, 2000, Szikinger, 2000, Silva, 1999, Gleizal, 2000, Terrill, 1996). Both police organizational reforms tend to operate in ways similar to one another, as a more democratic method of police control. We analyzed relations between the presence of civilian complaint boards and oversight of police by NGOs and the Political Terrorism Scale (PTS) assessment of countries, with “level 1” being highest with a secure rule of law, down to “level 5” marked by extended levels of violence. Our analysis revealed that eight of fifteen countries had civilian complaint boards, six did not. Eleven countries had oversight of police by NGOs, four did not. Six of the fifteen countries with civilian complaint boards also had good PTS assessments, but one had a poor PTS assessment of “level 4” and one was “level 5.” Three countries without civilian complaint boards had good PTS assessments, but three had poor PTS scores. Similarly, eight of the fifteen countries with oversight of police by NGOs also had good PTS assessments, but two had poor PTS assessments of “level 4” and one was “level 5.” Three countries without oversight of police by NGOs had good PTS scores, but one had a PTS assessment of “level 4.”

The concepts of internal police controls and effective disciplinary procedures were found as a part of nearly every policy agency in every country we analyzed. Since the day of Bayley (1985) and Berkley (1969), scholars have argued that the organizational structures of police organizations must use such mechanisms to hold
police accountable not only to the community they serve, but also to other stakeholders and government. We analyzed relations between the presence of internal police controls and effective disciplinary procedures and the Political Terrorism Scale (PTS) assessment of countries, with “level 1” being highest with a secure rule of law, down to “level 5” marked by extended levels of violence. Our analysis revealed that all countries had internal police controls and only one country was revealed to have had no effective disciplinary structure in light of the case field studies. Ten of the fifteen countries with internal police controls also had good PTS assessments, but four countries had a poor PTS assessment of “level 4” and one was “level 5.” Similarly, eight of the fifteen countries with effectively disciplinary structure also had good PTS assessments, but four countries had a poor PTS assessments of “level 4” and one was “level 5.” The one country with no evidence of effective disciplinary structure from the case field studies also had a poor PTS assessment of “level 4.”

Modern and advanced scientific policing techniques seem to be universally desired and recommended by scientists as well as governments. However, due to the rapidly changing nature, increasing costs, and added training required for today’s technology, the level of technology used in each country varies along a huge flabellum. We analyzed the relations between the presence of the use of advanced technology for investigation of crime and the Political Terrorism Scale (PTS) assessment of countries, with “level 1” being highest with a secure rule of law, down to “level 5” marked by extended levels of violence. Our analysis revealed that eight of the fifteen countries with the use of advanced technology for investigations of crime also had good PTS assessments, with only two such countries having a poor PTS assessments of “level 4.” On the other hand, countries without use of advanced technology for investigations of crime had only poor PTS assessments, with two at “level 4” and one at “level 5” assessments. Police trade unions have been a catalyst for change in policing organizations. In principle, they foster the democratization of the organization (e.g., Berkley, 1969; Skolnick, 1966). For example, police trade unions in Russia helped to democratize policing, even with inefficient union structures (e.g., Gilinskiy, 2000). Studies of French and English police trade unions found that like any other trade union in a democratic society, trade unions encourage and promote the democratization of the police organization and help with the overall democratic stabilization of the country itself (e.g., Gleizal, 2000; Morgan & Newborn, 1997).

We also analyzed the relations between the presence of police trade unions and the Political Terrorism Scale (PTS) assessment of countries, with “level 1” being highest with a secure rule of law, down to “level 5” marked by extended levels of violence. Our analysis revealed that eight of the fifteen countries with police trade
unions also had very good PTS assessments, with only one country with police trade unions had a very poor PTS assessments. On the other hand, countries without police trade unions had average or poor PTS assessments, with only one country without police trade unions ranked in the top “level 1” assessment.

We also analyzed the relations between police “use of force training” the Political Terrorism Scale (PTS) assessment of countries, with “level 1” being highest with a secure rule of law, down to “level 5” marked by extended levels of violence. The measured the concept of “use of force training” by whether the case studies reveals that intensive training takes place within a country to help officers understand when the use of force is appropriate and respectful of individual human rights. However, we found much confusion in the use of this concept, since the term “use of force training” was also used to describe simple “how to” classes. Because use of force training is classified as one of the necessary requisites of basic police training, all countries have such training at some level. Such classes may simply teach recruits or police officers how to operate weapons or how to physically overcome and combat a presumed criminal. It was, admittedly, difficult to tell how the term “use of force training” was being applied in each case study. For this reason, we used extreme skepticism when evaluating “use of force training.” For example, “use of force” training was always a core class in the Turkish National Police academies. The law and organizational mandates were presented clearly and in compliance with standards as announced by democratic political institutions, i.e., the “zero-tolerance” policy on torture (İşkenceye Sıfır Tolerans, 2004). However, until 2000, the curriculum was not extensively developed and the course focused more on practical “how-to” training, rather than human rights concerns. Since 2000, “use of force” has become mandatory for all who graduate from the Faculty of Police Sciences and Police Vocational Schools (Eğitim Alanında Yapılan Çalışmalar, n.d.).

