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What Does Crime Victimization Survey Reveal about Victims and Responses of Police Agencies - Taiwanese Experience

by
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Abstract

Sponsored by the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior of Taiwan, the Republic of China, the first crime victimization survey (CVS) has been completed in December 2000. The author of this article, based on findings from the CVS, is a primary member of the research team who conducted that survey. A stratified multi-stage random probability design was employed to select sample. A total number of 12,418 individuals, aged from 12 to 70, were selected and interviewed. The respondents were asked in private households about their own experience and that of others in their household for household crimes, and about their own personal experience for personal crimes. The main issues covered in this article include: prevalence of victimization incidents, costs and injuries of crime, reporting rate to the police, and victims’ satisfaction with the police.

According to the results of this survey, 35.6% of respondents reported being victimized by crime. Vandalism against cars, the most common household crime, made up 28.4% of total household crimes. The 21.8% of household crimes involved bicycle theft, and 20.1% of household crimes involved motorcycle theft. Car vandalism, bicycle theft and motorcycle theft were the three most common household crimes in Taiwan. Furthermore, the most common personal crimes involved some types of theft (69.4% of the total personal crimes). The 11.8% of personal crimes involved forceful taking, and 10.1% of personal crimes involved assaults. Theft, forceful taking and assault were the three most common personal crimes in Taiwan.

Of overall crimes revealed in this survey, 36.1% in them were said by their victims to be reported or known to the police. The majority of crimes, then, were not reported to the police at all. The 69.6% of respondents who reported crimes were satisfied with the police attitude of disposing his or her case. Police agencies were the main public sector receiving crime reports from victims. Only 1.9% of victims reported cases to other criminal justice agencies.
Introduction

The measurement of crime is one of the most important issues in criminological research. Without accurate measure of crime's victim, trend, type, occurrence time, location, the relationship between offender and victim, and costs of crime, not only is the quality of academic research questioned, but the crime control policy also loses its solid basis. In the Criminal Victim Protection Program of 1998, the Ministry of Justice in Taiwan has emphasized the importance of implementing the following work: professional and psychological counseling to criminal victims, medical service and specialized support, professional workshop and seminars, citizen-education programs, and editing crime prevention and victim protection pamphlets. These activities are regarded as the victim empowerment program. However, the availability and effectiveness of these activities depend largely upon the completeness and accuracy of victimization survey. Simply put, victimization survey is a useful instrument for understanding the crime condition of a society. Accordingly, the accuracy of crime and victimization measurement has become a concerning focus by criminal justice agencies in many countries.

In general, there are two traditional measure methods of crime in Taiwan, official statistics and self-report surveys. First, the Crime Statistics issued annually by the Criminal Investigation Bureau and the Condition and Analysis of Crime issued annually by the Ministry of Justice are the primary publications of official statistics. Starting in 1959, the Criminal Investigation Bureau began to issue the criminal offenses “known to the police” which is the main content of Crime Statistics. The Ministry of Justice started to systematically record and analyze the convicted cases from 1973. Both the Crime Statistics and the Condition and Analysis of Crime are the best-known sources of official crime data in Taiwan. However, several methodological and conceptual problems with the official crime data have been identified. The official data only reflect crimes known to the criminal justice system, especially the police agencies. Many crimes are never reported or discovered by police agencies. In addition, police departments may use differing definitions of specific crimes or various methods of recording crimes. It can be expected that errors will be made with recording and reporting crime date. These unreported or unrecorded crimes are commonly referred to as the “dark figure” or “hidden crime”. As a result of its weakness, any attempt to equate the official data to actual crimes committed is subject to serious error.

The other major traditional measure method of crime is self-report surveys. The self-report surveys ask selected subjects whether they have committed crimes. To date, most self-report surveys conducted in Taiwan have been administered to school-juveniles, especially junior high school students. A primary criticism of many self-report surveys is that they ask about less serious offenses, such as cutting classes, disobeying parents, and stealing items worth less value, while omitting questions about serious crimes, such as robbery, burglary, and sexual assault. Other questions concern self-report surveys' replication, reliability and validity.

In addition to the above traditional measures of crime, the new method appeared by the end of 20th century in Taiwan. The new measure approach is crime victimization survey that was first conducted from July 1999 to December 2000. It is a general survey of a representative sample of Taiwan households designed to find out whether persons responding, or other persons in their household, have been victims of violent or property crime in the period of year 1999. The Central Police University, sponsored by the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior, was responsible for design, sampling strategies, actual survey, analysis and evaluation. This article is based upon part of findings from that survey.

Considering the progressive development of victim empowerment programs in many countries, the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior are eager to promote the quality of relevant criminal policies in Taiwan. Both Ministries strongly wish to achieve the following purposes through the crime victimization survey.

1. To understand more clearly the qualitative and quantitative nature of criminal victimization, and establish a more comprehensive data base of crime.
2. To assess the various agencies of the criminal justice system, their performance, and
the quality of services they render to the clients of the system.

3. To obtain information on victims’ interaction with the criminal justice system and the level of victims’ satisfaction with the system.

4. To obtain information on the amount of victims who did not report their victimization to the police, the reason for non-reporting, reporting rate among different types of crimes.

5. To develop more effective and suitable criminal policies based upon the above information.

Development and History of Crime Victimization Survey

The first crime victimization survey was carried out in the United States in 1966 for the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Kennedy & Sacco, 1998). A. Biderman and A. Reiss, Jr. had suggested to the commission that the survey method might provide a better and more accurate alternative to police statistics as a source of data on crime. The first pilot survey was done in Washington, D.C., by the Bureau of Social Science Research under the direction of A. Biderman. Interviews were conducted in April through mid-July, 1966, with a sample of 511 randomly selected adults of age 18 and over, in three police precincts in the District of Columbia (Fattah, 1991). The second pilot survey was conducted by the Institute for Social Research of the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, under the direction of A. Reiss, Jr. It consisted of interviews with the owners or managers of 768 businesses and organizations in Washington, D.C., Boston, and Chicago areas using the same questionnaire as that used in the Bureau of Social Science Research pilot survey (Sparks, 1981). The third survey, and by far the largest, is usually referred to as NORC since it was carried out by the National Opinion Research Center under the direction of Philip H. Ennis. This was a national survey using a probability sample of 9,644 households. The survey revealed some startling information. It showed that the volume of hidden victimization reported by the respondents was far beyond expectations and much higher than previous estimates. The survey revealed, for example, that rates of victimization exceeded those officially reported by 50 percent for robberies, by 100 percent for aggravated assault, and nearly 300 percent for forcible rape. There were twice as many larcenies and three times as many burglaries as compared to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (Fattah, 1991).

After the above two pilot surveys and a national survey, victimization surveys have been conducted annually since 1972 by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics. Formerly called the national crime surveys (NCS), the National Crime Victimization Surveys (NCVS), published under the title Criminal Victimization in the United States, were created not only as a basis for learning more about crime and its victims, but also as a means of complementing and assessing what is known about crime from the FBI’s uniform crime reports. The annual sample of households has increased since the early surveys. In 1992, for example, 166,000 interviews were conducted in 84,000 households (BJS, 1993:36). From a nationally representative sample, respondents aged 12 or older are asked in interviews whether they have been victims of any of FBI’s index offenses (Except murder and nonnegligent manslaughter and arson) or other crimes during the past six months. If they have, they are asked to provide information about the experience. Changes in the format and methodology of the NCVS were introduced in 1992. Before July 1992, data were collected under the NCS, and data have been collected under the redesigned methods of the NCVS since July 1992.

Approximately 28.8 million violent and property crimes were experienced by Americans age 12 or older during 1999 according to NCVS data (BJS, 2000). Overall victimizations included about 21.2 million property crimes, 7.4 million violent crimes, and approximately 0.2 million personal thefts. The 44% of overall violent victimizations and 34% of all property crimes were reported to the police in 1999. The most frequently reported crime was motor vehicle theft (84%), while the least frequently reported victimization was personal theft (26%).

This high amount of unreported victimization is not exclusive to the United States. When findings of the British Crime Survey (BCS, 1998) were compared to officially recorded criminal statistics, they also show a much higher incidence of victimization. Of all comparable BCS
crimes in 1997, 44% were said by their victims to have been reported to, or become known to the police. The majority of crimes are not reported to the police at all. Reporting rate varies considerably by type of offense. Thefts of cars are reported most often: 97% were in 1997. Burglaries in which something was stolen were also usually reported (85%). Theft from the person and vandalism were the least likely comparable offenses to be reported: 35% and 26% respectively.

The NORC study and its findings engendered much excitement among researchers inside and outside the United States. Before long, several other victimization surveys, mostly of a smaller scale, were being conducted in several other countries. Surveys were conducted in Scandinavia (Aromaa, 1974, 1984; Hauge & Wolf, 1974; Sirén, 1980); in Germany (Stephan, 1976); in England (Sparks, Genn & Dodd, 1977); in Holland (Fiselier, 1978; Van Dijk & Steinmetz, 1984); in Switzerland (Clinard, 1978); in France (Levy, Perez-Diaz, Robert & Zauberman, 1986); and in Australia (Braithwaite & Biles, 1980, 1984).

The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS), which was initiated in 1987, has been implemented so far in over fifty different countries under the supervision of an international working group. There have so far been three rounds of the ICVS. Field data for the third ICVS were gathered at the beginning of 1996 and published in 1997 (Mayhew & van Dijk, 1997). Sample sizes varied between 1,000 in developing countries and 2,000 in most other countries. Perhaps the most striking finding is that more than half of urban respondents, report being victimized by crime, no matter what part of the world (except some Asian cities). It also shows that the overall five year victimization rates are highest in Latin America (including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Paraguay) and Africa (including Egypt, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe), where three of every four citizens living in urban areas were victimized at least once. The overall victimization rates are the lowest in Asian cities (Asian countries include China, Japan, India, Indonesia and Philippines). For all crimes together, the rates of report to the police are the highest in the New World countries (54%, including USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and Western Europe (52%, including 15 countries). Reporting rates are moderately high in Africa (40%) and Central and Eastern Europe (35%, including 20 countries). Reporting of crimes to the police is less common in Asia (31%) and Latin America (27%). The findings also indicate that the police in most countries fail to satisfy the demands of a large part of reporting victims. Dissatisfaction is the highest among victims of burglaries and other property crimes in less affluent countries where victims are dependent on the police for recovering their property or claiming compensation. In all regions, dissatisfaction is also high among victims of contact crimes. Obviously, the police have a long way to go to adequately empower crime victims.

The above list is by no means an exhaustive one, yet it illustrates the interesting findings and great appeal that victimization surveys had for researchers in recent decades. Thanks to the development and innovation of crime measure methods in many countries, the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior in Taiwan sponsored a research team to conduct the first crime victimization survey in Taiwan area. The research team, including five members, was set up in July 1999, leading fieldwork early in 2000. Author of this article is a member of the research team who was responsible for questionnaire design (the part of victimization experience form), interviewers’ training, and data analysis (concerning the amount and distribution of victimization, characteristics of victim and offender, costs and injuries of crime, reporting rate to the police, and victim’s satisfaction with the police). This article is based upon the work which the author was responsible for during the survey.

Research Design and Methods

The findings revealed in this article are based on data gathered from residents living throughout the Taiwan areas. Armed forces personnel living in military barracks and institutionalized persons, such as correctional facility inmates, were not included in the scope of this survey. Similarly, Taiwan citizens residing abroad and foreign visitors were excluded. With these exceptions, individuals aged 12 to 70 were eligible to be interviewed.
Sample Design and Size

The crime victimization survey sample was designed to give, after appropriate weighting, both a representative cross-section of private households in Taiwan area, and of individuals aged 12 to 70 living in them. The Taiwan Census Data (TCD) of 1999 was used as the sampling frame. The TCD, listing all post delivery points in Taiwan area, represents the fullest register of household addresses as almost all households have one deliver point. A stratified multi-stage random probability design was used to select the sample of addresses. There are 2 municipalities, 5 cities and 16 hsien in Taiwan area. The sampling frame was developed from these 23 primary sampling geographic areas. From these primary population areas, 7 strata were created based on population characteristics, industry development, public facilities, financial condition and geographic environment. Under the 23 primary sampling geographic areas, a total of 359 administrative districts cover the entire Taiwan area. Then, 110 administrative districts were randomly selected as the primary sampling units (PSUs) from 7 strata. Basically, five secondary sampling units (SSUs) were selected from each PSU. This involved a systematic selection of enumeration households, with a probability of selection proportionate to SSU size. A number of 609 SSUs were selected form PSUs. Finally, 12,100 households were selected from 609 SSUs. One person, aged from 12 to 70, from each of these households was interviewed. Simply put, 12,100 citizens living in units designed for the sample were interviewed in this research.

Data Collection

I. Structure of the Questionnaire

In order to achieve the survey purposes, the research instrument (questionnaire) consisted of four parts, such as interviewer record form, screening questions, victimization experience form, and self-completion section. All data were collected and recorded personally by trained interviewers except the data of self-completion section. The quality of survey was maintained through a standardized interview process.

(I) Interviewer Record Form

The function of this form is to understand the individual interview process and source of respondent. To some extent, the interviewing quality was able to be controlled by the interview record form. Each interviewer was required to record the following information on this form, such as respondent's identification number and name, interviewer's name, level of respondent's cooperation, interviewing language (official language or dialects), difficulties during interview, and questionnaire completion checks.

(II) Screening Questions

The screening questions were designed on the premise that respondents required a series of prompts to ensure that all incidents of crime were mentioned, including relatively minor incidents. The statement of the questions was also designed to ensure that, as far as possible, each incident was counted only once. The screening questions were divided into two parts, one concerned with incidents affecting any person currently in the household over the period since the beginning of the year 1999 (the past year before interview), and the other limited to incidents which have affected the respondent over that period of time. A typical example of a “household” incident was car theft, which it was assumed the respondent could recall even if he or she was not the named owner of the household's car. An example of a “personal” incident was robbery, in which the issue was whether the respondent him or herself suffered assault or loss. Incidents elicited from the screening questions were then followed up in more detail using the Victimization Experience Form.

(III) Victimization Experience Form

The victimization experience form is the key to the analysis of victimization. This form

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1 Besides 23 primary sampling geographic areas, there are five categories of administrative districts in Taiwan areas, i.e., ch'us (in two municipalities and five cities), shihs, chens, hsiangs (in sixteen hsien). The total number of these administrative districts is 359.

2 1999 year-end population in Taiwan: 22,092,387, household number in Taiwan: 6,532,466.
covered victimization types, occurrence time and location of offense, dwelling intrusion methods, criminal tools, assault behaviors, victim's responses, offender’s characteristics, relationship between offender and victim, loss and damage or injury of crime, notification of the police and how well they dealt with the incident. The questions concerning the process after reporting to the police were also included, such as response time of the police, crime solving, prosecuting and sentencing. This form collected details of the latest incident of respondent's victimization experiences. First, respondents were asked to describe the incident in their words. Then the interviewer asked a series of key questions to establish with reasonable certainty whether, for instance, any violence was used, whether any property was stolen or damaged, and so on. If a key question was answered “yes”, then further details were elicited.

(IV) Self-completion Section
This section was to explore the information about respondent's family situation, such as the relationship among family members, life events, and deviance. Since these questions were sensitive to respondent, they were completed by respondent him/herself.

II. Interviewers Briefing Conferences
In order to conduct the field investigation successfully, interviewers briefing conferences were designed and implemented. The first briefing conference was held on 29 October 1999, with representatives from the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior. The final briefing session took place on 4 January 2000. There were three briefing sessions, and they were attended by a total of 431 interviewers. Each briefing conference included:
(I) an introduction to the crime victimization survey and its use by the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior;
(II) instructions on the selection procedure of respondents;
(III) a questionnaire-filling exercise and an interview exercise, designed to familiarize interviewers with the design of questions, and in particular the procedure for selecting incidents which would be covered in victimization experience form.

III. Fieldwork
After the interviewers briefing conferences were completed, the face-to-face interviews were conducted. These fifty-minute interviews included introductory questions, screening questions (to determine if victimization occurred), victimization experience form, and self-completion section (concerning respondent’s family events and conditions). Only one person from each selected household was interviewed. In the case of temporarily absent household members and persons who were physically or mentally incapable of granting interviews, interviewers may accept other household members as proxy respondents. Field quality control measures included interview supervisors, telephone back-checks and post back-checks. Fieldwork was substantially completed by the end of June 2000. A small number of interviews were conducted in July 2000, these mainly being re-issues in selected areas to ensure a satisfactory response rate. A total number of 12,418 respondents were actually interviewed during the survey (the initially planned respondents were 12,100).

Results Concerning Victims and Policing
The results concerning victims and policing of Taiwanese first victimization survey, accomplished by means of a face-to-face questionnaire interviewing to 12,418 citizens, are presented in this article. This survey focuses on certain household and personal crimes that are of major concern to the general public and law enforcement authorities. The household crimes consist of six categories of crime, such as bicycle theft, motorcycle theft, car theft, theft from car, car vandalism, and burglary. The personal crimes consist of other eight categories of crime, such as theft from person, theft of personal property left somewhere, assault, robbery, forcible taking, kidnapping, extortion, and sexual assault.
Among the 12,418 interviewed questionnaires, 10,375 questionnaires are valid for data analysis. The response rate arrives at 83.55%. As data shown in Table 1, the 35.6% of 10,375 valid respondents expressed that he or she experienced criminal victimization during the 1999 calendar year. Among the 10,375 valid respondents, 33.3% had household victimization experience, and 11.3% had personal victimization experience.

Table 1 Percentage of Respondents with Victimization Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victimization Experience</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Victimization Typology</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>Household Victimization</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>Personal Victimization</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=10,375

Amount and Distribution of Victimization

I. Household Victimization

The household victimization can be divided into two parts. One is associated with the bicycle theft and motor vehicle theft or damage, and the other with burglary against domestic premises. As data indicated in Table 2, among the 10,375 valid household respondents, 1,050 households were victimized by bicycle theft. The number of bicycle theft victimization was 1,646. There were 1,138 households victimized by motorcycle theft, and the incident number was 1,515. There were 268 households revealed that their cars were stolen during the year before the interview. The incident number of car theft victimization was 366. In addition to the above thefts of bicycles and motor vehicles, 538 households experienced the thefts from their cars (something of car was stolen), and the incident number was 782. There were 1,223 households experienced car vandalism, and the incident number was 2,136.

The following is associated with burglary against domestic premises. Data in Table 2 show that there were 763 households victimized by burglary among the 10,375 valid household respondents. The incident number of burglary was 1,099. In 351 households of these the offender actually did some damage against victim's domestic premise (burglary with damage) and in 615 households something was stolen (burglary with stolen loss). The incident number of burglary with damage and with stolen loss was 455 and 849 respectively.

Table 2 Types of Household Victimization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victimization Types</th>
<th>Number of Victimization</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Number of Victimized Household</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bicycle theft</td>
<td>1,646</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycle theft</td>
<td>1,515</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car theft</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft from car</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car vandalism</td>
<td>2,136</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>1,223</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>1,099</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary with damage</td>
<td>(455)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>(351)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary with stolen loss</td>
<td>(849)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>(615)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,534</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4,980</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According the findings of survey, there were 3,456 households, among the 10,375 valid respondent households, experienced the household victimization during the 1999 calendar year. A total number of household victimization incidents was 7,534. The number of car vandalism
incidents was 2,136 which occupied the largest proportion (28.4%) of overall household victimization, data as shown in Figure 1. Bicycle theft (1,646 incidents) made up a further 21.8% of household victimization. Motorcycle theft (1,515 incidents) occupied a similar proportion (20.1%) to bicycle theft. Burglary (14.6%) and theft from car (10.4%) made up another 25.0% of household victimization. Car theft (356 incidents) occupied the smallest proportion (4.7%) of household victimization. In sum, car vandalism, bicycle theft and motorcycle theft were the three most common household crimes in Taiwan.