However, human rights training seems to be another matter. We found that the “snapshot” of field case studies of Turkey and 14 countries revealed an unclear picture as to whether human rights trainings was a substantial part of police training. Yet, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has designed the standards of human rights training programs of police to be consistent with the UN Decade for Human Rights Education Program. In addition, the European Council Directorate General of Human Rights designed parallel requisites in its report on “Police and Human Rights 1997-2000.” Both international organizations have established access to check the situations in each country and publish reports regarding the situation in each country at the moment. The unclear picture from the field case studies does not mean, however, that there was no human rights training in police education in our fifteen countries. For example, hu-
Human rights training was always a part of the Turkish National Police in some form, however slight. There were always more classes in law and legal rights in the Turkish Police Academy and Police Vocational Schools’ curriculum, than were the more applied or professional classes. However, dedicated curriculum in human rights was made formal in 2001-2002 with a class entitled, “Democracy and Human Rights.” About the same time, other similar courses appeared for the mandatory in-service training of sworn officers, such as “Human Rights and Civil Liberties” and “Human Rights” and “Public Relations” classes. Beginning in 2004, most all in-service trainings required at least 2 hours of training in “Human Rights,” “Community Policing” and “Police Ethics.” Thus, “Human Rights” training was found in all in-service Turkish National Police training courses between 1999 and 2005 to a total of 195,748 sworn officers. Nearly every sworn officer in the TNP completed this training.

In addition to the variables explored above, several social scientists state that the media has extensive control over the police by bringing public attention to their anti-democratic wrongdoings (e.g., Goldsmith, 1999; Lewis, 2000; Marx, 2000; Goldstein, 1990). In the case studies, police administrators have adopted new policies to keep society informed and to make their operations transparent in order to increase their reliability and accountability, especially in countries ranked at “level 1” by the “Political Terrorism Scale” (PTS) of Purdue University. The cases studies revealed that six of fifteen national policing organizations adopted policies to establish transparency to the media in their regular and routine operations. As the case studies have shown, the media is a powerful tool that can be used to combat crime. In order for police to successfully wield this tool, their operations must be open to the media (Windlesham, 1998; LaFree, 1989).

On the other hand, according to the Vera Institute’s 2001 Report, particularly in countries where community based or non-governmental structures do not have open relationships with police, the media can give voice to society’s concerns about crime or police responsiveness. Accordingly, the media also plays a role in exposing police misconduct and pressuring police to reform (Stone and Ward, 2000). For example, the Turkish National Police had a more traditional and distant relation with the media before the 1990s. Now the Turkish National Police hold weekly meetings with media to inform them about the events of national interest and respond to any questions. TNP Chiefs of Police, such as Antalya’s Feyzullah Arslan, have met with media to build support for community policing initiatives and be transparent with the media and the public (Emniyet Müdürü Ayağının Tozuyla Konuştu, n.d.).
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This paper proceeded from the assumption that police institutions are highly important in how citizens perceive democracy and human rights within their government through many ordinary, day-to-day contacts at the street-level. This paper illustrates by comparative analysis of how the restructuring of police organizations into “democratic policing” may relate to general perceptions of democracy and respect for human rights, especially in the case of Turkey in comparison with fourteen other nations.

Decentralized police organizations were more likely than centralized police organization to promote democracy. All democratic police reforms focused on “oversight” are associated with a significant support and promotion of democracy, such as “internal controls,” “effective disciplinary structures,” “unionism,” and “the use of advanced technology to investigate crime.” However, while “community policing” is often adopted in countries, “problem-oriented policing” was not often adopted. Some democratic policing reforms were only chosen by democratic countries, such as unionism, civilian complaint boards, and civilian oversight by NGOs. Unionism and civilian control boards were never chosen by transition democracies or anti-democratic countries. But new democracies such as Hungary, Slovenia, and South Africa have adopted at least one of these applications. In itself, the presence of “human rights training” did not positively relate to perceptions of democracy in countries. There is no clear relation between democracy and the use of advanced technology to investigate crime and democracy. The variable, “transparency to the media,” showed a strong relation between police-media relations and democracy.

The specific comparison of Turkey as a case-against-cases reveals a significant improvement (over 1.5 points on a 7-point scale) from 2002 to 2005 in its Freedom House ratings. This correlates to a time period when many democratic policing reforms were implemented by the Turkish National Police. These democratic policing reforms included training in community policing, implementation of community policing in many individual police departments, use of force and other human rights training, greater transparency to media and public relations efforts, and other aspects of democratic policing.

Our comparisons strongly suggest that several aspects of democratic policing may also be effective in promoting the general perception of a nation’s democracy and respect for human rights. In addition, democratic policing methods explicitly encourage police agencies to act within the scope of the law, be accountable to the public, be representative of the community, and be responsive to the community. All of these by-products of democratic policing promote democracy in the so-
society at large. It is highly likely that the world can perhaps expect more from
democratic policing than even these results may suggest. Further research is
needed to clarify the relationship between democratic policing and democracy.
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