![Figure 1 Percentage of Household Victimization Incidents](image-url)

**II. Personal Victimization**

As data indicated in Table 3, among the 10,375 valid respondents, 460 of them experienced the victimization of theft from the person not involving force, such as pickpocketing. The number of its incidence was 605. There were 503 respondents expressed that they were victimized, with a total number of 853 victimization incidents, by the theft of other personal property from a location other than the home. The 148 of overall 10,375 respondents were victimized by assault, and its incident number was 218. There were 51 of overall 10,375 respondents victimized by robbery, and its incident number was 63. There were 170 of overall 10,375 respondents victimized by forcible taking, and its incident number was 255. Robbery is defined here as the actual or attempted taking other people’s property by force, threat, drug, hypnotism or other means to the level that victim can not resist. Forcible taking is defined as taking other people’s property during a while that victim does not pay attention on his or her property. There were 12 of overall 10,375 respondents victimized by kidnapping, and its incident number was 11. 【The victimized respondent(s) replied some missing data on number of victimization, thus, the number of victimization was lower than number of victims.】 There were 73 of overall 10,375 respondents victimized by extortion, and its incident number was 117. Finally, there were 25 of overall 10,375 respondents victimized by sexual assault, and its incident number was 43.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victimization Types</th>
<th>Number of Victimization</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Number of Victims</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theft from person</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 Types of Personal Victimization
Theft of personal property left somewhere 853 39.3 543 36.7
Assault 218 10.1 148 10.0
Robbery 63 2.9 51 3.4
Forcible taking 255 11.8 170 11.5
Kidnapping 11 0.5 12 0.8
Extortion 117 5.4 73 4.9
Sexual assault 43 2.0 25 1.7
Total 2,165 100.0 1,482 100.0

Since the victimized respondent(s) replied missing data on number of victimization, thus, the number of victimization was lower than number of victims.

According to results of the first crime victimization survey in Taiwan, there were 1,173 respondents (11.3%) experienced personal victimization, with a total number of 2,165 victimization incidents. The largest amount of personal victimization was theft of personal property left somewhere. Its incident number was 853, and occupied 39.4% of overall personal victimization incidents. As data revealed in Figure 2, the following personal victimization types, from most to least amount, were identified as: theft from person (605, 30.0%), forcible taking (255, 11.8%), assault (218, 10.1%), extortion (117, 5.4%), robbery (63, 2.9%), sexual assault (43, 2.0%), and kidnapping (11, .5%). In sum, Theft, forceful taking and assault were the three most common personal crimes in Taiwan.

Figure 2  Percentage of Personal Victimization Incidents

Costs and Injuries of Crime

In order to decrease the false description made by respondents and to collect more accurate data, this survey targeted the costs of property stolen or taken without permission, relevant damage, and physical injuries. Comparatively, these targets were more tangible than others, such as reduced quality of life.
As data shown in Table 4, 59.8% of respondents with victimization experience recognized that their property were stolen or taken without permission by offender. In 56.8% of these revealed that the value of their stolen or taken property was 10,000 NT dollars or less, 8.5% revealed 10,000 to 20,000 NT dollars, 13.6% revealed 20,001 to 40,000 NT dollars, 9.5% revealed 40,001 to 60,000 NT dollars, 4.9% revealed 60,001 to 100,000 NT dollars, and 6.7% revealed 100,001 NT dollars or more (currency rate in the end of 1999, 1 US dollar = 31.40 NT dollars. Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs). Obviously, the majority of stolen or taken property’s value was 10,000 NT dollars (about US 320 dollars) or less.

Table 4 also indicated that most victims (86.5% of victims whose property were stolen or taken) did not get their property back. Only a small part of victims got all or some property back. Among the recovered property, 52.3% of them were valued as 5,000 NT dollars or less, 17.7% were 5,001 to 20,000 NT dollars, and 12.9% were 20,001 to 40,000 NT dollars. The percentage of other recovered property value was lower than the above three. The majority of recovered property value was 5,000 NT dollars (about US 160 dollars) or less.

According to the finding of the survey, 62.3% of respondents with victimization experience described that they did not get injured from crime, 32.2% of respondents with victimization experience expressed that they had psychological suffering, and a few of respondents with victimization experience indicated that they had physical or other injuries, such as bruises, black eye, scratches, cuts, broken bones, and gun-shot injuries. A majority of victims, thus, did not get injuries from victimization experience.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was anything stolen or taken without permission?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did you get anything back?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes – all</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes – some</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The value of property that was stolen or taken without permission.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 NT dollars or less</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,001~3,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,001~5,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,001~10,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,001~20,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,001~40,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,001~60,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,001~100,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,001~300,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300,001 NT dollars or more</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total value of the property got back.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 NT dollars or less</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,001~3,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>3,001~5,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,001~10,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,001~20,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,001~40,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,001~60,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,001~100,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,001~300,000 NT dollars</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300,001 NT dollars or more</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Contact with Police Agency
I. Reporting to the Police

Victims of crime were asked whether they or anybody else had reported the incident to the police. As data indicated in Table 5, only 36.1% of victims recognized that the police were aware of the victimization incident. A majority of victims (62.3%) said that the police did not become aware of the incident. Car theft was the most often reported household crime (60.5%), and bicycle theft was the household crime with lowest reporting rate (20.0%). Robbery was the personal crime most often reported (56.9%) while theft of personal property left somewhere (27.4%) and sexual assault (28.0%) were the least often reported to law enforcement.

Among the overall incidents known to the police, 58.2% of them were reported by respondent, and 36.4% were reported by another person in respondent’s household. Just a very small part of incidents known to the police were proactively found by the police themselves (.8%). In sum, crime victims and their families were primary persons who reported victimization incidents to the police. However, most of the crime victims or their families did not report victimization incidents to the police. Figure 3 indicates the percentage of crimes known and unknown to the police.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did the police come to know about the matter?</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>How did the police come to know about it?</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>Police told by respondent</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>Police told by another person in respondent’s household</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Police told by person with special authority&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Police told by respondent’s neighborhood or passenger</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Police were there or found it</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Police told by other person</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup> Such as guardian, school staff, and apartment managers.

II. Reasons for Reporting and for Non-reporting

In the survey, those who had reported victimization to the police were asked about their reasons. As data revealed in Table 6, reporting victims quite often seek assistance of the police to promote the level of security in surrounding environment (41.1% of reporting victims) and to recover property (40.5% of reporting victims). Many reporting victims were also concerned with stopping or ceasing what happened. Some reporting victims hoped to avoid repetition of crime to himself/herself or his/her families. To apprehend and punish the offender was another common reason for reporting. Generally, victims had a variety of reasons for reporting to the police, with moral, legal, financial and practical considerations all playing a role. Comparatively, insurance, assistance after injured, and avoiding repetition of crime to others were relatively less common reasons than the above. Unlike most industrialized countries, a low percent of respondents were insured against household burglary in Taiwan. It goes some way in explaining victims reported not to back up insurance claims but in the hope of reclaiming their property from the offender through the police.
Findings on the opinions of victims showed that the top five reasons for reporting were:
- To make the police pay more attention to the surrounding environment (41.4%)
- To hope that property would be recovered (40.5%)
- To stop or cease the event (29.8%)
- To avoid repetition of crime to oneself or families (20.9%)
- To apprehend and punish offender (20.8%)

Victims whose victimizations were not reported to the police were asked about their reasons for non-reporting to the police. The main reason for non-reporting was that the incident was not serious enough. Furthermore, lack of criminal evidence and confidence in the police seems to be other determining factors behind non-reporting of crimes. No time to report, a low possibility of recovering stolen property or damage, and fear of reprisal were also mentioned by victims. The reasons for non-reporting are given in Table 6.

The top five reasons for not reporting were:
- Too trivial/not worth reporting (59.4%)
- Can’t identify offender, lack of evidence (34.3%)
- Police will regard it as an unimportant matter (20.4%)
- Private or personal matter (12.3%)
- Police performance is not good (10.8%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for Reporting</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Reasons Not Reporting</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To stop or cease the event</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>Private or personal matter</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured and need assistance</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Too trivial/Not worth reporting</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the hope that property would be recovered</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>Can’t identify offender, lack of evidence</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For purposes of insurance claim  5.1 | Police will regard it as an unimportant matter  20.4
To avoid repetition of crime to oneself or families  20.9 | Police performance is not good  10.8
To avoid repetition of crime to others  15.6 | No time to report  7.4
To arrest and punish offender  20.8 | Can’t restore or recover  6.2
To make the police pay more attention to the surrounding environment  41.1 | Fear of reprisal by offender  1.6
Other  6.6 | Other  4.1

[1] The item of reasons can be multi-selected, thus, the sum of percentage is higher than 100.

III. Satisfaction with the Police

All respondents who had reported a crime to the police in the year before interview were asked several questions concerning whether they were satisfied with the way the police had dealt with their last report. The answers gave an important performance indicator about the victim empowerment policies of the police. The findings indicated that 31.4% of the reported victimizations were dealt with in 5 minutes by the police after reporting, 15.9% were dealt with in 5 to 10 minutes, 15.1% were dealt with in 11 to 60 minutes. Furthermore, some reporting victims (8.3%) waited more than one hour before the police attended to the incidents. Approximately, ten percent of the reporting victims waited no response from the police. The victims of theft from person revealed the highest percentage of no response from the police, victims of sexual assault revealed the lowest.

Seven in ten victims who reported their cases to the police were satisfied with the response. However, more than a quarter were dissatisfied. Findings on the opinions of reporting victims generally showed that more burglary victims were dissatisfied than victims of contact crimes. The victims of burglary expressed the highest level of dissatisfaction, victims of motorcycle theft expressed lowest. This implies that the burglary victims were more likely to be unhappy because the police did not recover their property or apprehend the offender. Such victims wanted to be treated more efficiently and with respect. Another finding likely related with victim’s dissatisfaction was that around 30% of reporting victims were not informed of the progress of incident’s investigation. Interestingly, most of the reporting victims did not contact with other criminal justice officers except with the police. Police agency was the main public sector to which victims reported their victimization (95.6% of the reporting victims). For most crime victims, the police was the single most important agency representing the criminal justice system.

Conclusion

The criticisms of and dissatisfaction with official records and self-report surveys as accurate measures of the amount and distribution of crime have led Taiwanese criminologists to concern with alternative measures of crime. In Taiwan, besides official statistics and self-report surveys, the third measure approach of crime has been initially developed by the end of year 2000. In this pilot crime victimization survey, 12,418 respondents aged 12 to 70 years old were asked in interviews whether they have been victims of certain offenses during the past year. If they have, they were asked to provide information about the experience. This article, based upon part of its findings, primarily focuses upon the information concerning victims and policing.

Among the 10,375 valid respondents, 35.6% of them (N = 3,696) revealed being victimized by crime in the 1999 calendar year. The percentage of household victimization (33.4% of total valid respondents) was higher than that of personal victimization (11.3% of total valid respondents). The most common household crime involved car vandalism (28.4% of total
household crimes), and the most common personal crime involved theft of personal property left somewhere (39.4% of total personal crimes).

Nearly six in ten respondents with victimization experience described that their property were stolen or taken without permission by offenders. The 56.8% of them revealed the property loss amounted less than US 320 dollars. The victims with US 3,200 dollars loss or more (about 100,000 NT dollars or more) just occupied 6.7% of the total victims with property loss. Noticably, 86.5% of victims whose property was stolen or taken did not get back their property. Only a small part of victims got all or some property back. Among the overall recovered property, a higher percentage of them (52.3%) were valued less than US 160 dollars (about 5,000 NT dollars). A majority of victims (62.3%) said that they did not injured from crime.

Around 36% of victimization incidents were reported to the police. Car theft and robbery were the incidents most likely to be reported to the police (about 60% of car theft and robbery victimization incidents). Bicycle theft, theft of personal property left somewhere and sexual assault were the least likely to be reported. Only a very small part of the incidents known to the police were found by the police themselves. Conversely, most of them were reported by citizens rather than be found by criminal justice officers. The victims’ main reasons for reporting were to make the police pay more attention to the surrounding environment and to hope their stolen or taken property could be recovered. The main reason for non-reporting was that the incident was not serious enough or not worth reporting. Lack confidence in the police is another frequently mentioned factor by victims.

About seven in ten reporting victims were satisfied with the police attitude of disposing his or her case. The victims of burglary revealed the highest level of dissatisfaction with police attitude. The victims of motorcycle theft expressed the lowest dissatisfaction. More than a quarter of reporting victims were not informed of the progress of their reported incidents. To some extent, victims were unhappy that the police did not keep them sufficiently informed. Besides, victims were also likely to be unhappy that the police did not recover their property or apprehend the offender.

These findings show that the victim empowerment programs were not sufficiently implemented in Taiwan. In relation to this, many victims were reluctant to report crimes to the police. This lack of confidence in the police implied that crime victims had often no authority to turn to and felt alienated. Low reporting rates were also an impediment for effective crime prevention and control. The chances of arresting the offender and getting a conviction are largely dependent upon the information provided by the victim. If many victims are doubtful whether reporting to the police will do them any good, the effectiveness of the police is severely undermined. For more effective criminal investigations the cooperation of the victims is essential (Mon, 1997; van Dijk, 1999). This is an important reason why the proportion of dissatisfied victims ought to be used as a performance indicator for law enforcement agencies.

Several problems have been identified after the first crime victimization survey in Taiwan. First, crime victimization survey is an expensive undertaking, in large part because it requires a very large sample. Second, for a variety of reasons, the people who were interviewed in the victim survey might be unable or unwilling to tell the interviewer about the crimes that they had experienced. Third, The crime victimization survey, either by design or as a result of sampling errors, provided a less than complete picture of victimization. This survey did not interview anyone below the age of 12 and thus did not count crimes involving children below this age. The crime victimization survey told us very little about those segments of the population that were hard to sample and interview. Groups such as the homeless, the transient, and illegal aliens, for example, rarely figured prominently in survey. Fourth, the survey asked respondents only about a limited number of crimes. Questions were not asked about the way in which governments and corporations victimized people. The above problems will become the important reference for the next survey.
References


STUDENTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVATE POLICE IN SINGAPORE

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AND

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Abstract

Despite large increases in the growth of the private policing industry in the last four decades in the emerging markets, we know very little about how the public perceives agents of private policing. In this paper, the attitudes of students in Singapore toward private security officers are examined. Responses were received from 260 undergraduate, polytechnic, and secondary school students (of 300 distributed surveys). The findings suggest that respondents generally held positive attitudes toward private security officers. While they held less positive views on some issues, it was more likely that they were less certain than negative about security officers. Further analysis reveals observable differences based on subjects’ demographic characteristics. These differences were strongest for income, work status, and “contact” variables, with some support gained for variables related to years in school, residence in parents homes, and family employment in law enforcement.

KEY WORDS: Private police; private security; security officers; security guards; citizen perceptions; law enforcement/security relationships

Introduction

In this paper, we use the terms private police and private security interchangeably. Numerous groups of agents of social control are continuously engaged in regulating, supervising and policing different groups of people at different times and places. Private security personnel employed by private entities constitute one such group of social control agents. Many scholars prefer to call this group “private police” since they engage in some of the very functions public police undertake (e.g. Scott and McPherson 1971; Shearing and Stenning 1987; Bayley and Shearing 1996). During the last four decades the number of people employed in the private police industry, particularly uniformed private security officers, has increased significantly. Personnel employed in the private security industry far outnumber law enforcement officers and this number is expected to grow faster than the average growth for other industries in most developed (U.S. Department of Labor 2000) and developing economies such as Singapore, South Korea, India, and South Africa (Nalla 1998). Despite the significant growth in the number of people employed in private police industry we know very little about how people perceive private security personnel and their relationship with law enforcement. This is important because while security officers in uniform appear similar to police officers, they have no more authority than private citizens. However, because of the similarity in role, appearance and observable behavior to police officers, their occupational role as agents of social control makes the issue of public perceptions an important research issue. Given the
paucity in research on these issues, in this paper we examine the nature of the private security industry with specific reference to security officers. In addition, we also examine youth perceptions of private police, more specifically, uniformed private security officers.

Nature and Goals of Private Police

What is the primary function of a private security officer? Some argue that the “singularly most conspicuous role of the security department in any organization is that of protector or guardian” of an enterprise. Findings from a study of common security goals and functions among Fortune 1000 companies (Nalla and Morash 2002) suggest that the most common tasks for security departments include protection of executives and employees, tracking and forecasting security threats, alarm monitoring, fraud detection and prevention, investigations, crisis management, prevention and response to substance abuse. While the functions of a security organization is varied the general public people associate private security with uniformed security guards. In this capacity as a protector or guardian, private police protect company property, assets, reputation, and employees. So, by nature, uniformed private security officers come in contact with the public in ways similar to public law enforcement, that is, their role and the nature of work resembles that of public police officers.

Despite the large number of security professionals such as security officers, very little is known about what the public thinks of private police organizations and their personnel. Security industry and security officers are not always cast in a positive manner in popular culture. A 1987 Hollywood film *Armed and Dangerous* portrays security officers as poorly paid, untrained, and incompetent individuals. To date, only one study examined public perceptions of private security. Shearing and his colleagues (1985) interviewed 209 Canadians to assess their perceptions of private security personnel, the nature of security work, and their relationship with public law enforcement. Shearing et al. suggest the public did not have a cultural referent or stereotype for security officers. The public perceived security guards in the context of their behavior and personality rather than from an established professional imagery. Walsh (1989) noted that while security officers’ work-related attitudes actually make them more satisfied and committed than law enforcement officers, the former are still perceived as unregulated, untrained, minimum-wage employees whose only goal is to protect their employer’s property at all costs. One would anticipate, then, that, in general, the public would have a slightly more negative perception of private security than of public policing. In another study of student perceptions of private police in the U.S. (Nalla and Heraux 2000), findings suggest that respondents generally held positive attitudes toward private security officers though there were some observable differences based on subjects’ demographic characteristics. These differences were strongest for gender, employment and “contact” variables, with some support gained for variables related to family income and race.

The aim of the present study is to review briefly the nature and extent of private police in Singapore. In addition, we examine a segment of the general public, specifically students’ attitudes toward private security officers in Singapore. We have chosen Singapore for the following reasons. In recent years, a growing number of emerging markets with attractive features such as economic liberalization, relatively low labor costs, and enormous growth rates, has drawn the interest of multinational companies. These markets offer promising opportunities for trade, manufacturing, and sourcing. New opportunities have opened up as a result of ongoing market liberalization policies by countries that were once less open to international trade due to political and ideological factors. The U.S. Department of Commerce lists eighteen such markets including China, Hong Kong, Taiwan (The Chinese Economic Area), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei (ASEAN), South Korea, Vietnam, India, Turkey, Poland, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The *Economist* modified this list by including Chile, Venezuela, Greece, Israel, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Russia making a total of 26 emerging markets (e.g., Cavusgil 1997).

All these countries, however, share common, yet identifiable characteristics. Their markets have a young labor force and a sizeable middle class that offers opportunities for both production as well as market consumption. Though these markets have less than U.S. $10,000 per capita income, they enjoy good economic growth rates and show prospects for market expansion. As a group, they constitute half the world’s population and exert major economic
and political influence in their regions.

While these markets are economically attractive for business ventures, diverse social, political, and cultural factors complicate our understanding of the security challenges unique to these countries. Businesses with aggressive corporate cultures seek attractive markets and pay scant attention to security concerns. It is not uncommon for corporate management teams to ignore input from their security departments or to exclude them from decisions about entering emerging markets. Consequently, security departments must often backtrack to undo the damage done by hasty corporate decisions to enter new markets.

Insufficient information and research on security issues in emerging markets exacerbate this problem. To date, we have little research which examines security-related topics in these countries. Thus, this paper’s objective is to explore students’ perceptions of private security guards. Students constitute a sizeable segment of the population who are consumers and participate in numerous economic activities, primarily as consumers.

**Private Policing in Singapore**

The private security industry in Singapore is enjoying a growth in demand for consulting, and for guard and ancillary services. Expedited by the heightened challenges in protecting national security, the government has committed the Singapore Police Force (“SPF”) to working with private security to enhance security awareness and professionalism (Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs 2002). As of March 31, 2001, the SPF had 11,102 full-time officers, comprised of 7,534 regular officers, 1,051 civilian officers and 2,517 National Servicemen, to serve a population of 4.13 million (Singapore Police Force 2002, Singapore Department of Statistics 2002). Four years previously, as of March 31, 1998, the number of full-time officers was 12,624 and was comprised of 9,005 regular officers, 790 civilians and 2,829 National Servicemen, and served a population of 3.92 million. Based on the four year period, the number of regular officers has decreased by 1,471 while the population has increased by about 210,000. However, the SPF has also had increased support over the same period from its reservist forces, which have increased by 1,103 from 19,374 in 1998 to 20,477 in 2001. We have to keep in mind that after completion of full-time national service, the majority of Singaporean males are required to serve a number of years in the reserve force, which requires them to report to army/police/civil defence duty annually for about two weeks. Nevertheless, the tasks to which reservist officers can be deployed would be more limited than those of regular officers due to the shortness of their reservist duty (usually two weeks per year) and the sophistication of new work processes requiring specialized training.

Besides the state police and private security, Singapore has a hybrid creature called the auxiliary police officer, who, by law, has the powers of state police within his area of jurisdiction, which may also be legislated. For instance, Singapore Airport Terminal Services (SATS) has its own police force, which is legislated to have police powers within the vicinity of Changi International Airport and Paya Lebar Airport (Singapore Statutes 1985, Chapter 235, Section 71[1]). Auxiliary police forces have compulsory training requirements which bear some resemblance to compulsory training for state police; they carry firearms, have the same ranks and wear uniforms which are sometimes identical to those of state police. Auxiliary police forces provide security services such as cash-in-transit armed escort, crowd control and guarding of key installations which private security will not be legally qualified or trained to undertake. In recent years, state police have divested more functions to auxiliary police. Among these are crowd control at major events, guarding of key installations including the homes of politicians, escorting prisoners and manning the country’s entry and exit points. Auxiliary police forces work for profit for specific customers who pay their bills.

Private security providers in Singapore generally offer three types of services – guard services, investigations and consulting. There are licensing requirements for persons wishing to establish agencies offering guard and investigation services under the Private Investigation and Security Agencies Act (Singapore Statutes 1985, Chapter 249). A person who carries on the business of a security guard agency without a licence commits an offence which carries a penalty of a fine not exceeding Singapore dollars $10,000 and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. Licences are issued by the Licensing Division of the Police Operations
Department at the discretion of the licensing officer. The Licensing Division issues some public guidelines on the eligibility criteria for applicants of a security guard agency licence. The applicant must have a minimum of two years experience in a security-related business and in management, an initial start-up capital of $25,000, be of good fame and character i.e. without criminal records and preferably have a minimum of three General Certificate in Education GCE) O Level passes or an Institute of Technical Education NTC-2 Certificate. There are also disqualifications under Section 7(3) of the Act, for which the licensing officer shall refuse to grant a licence. These disqualifications pertain to the character of the applicant for the licence – he must be proved to be a person of good character and must not have any criminal conviction for an offence involving fraud or moral turpitude. The licensing officer may also refuse a licence to the applicant if he considers it against the public interest to grant it. As of April 16, 2002, there are 301 security guard agencies holding licenses and employing 10,433 guards.

Interestingly, this number compares favourably with the 11,102 full-time officers in the Singapore Police Force, and does not include the number of auxiliary police officers nor in-house staff who are deployed to security duties (and do not require to be licensed under the Act). It is likely that the number of non-state agencies providing security services would outnumber state police, as is the established fact in developed countries (Shearing and Stenning 1983).

Besides the registration requirements, there are ongoing disclosure requirements under the Act. By virtue of Sections 13 and 14, holders of security guard licenses must not employ any person who has a criminal conviction involving dishonesty or moral turpitude or who is not a “fit and proper person” to be a security guard. All potential employees are required to submit to the licensing officer a prescribed form of statement containing various declarations including declarations as to whether he has had any criminal convictions. All guards are screened with the Criminal Investigation Department for confirmation as to whether any potential employee has a relevant criminal record.

The Act does not currently require a licence holder to train his employees. Accordingly, Singapore suffers the common ailment of having many guard agencies of untrained or poorly trained, unfit personnel. However, as a matter of practice, the Licensing Division will not renew the licence of a security guard agency if it does not meet specific training targets. The agency must show proof that 30% of its guards are trained in the Basic Security Course which typically lasts 2.5 days. These trainings are conducted by various approved centres at the end of the first year, and are steadily increased as the percentage of guards have gone through the basic training until the percentage is at least 75% by the end of the 5th year. This criteria is also used by the Security Association of Singapore (a security practitioners’ professional association) to confer the term “accredited” to security guard agencies (Security Association of Singapore 2002).

Due to the variation in size and commitment of security providers in Singapore, the impressions that the public has of private security is expected to vary with their own experiences and knowledge obtained in the media. There have been prominent newspaper reports of security officers being charged in court for hijacking shipments of computer parts, molesting condominium residents and not taking any action upon spotting crimes in progress (The Straits Times 1999). While the media has also reported cases involving state police officers charged with sometimes equally disturbing crimes, the public seems to be less concerned, as such reports are usually followed swiftly by a pledge from the Commissioner of Police or some other high-ranking officer that stern actions and reviews of processes to prevent recurrences will occur. There is currently no equivalent disciplinary and accountability structure for private security.

**Student Perceptions of Security Officers**

The data for this research were gathered from a segment of the general population consisting of secondary (high) school, polytechnic, and junior college students in Singapore.

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3 Statistics from K Murali, Officer in Charge of the Licensing Unit, Licensing Division, Singapore Police Force, with the kind consent of Assistant Commissioner Soh Wai Wah, Director of Operations, Singapore Police Force.
To assess the student perceptions of private security officers a questionnaire was developed with items from earlier research conducted in the United States by the first author. The questionnaire was modified to suite the demographic characteristics of Singapore. Responses were elicited on a Likert Scale with the range of 1 (Strongly agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree). The questionnaires were distributed to students in several secondary (high) schools and junior colleges, and randomly chosen classes in the Business school of a Polytechnic in Singapore. A total of 300 questionnaires were distributed out of which 260 useable surveys were returned representing an 87 percent response rate.

Findings

Respondent Characteristics

The demographic characteristics of all survey respondents are presented in Table 1. Respondents were evenly split in terms of age, with 49 percent in the age group of 12 to 18 years and 51 percent over 19 years. Those in the age group of less than 16 (not shown in table) constitute less than 10 percent. Of those who responded 70 percent were female and the remaining male. Respondents were less well distributed with respect to race/ethnicity, with 78 percent of the sample listing themselves as Chinese and the remaining consisting of Malay, Indian and unspecified others; this spread, however, represents the general population in Singapore. A majority of the respondents live with their parents (93%). Half of the respondents’ annual income is less than Singapore $25,000 while nearly a quarter (24%) of the sample earn between $25,000 and $50,000 annually and the remaining earn more than $50,000. Only 20 percent of the respondents work. In terms of family work history, 22 percent of the respondents’ parents or relatives work in law enforcement and less than 10 percent work in private security. About 14 percent of the respondents have security devices installed in their houses. Within the survey there was also a relatively even distribution for the variable of encounter or interaction with a security officer. Of those who had an encounter with a security officer, 59 percent indicated the interaction as positive. The respondents typically encountered security officers in shopping malls (38%), campus/school (27%), or in other areas (35%). Nearly half of those who interacted with an officer sought information and 14 percent were approached by a security officer asking if they needed help.
Table 1. General Characteristics of Respondents (N = 260)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percentage*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 – 18</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 and above</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity/Race</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently a student in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polytechnic/Undergraduate</td>
<td></td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With parents/family</td>
<td></td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual family income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;$25,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;$25,000 and &lt;$50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;$50,001 and &lt;$100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents/relatives in law enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents/relatives in private security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security devices/systems in parents’ homes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encounter with security officer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you characterize your encounter as</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td></td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You had your encounter in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping mall</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In school/on campus</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Encounter</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needed some information</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asked if needed help</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Missing cases not reported. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
Perceptions

Table 2 displays the percentage of subjects falling within each response category for the survey questions used in the analysis, as well as the means for these questions. Note that while in the original survey there are five response categories, for purposes of presentation the "Strongly Agree" and "Agree" categories were collapsed into one category, while the "Strongly Disagree" and "Disagree" categories were collapsed into a single category as well. This provided a somewhat more even distribution of the categories while maintaining the overall valence of the survey responses. A total of thirty-two questions were asked.

Of those questions that were strongly valenced (i.e. 50% or greater response rate), all were weighted in favor of the general "Agreement" category. These findings suggest that: (a) survey respondents felt that they were knowledgeable enough concerning security officers and security work to provide a valenced opinion; and (b) overall, survey respondents generally had a positive view of security officers and security work. More specifically, the respondents were more likely to agree with the opinion that security officers work toward making society a better place (70%), generally helpful (69%), protect customers (62%), serve organizations (61%), and work with police officers to protect citizens (69%). Over half of the respondents also indicated that the public generally trusts security officers and they should be allowed to use force. Though 55 percent do not believe that security work is dangerous, over 40 percent believe that officers are generally honest and they should be well paid. Over two-thirds do not believe that security officers are professional nor that their work is stressful. Only 20 percent believe that security officers are well educated.

Table 2. Perceptions regarding security officers (N=260)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Strongly Agree/Agree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disagree/Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Mean a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Work towards making society better</td>
<td>181/69.9</td>
<td>50/19.3</td>
<td>28/10.8</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Security and police officers together will protect the public from criminals</td>
<td>179/69.4</td>
<td>56/21.7</td>
<td>23/8.9</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Officers generally helpful</td>
<td>164/63.6</td>
<td>54/20.9</td>
<td>40/15.5</td>
<td>2.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Face noncriminal situations while working</td>
<td>159/61.6</td>
<td>65/25.2</td>
<td>36/13.2</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Officers help protect customers</td>
<td>158/61.3</td>
<td>64/24.7</td>
<td>36/14</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Provide valuable service to their organizations</td>
<td>158/61</td>
<td>80/30.9</td>
<td>21/8.1</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The public generally trust security to protect property and lives</td>
<td>150/58.2</td>
<td>66/25.5</td>
<td>42/16.3</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Should be allowed to use force to arrest</td>
<td>147/56.8</td>
<td>77/29.7</td>
<td>35/13.5</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Officers help reduce losses for business</td>
<td>143/55.5</td>
<td>79/30.6</td>
<td>36/13.9</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Officers well trained</td>
<td>128/49.5</td>
<td>88/34</td>
<td>43/16.6</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Security work is dangerous</td>
<td>117/45.1</td>
<td>83/32</td>
<td>59/22.7</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Get injured in the course of their duty</td>
<td>111/42.8</td>
<td>92/35.5</td>
<td>56/21.6</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Officers should be paid well</td>
<td>109/42.1</td>
<td>112/43.2</td>
<td>38/14.6</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Officers unaware of customer’s needs</td>
<td>108/41.7</td>
<td>118/45.6</td>
<td>33/12.8</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Officers are generally honest</td>
<td>105/40.5</td>
<td>130/50.2</td>
<td>24/9.3</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Spend little time apprehending criminals</td>
<td>99/38.4</td>
<td>98/38</td>
<td>61/23.6</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Law violators are always detected by security departments</td>
<td>99/38.2</td>
<td>93/35.9</td>
<td>67/25.8</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Security work is generally structured similar to police work</td>
<td>99/38.2</td>
<td>93/35.9</td>
<td>67/25.8</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Primary role is to apprehend criminals</td>
<td>98/37.8</td>
<td>92/35.5</td>
<td>69/26.7</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Officers sensitive to the public</td>
<td>98/37.8</td>
<td>97/37.5</td>
<td>64/24.7</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Security and police work together</td>
<td>94/36.4</td>
<td>112/43.4</td>
<td>52/20.1</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Officers are professional</td>
<td>89/34.5</td>
<td>103/39.9</td>
<td>66/25.6</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Have a lot of discretion</td>
<td>86/33.2</td>
<td>130/50.2</td>
<td>43/16.6</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Security departments organized similar to police agencies</td>
<td>84/32.7</td>
<td>120/46.7</td>
<td>53/20.6</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Security work is stressful</td>
<td>80/31.1</td>
<td>107/41.6</td>
<td>70/27.2</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Officers act as social workers</td>
<td>72/27.9</td>
<td>99/38.4</td>
<td>87/33.7</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Have good planning skills</td>
<td>71/27.4</td>
<td>132/51</td>
<td>56/21.6</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. In the future, many police functions will be taken over by private security</td>
<td>69/26.7</td>
<td>114/44.2</td>
<td>75/29.1</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Security officers abuse their powers</td>
<td>66/25.6</td>
<td>111/43</td>
<td>81/31.4</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Suspects more likely to be released after officers recover stolen property</td>
<td>60/23.3</td>
<td>124/48.1</td>
<td>74/28.6</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Difficult to distinguish security officer from police officers in solving crime problems</td>
<td>49/19</td>
<td>44/17.1</td>
<td>164/63.9</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( ^a = \text{N / } \% \)

\( ^b = 1: \text{Strongly Agree}, 2: \text{Agree}, 3: \text{Undecided}, 4: \text{Disagree}, 5: \text{Strongly Disagree} \)
Reliability analysis was used to force related survey questions together into factors based on the underlying theoretical model. Each forced factor was then submitted for factor analysis to determine the factor loadings of each question. Five factors emerged: (1) Professionalism of security officers; (2) Goals of security work; (3) Organization of security departments; (4) Image of security officers; and, (5) Nature of security work. The scales that were developed were reliable, with all five scales having a Cronbach's alpha of greater than .7. In order to examine whether different groups of respondents held different views regarding these scales, analysis was conducted using analysis of variance (ANOVA) to compare mean scores for the scales.

Table 3. Factor Loadings and Mean Scores for Survey Respondents (N=260)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
<th>Means*(1-5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professionalism of Security Guard (Mean= 2.90)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers are well-trained</td>
<td>.721</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers are well-educated</td>
<td>.675</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers are professionals</td>
<td>.751</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers are sensitive to the public</td>
<td>.687</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers have good planning skills</td>
<td>.693</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbachs Alpha = .8449</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals of Security Officers (Mean 2.48)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The public generally trusts security officers to protect property and lives</td>
<td>.663</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers perform valuable services to their organizations</td>
<td>.747</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers help protect customers</td>
<td>.654</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security professionals and police officers together protect public from crime</td>
<td>.663</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers help reduce losses for businesses</td>
<td>.601</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbachs Alpha = .8294</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization of security departments (Mean=2.95)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary role of security officers is protect property and lives</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security work is generally structured similar to police work</td>
<td>.649</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law violators are nearly always detected by security department</td>
<td>.648</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security departments are organized similar to police agencies</td>
<td>.632</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers act as social workers</td>
<td>.658</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the future, man police functions will be taken over private security</td>
<td>.647</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbachs Alfa = .7753</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Image of security officers (Mean= 2.53)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officer are in general helpful</td>
<td>.598</td>
<td>2.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers be should be allowed to arrest people</td>
<td>.675</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers are generally honest</td>
<td>.534</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers work towards making society a better place for all.427</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbachs Alpha = .7284</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature of security work (Mean= 2.89)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security work is stressful</td>
<td>.760</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security work is dangerous</td>
<td>.727</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbachs Alpha = .7364</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conducting ANOVA, it was necessary to perform an additive function with respect to individual questions comprising each factor, thus the means for the factors (as displayed in the following ANOVA tables) will vary based on the number of questions in each factor. The mean for the "Nature" factor, therefore, has a potential range of 5-10, as it contains two questions, each of which has an individual mean range of 1-5. Similarly, the "Professionalism" factor, which contains five questions, has a potential range of 5-26.
Non-Significant Mean Differences

Of the eight independent variables presented in Table 1, three variables exhibited no significant mean differences between the groups with respect to the five factors when submitted to an ANOVA test. There were no significant differences on any of the five factors between variables of age, gender, race/ethnicity, parents/relatives in private security, security devices in parent’s homes, and place of encounter with security officers. These findings are not shown in the table. While at first glance this result may seem surprising, as one would expect age, gender and race may influence perceptions. Perhaps there is greater homogeneity among the majority of Singaporeans, particularly those clustered in the age group of 17 to 19 (which is the majority in our sample). Similarly there is less variation in our sample in terms of gender and race.

There were also no significant differences on any of the five scales between respondents who had a family member either working in private security or in law enforcement, and those who did not. Again, while this is surprising considering that the latter individuals would have a greater knowledge base, as noted before, this does not necessarily lead to a difference in attitudes. Yet, it seems intuitive that respondents who had family members working in private security would have more positive views than those who did not, if only due to familial self-esteem issues. Once again the lack of difference may be due to the size of the sample, as only 9 percent of respondents indicated that they had a family member working in private security, and only 14 percent indicated that they had security devices in their homes suggesting some knowledge of private security industry.

Comparison of Means for School Status

Comparison of mean differences among different school levels shows that those in secondary school are likely to have a more positive view of the role of private security officers (16.72 v.17.90) relative to polytechnic and undergraduate students. The findings are similar for the image of security officers (9.50 v.10.28). However, these findings are marginally significant.
Table 4. Comparison of Mean Differences (AVOVA) for Respondents Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Professionalism</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Nature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>School Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>14.06 / 46</td>
<td>12.22 / 46</td>
<td>16.72 / 46</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>5.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.01)</td>
<td>(3.46)</td>
<td>(4.35)</td>
<td>(3.07)</td>
<td>(1.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polytechnic/Undergraduate</td>
<td>14.65 / 212</td>
<td>12.46 / 211</td>
<td>17.90 / 211</td>
<td>10.28</td>
<td>5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.16)</td>
<td>(3.16)</td>
<td>(3.56)</td>
<td>(2.39)</td>
<td>(1.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Value</td>
<td>1.169</td>
<td>2.92*</td>
<td>3.84*</td>
<td>3.6*</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With parents/Family</td>
<td>14.62 / 234</td>
<td>12.50 / 234</td>
<td>17.77 / 234</td>
<td>10.23</td>
<td>5.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.35)</td>
<td>(3.26)</td>
<td>(3.75)</td>
<td>(2.57)</td>
<td>(1.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental</td>
<td>13.78 / 18</td>
<td>11.12 / 17</td>
<td>16.47 / 17</td>
<td>9.18</td>
<td>5.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.04)</td>
<td>(2.40)</td>
<td>(3.59)</td>
<td>(1.88)</td>
<td>(1.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Value</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>9.97 / 204</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.7*</td>
<td>.644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annual Family Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000 and more</td>
<td>14.02 / 120</td>
<td>12.13 / 117</td>
<td>17.16 / 118</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.97)</td>
<td>(3.03)</td>
<td>(3.54)</td>
<td>(2.18)</td>
<td>(1.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000 - $50,000</td>
<td>15 / 55</td>
<td>12.76 / 55</td>
<td>18.00 / 55</td>
<td>10.45</td>
<td>5.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.96)</td>
<td>(3.51)</td>
<td>(4.10)</td>
<td>(2.80)</td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,001 and more</td>
<td>15.8 / 56</td>
<td>12.73 / 56</td>
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a = Mean scores / number of cases; (standard deviation); * <= .10; ** <= .05
Comparison of Means for Housing

Comparison of mean differences among those who live with parents suggests that they are less likely to be positive of security goals (12.50 v. 11.12) and image (10.23 v. 9.18) compared to those who live in rental accommodations. These findings are also marginally significant.

Comparison of Means for Respondents with Differing Levels of Family Income

A comparison of mean differences between respondents with different levels of family income is also presented in Table 4. Only two of the results reported were significant, with respondents with the lowest level of family income reporting the most positive views regarding the security professionalism, followed by those with the middle levels of family income and those with higher levels of family income (14.02 v. 15. v. 15.8). This trend was generally followed for the role of security work (17.16 v. 18 v. 18.69).

Comparison of Means for Respondents with Different Employment Patterns

Results for the comparison of mean differences between respondents with different employment patterns are also found in Table 4. With the exception of security professionalism, all mean differences between those who worked and those who did not were significant. Concerning security, those respondents who either do not work or work on-campus had more positive views (12.15 v.13.65) than those who worked. The trend is similar for other variables. These include: security role (17.34 v.19.54); security image (9.97 v.11.04); and, nature of security work (5.70 v.6.16). That is, those that did not work held more positive views about various attributes of security.

Comparison of Means for Respondent’s Parents/Relatives in Law Enforcement

Table 4 displays findings on mean differences for those whose parents and/or relatives work in law enforcement. Those whose parents/relatives work in law enforcement are likely to hold a less positive view of security goals (13.09 v.12.23) and the role of security officers (18.53 v.17.47) compared to those whose parents/relatives do not work in law enforcement. These findings are marginally significant.

Comparison of Means for Respondents’ Contact with Security Officers

Table 4 also contains the results of a comparison of mean differences among respondents who either have or have not had an encounter with a security officer. Concerning
the role of security work, respondents who have had an encounter with a security officer had less positive views (18.09 v.17.27) than those who have not had such an encounter. This finding was significant at .01 level. Others findings were not significant. However, those who had positive contact were more likely to hold positive views of all the factors that include professionalism, goals, role, image, and nature of security work. Interestingly, all of these findings were significant at .001 level.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Overall, in this study we find that Singaporean youth have a fairly positive view of security officers even though they do not have any misperceptions about the level of difficulty and stress at work, nor do they confuse their appearance with that of a police officer. However, they do believe that they contribute to the general social order of society and help customers, and clients and organizations of their sponsors. Whether such a generally positive view of the industry prevails among working adults and among certain sectors such as those in law enforcement is an open question; it is likely that these latter groups will have more informed and articulated views on private security due to experiences with private security on a more sustained basis.

One of the most important findings from this study is that those who have a positive contact with security officers are more likely to hold a positive view of many attributes of security officers including their professionalism, goals, role, image and nature of security work. Given that a significant part of public contact with private security involves giving or obtaining information, this suggests that, in their training modules, security organizations have to emphasize the importance of approaching customers and clients to offer help rather than posing as agents of social control. This may also raise questions as to how relevant it is to ask the public to compare police work and the work of private police.

Also, the fact that most respondents do not believe that security officers are not well educated does not help project a positive image to the security guard industry. Security organizations have to educate the masses about the role security officers play in supporting the activities of law enforcement. However, the viability of such a public acceptance campaign needs to move in tandem with professionalising the industry in terms of higher entry criteria and continual training, both of which will fundamentally affect the bottom lines of security agencies and their customers. To this end, a government-initiated multi-agency review is ongoing in Singapore to rationalise the training and registration of private police.
REFERENCES


CHINA'S UNTOUCHABLES: THE ANTI-SMUGGLING INVESTIGATION BUREAU

by

Prof. Benjamin C. Ostrov

Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics, and Strategic Research

The best laid schemes o' Mice an' Men, Gang aft agley.

Robert Burns, To a Mouse, On Turning Her Up in Her Nest with the Plough

Introduction

In January, 1999 China's Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau commenced operations. This paper aims to evaluate the performance of this organization in light of the purpose for its establishment, and come to an understanding of the reasons for such conduct. One must note, though, that the element of time, the nature of the regime, and the sensitivity of the question under study place important limitations upon an investigation of this subject. This is the best information available at this writing. Contrary to claims by Beijing, this writer finds that the performance of the unit has come up short. The reasons are inherent to the regime itself. A thorough analysis of the inherent deficiencies of the People's Republic of China is beyond the scope of this paper. At most, those which are relevant to the war on smuggling can be alluded to and briefly discussed.

China's leadership has been engaged in a war against corruption in general, and smuggling in particular, since July, 1998. It is my contention that such a battle will be unsuccessful. A regime which monopolizes power in the absence of potent competition is prone to harbor those who abuse power. Campaigns against smuggling, or corruption in general, must be limited to avoiding undermining the regime (Fabre 2000). Indeed, such a war on smuggling will only occur when the benefits of the activity have not been distributed widely enough and when violations are so flagrant that they cannot be ignored. The true function of any anti-smuggling campaign in a regime like China's then is not to eliminate smuggling. It is to show the public that something is being done to contain a type of crime which has become highly visible and to reinforce the regime's economic, as opposed to ideological, claim to legitimacy.

As long as real and potent political competition is absent, smuggling, with the connivance of officialdom, and other forms of corruption will persist. A comprehensive comparative study is, ultimately, what is required to defend this hypothesis. Here is an initial step: a case study of the effort to combat smuggling in China.
The Problem of Smuggling

A cursory survey of the history of smuggling reveals that the activity was first defined a few centuries ago. This required the existence of a coercive central authority to decide that certain products should be prohibited from importation or subjected to extra taxation. The notion of importing external goods implies the existence of political boundaries. Indeed, the appearance of smuggling as a recognized activity coincides with the formation of the nation-state.

In nineteenth century China, the Qing government banned the importation of opium and then had to contend with smugglers, mainly of British origin, bringing the product into the country. When necessary, the smugglers bribed and corrupted Chinese government officials in order to get the product to market. Eventually, an honest incorruptible official, Lin Cexu (Lin Tse-hsü), was appointed to solve the problem. He seized and destroyed a load of opium. The Opium War, from which Britain acquired Hong Kong, followed. After this, China proceeded to be victimized by Western powers and Japan until the end of the Qing dynasty and beginning of a non-imperial system in 1911. Many have viewed the Chinese government's actions against the opium trade as motivated by the humanitarian desire to stop drug addiction (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online 1999). However, a less charitable interpretation is presented in Collis' classic, Foreign Mud (1968). He notes that Chinese economists were concerned about the impact on the economy the continued outflow of silver would have. It was silver that was used by Chinese to purchase the opium. These economists believed that this trade would wreck the financial stability of the country and damage the state.

In this case, smuggling represented a challenge by external agents to the sovereignty of a polity undergoing state building. Today, smuggling is still viewed by states as a challenge to their sovereignty and, as such, is a crime not against any individual but against the state. Just as 160 years ago, Chinese officials are still concerned about the threat of smuggling against the financial health of the state. Members of the Chinese government have "conceded that smuggling, especially that by legal persons {companies}, has been eating away at {the state's} revenue and undermined the national economy (He 1998: 8)."

From an individualist or libertarian point of view, the legal consideration of a particular type of trade as smuggling is dubious when viewed in the state-focused context above. However, as mentioned in the case of opium, smuggling might be harmful to individuals as well. The opium trade may be a poor example because, at least prior to addiction, buyers freely chose to purchase opium. One must wonder whether the state is obligated
to protect individuals from themselves. If so, where will the intervention of the state end? However, the more common case of harm to individuals from smuggling concerns the damage to indigenous producers of a good when it is imported more cheaply from a foreign source. This problem also exists in China today. An example can be found in the case of sugar. In the past two years, a large quantity of white sugar has been smuggled into Guangdong Province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (He 1998). This has caused the closure of many sugar mills there and great losses for farmers engaged in cultivating sugar cane.

In this case, one may be more sympathetic to prohibiting or limiting trade by creating legislation defining certain types of importation as smuggling. However, even here, one might question the need or justification for such legislation. Such legislation presumes that controlled products can be acquired more cheaply from abroad. In other words, controlling foreign imports harms domestic consumers. One might say that domestic producers who are undersold by foreign ones should find a new line of work. On a larger scale, this would require restructuring of a segment, at least, of a state’s economy. This is highly disruptive, on both the individual and national levels. Although such restructuring can and does occur, it is painful to many individuals. Established democracies like the USA have survived it. However, one must wonder whether non-democratic regimes can also survive this process. In the case of China, this dilemma is exacerbated by a peculiar problem of legitimacy. Since De-Maoization in the 1980’s, the regime’s source of legitimacy is no longer primarily ideological. Increasingly, it is economic progress. Currently China has a surplus worker problem. If unemployment and underemployment increase further without any safety net, the foundations of the regime might be shaken. Consequently, legislation and anti-smuggling activity which appear to be designed to protect individuals from harm can also be seen as protecting the state from harm.

However, the only individuals protected by campaigning against smuggling are those who could not compete with the lower costs from cross-border products. Many more individuals can benefit from smuggling. Smuggling, and corruption in general, grease the wheels of non-market and limited market economies (Fabre 2000). To use the language of organization theory, in such economies these activities can reduce transaction costs.\(^1\) Guangxi province appears to have even treated smuggling as a development strategy when it could get away with it in between anti-corruption or anti-smuggling campaigns. It has

\(^1\) I am indebted to Emilio E. Dellasoppsa for this insight, which comes from the presentation of his paper “Corruption, Structure of Social Relations and Collusion Process in Brazilian Society” to the Eighth Annual Meeting of the International Police Executive Symposium (IPES) on May 28, 2001 in Szczyno, Poland.
derived much benefit from illegal cross-border trade with Vietnam (Hendrischke 2000). Indeed, smuggling appears to be viewed as a development strategy elsewhere in China as well. "Even some local governments along the southeastern coast reportedly protected smuggling under the pretext of 'developing the local economy' (He 1998: 8)."

An unlimited campaign against smuggling and corruption, in such an economic context, would threaten not just the smugglers and others engaged in corruption but many more who derive benefits not available within the confines of the official economy. Furthermore, in a "monopolistic regime" (to use Fabre's phrase) like that of China, an unlimited campaign would be bound to reach the pinnacle of power and would threaten the leadership itself (Fabre 2000: 8). Besides the functional type of corruption previously discussed promoting this tendency, here is also another kind which affects China and reinforces the inherent structural limits upon any campaign. That is a corruption borne of the arrogance of those who have been in power too long. It can be found not only in states like China but democracies as well. Consider the current difficulties of Germany's Christian Democratic Party, the problems of some Conservatives near the end of the Thatcher/Major era, and even the difficulties that can afflict local government such as that of New York City where many around Mayor Koch fell to charges of corruption even though he remained untainted. Indeed, "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely (Lord Acton 1972: 335-336)."

The Need for an Anti-Smuggling Unit

From the Chinese state's perspective, limiting importation of certain goods is justified. Leaders also recognize that just as Chinese officials at the time of the Opium War2 were financially induced to allow banned commodities entry into China, the same phenomenon exists today. Therefore, recruitment of personnel to stop such trade would be difficult.

In July 1998, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council (a body analogous to the Cabinet in the USA) held a joint working meeting to address the problem of smuggling on a nationwide level. They demanded a unified carefully considered plan which would thoroughly deploy the necessary resources to launch a

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2 The Opium War was precipitated in 1839 by the seizure and destruction of over 20,000 chests of opium in Guangzhou (Canton) by the Imperial Commissioner Lin Ceshu. He had been sent by China's Emperor to end the importation of opium. The British East India Company exported it into China, resulting not just in an upsurge of drug addiction but also a drain on the Chinese economy. The British reacted to this seizure of private property by attacking China. The Opium War ended in 1842 with the Treaty of Nanking. One of the most important provisions of this treaty was the cession of Hong Kong to Britain 'in perpetuity' (Collis 1968).
arge scale anti-smuggling campaign. Thus the campaign was officially launched. Following this, the General Political Department, General Staff Department, General Logistics Department, and General Armament Department, the four departments near the pinnacle of the organizational structure of the PLA (People's Liberation Army), held meetings to work out feasible deployment of its forces nationwide to fight smuggling (Leung 1998).

However, also in July, 1998, Premier Zhu Rongji announced the impending establishment of the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau (Chou 1999). The following year, the views of State Councillor Luo Gan, secretary of the Central Political Science and Law Committee, were reported in a Xinhua release on January 5, 1999 which was reprinted the next day in China Business Information Network (CBNET) as "China Sets Up Anti-Smuggling Police Task Force". He said that an anti-smuggling unit would have "to investigate major cases and arrest smugglers regardless of the status of the individuals or departments involved." He also warned that "members of the force should scrupulously avoid corruption and graft." His statement implicitly recognizes that any of the potential combatants against smuggling, including the PLA, can be financially compromised and are difficult to rely upon. In 1998, according to official figures, some 158,000 Party members were disciplined for corruption (Kynge 1999).

While the PLA was initially to have a critical role in the war on smuggling, questions about its integrity represent a longstanding problem. The roots of this problem stretch back to the 1970’s and The Four Modernizations Campaign3. This put military modernization in the lowest priority (Deng 1977 and 1978). This low priority was reflected in the defense budget for many years. In order to make up the budget shortfall, many units created sideline businesses and were initially encouraged to do so (Deng 1977). However, allowing military units to go into business creates opportunities and temptations for corruption.

The army is allocated equipment valued by civilians. This equipment need not be purchased by the military, yet the PLA can sell or rent it. Thus, there is opportunity. Running enterprises orients thinking towards more accumulation of wealth and increases temptation. Thus there is desire. Some examples of such illicit military activity follow.

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3 The Four Modernizations (science and technology, industry, agriculture, and national defense) was first announced by Premier Zhou Enlai in January 1975. It called for China achieving a level of modernization equivalent to that of the most modern states by the end of the Twentieth Century. (This goal was not achieved.) The policy was delayed until 1978 by the death of Premier Zhou not long after his announcement and the opposition of the Gang of Four (Mao Zedong’s wife and her followers). In 1976 Mao Zedong died. In October that year, the Gang of Four was arrested. China’s then leader, Hua Guofeng, brought Deng Xiaoping back into national life. Deng had been purged a second time following Zhou's death. Deng was first purged during the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, Hua announced and Deng championed the revival of the Four Modernizations with national defense in the lowest priority (Zhou 1984; Hua 1978; Deng 1977 and 1978; and Ostrov 1991).
Starting in the 1980’s, the license plates of military transports were rented out and then used for smuggling (Chen and He 1988). As early as 1988, some military transports themselves were rented out in the Guangzhou military region (Chen and He 1988). In November 1988, two military units in the Shenyang military region were fined for illegally buying goods (Zeng and Shen 1988). By 1998, it was being reported that the PLA, especially in Guangdong province, has been running a smuggling empire (Sheridan 1998).

The most extreme case involved violence. PLA troops took part in the attack, robbery, and murder of a group of Taiwanese tourists on Zhejiang's Qiandao Lake on March 31, 1994. Beijing has denied the involvement of soldiers. However, Taiwanese intelligence sources as well as Mainland authorities’ mishandling of evidence and their initial claim that the incident was an accident suggest otherwise (Ngai 1994ab and Yeung 1994ab). This criminal behavior is the result of what originally began as legal efforts in profit-making business activities meant to compensate for budget shortfalls. These efforts eventually aimed at lifestyle enhancement, such as improved barracks and military base facilities. The effort to achieve this eventually went as far as to include illegal means such as piracy (Ostrom 1995).

Finally, in 1998 Beijing ordered the military and other organs to surrender their multi-billion dollar businesses to central government control. The Government claims this task is complete (Mudie 1999). That is doubtful. Although many businesses have been surrendered, these were primarily primitive small-scale factories near military bases that provided jobs to PLA family members and were subsidized by local governments. Now many are going bankrupt. However, the PLA has managed to retain control of its profitable investments in telecommunications (Forney 1999). It probably has retained control of large-scale profitable firms in other areas as well.

Besides the Military, other Government bodies representing potential combatants against smuggling, including the police and even some courts were found to be compromised by criminal involvement. As already mentioned, local governments occasionally do view smuggling as a development strategy. For example, it was revealed in January, 1999 that Beijing had sent a task force to Zhanjiang to investigate the city's leadership for taking part in a large smuggling operation, which included arms dealing (Mudie 1999). In the same month, two of China's top police officers, including a deputy minister of the Public Security Bureau, were detained for corruption. According to Zhu Rongji, they were likely to be executed (Mudie 1999). In addition, Li Jizhou, Vice-Minister of Public Security since 1995 and China's top anti-smuggling official, was dismissed in December, 1998 from his post and arrested in January, 1999 on corruption charges (Kurtenbach 1999). Furthermore, Luo Ji and Huang Lizhi, two of the country's top graft-busters, were dismissed from the
anti-corruption bureau of the state prosecutor in November, 1998 by the National People’s Congress (Mudie 1999).

Current and former Customs staff have also been involved in smuggling. Since the launch of the anti-smuggling campaign in the second half of 1998, five customs officers at department or bureau-chief levels had been investigated and then arrested for smuggling and bribery. Among them are the Zhanjiang customs chief, who was involved in a major case of smuggling in Zhanjiang. Also, a senior General Administration of Customs (GAC) official, who was implicated in the Li Jizhou smuggling case, has been arrested. Besides, it has been reported in Hong Kong on April 20, 1999 in a Ming Pao (Ming Bao) article entitled “Beijing Source Says Customs Leadership Under Investigation” that since the launch of this campaign in the second half of 1998, over 100 officers from the customs network under the GAC had been arrested. According to Huang Rufeng, head of the Disciplinary Commission of the GAC, "638 Customs personnel -- some 2 per cent of the total staff strength of 30,000 -- have been punished in the past five years for their involvement in about 450 cases (He 1998: 8).” Clearly, the most logical combatants against smuggling - the police, the military, and Customs authorities - have all been compromised and are of doubtful reliability. A new unit that is pure and uncompromised would be needed to offer a fresh start.

From January to November, 1998, "the number of cases and the value of smuggling increased 23 per cent and 95 per cent respectively over the same period from 1997. It ran to a total of 12 billion yuan [$1.43 billion]" (Chou 1999: 6). Items smuggled range from low to high tech. They included electronic gadgets and mobile communications goods, foodstuffs, textiles, oil, and automobiles. The last two were generally smuggled from Hong Kong and the last was particularly favored by the PLA (He 1998; Sheridan 1998; and Kynge 1999).

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW ANTI-SMUGGLING INVESTIGATION BUREAU

According to two articles on January 6, 1999, one being from the China Business Information Network (CBNET) entitled "China Sets Up Anti-Smuggling Police Task Force" and the other from the South China Morning Post entitled "Inauguration Marks Anti-Smuggling Peak," as well as an official news report from Beijing (Yu 1999), the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau commenced operations on January 5, 1999. The Bureau is being established in two phases. Initially, 6,000 special police officers have been recruited and placed into units called anti-smuggling police corps (Xiao 2000). They make up 18 special
investigation bureaus. In the second phase, which was supposed to be implemented throughout the first half of 1999, 24 more bureaus would be formed. Altogether, these 42 bureaus were supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officers all across China. However, the development of this agency could not keep up the pace required by this schedule. According to a *Xinhua* release entitled "Anti-Smuggling Police Force Effective" on August 3, 2000, by that time the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau consisted of only 4,751 people.

The anti-smuggling staff have been placed in many cities. By the time the establishment of the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau is complete, a network of cities with their own subsidiary bureaus will exist. Guangzhou, Beijing, Fuzhou, Shanghai, Nanjing, Shenzhen, Gongbei, Shantou, Jiangmen, Xiamen, and Zhanjiang are among cities where offices were set up relatively early. Other offices were opened later. For example, an article printed in *China Daily* on July 21, 1999 entitled "China: Customs' Anti-Smuggling Efforts Pay Off" reported that one of these was the office in Qingdao, where operations commenced that month. Clearly, the emphasis is on port cities and economic contact. However, other cities have also been included. A *Xinhua* release on June 30, 1999 entitled "Task Force Set Up to Tackle Qinghai Smugglers" reported that in landlocked Xining, a branch office was set up in Qinghai that day.

According to the January 5, 1999 *Xinhua* release and "Inauguration Marks Anti-Smuggling Peak," (South China Morning Post, January 6, 1999), the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau has been recruiting personnel mainly from the GAC and Public Security officers. It has also been getting officers from the PLA, other government departments, and university graduates. They are being recruited based not only on ability but character. They are made to receive specialized training. Their loyalty, integrity, and resistance to corruption are to be guaranteed by Party control. A political commissar system is to operate at the sub-bureau level and above.

The Bureau is to be an arm of the police but is also meant to be a specialized customs force (Chou 1999). The previously cited *South China Morning Post*, January 6, 1999 report says it will be directly run by the GAC but the Ministry of Public Security is supposed to retain some administrative jurisdiction (Chou 1999). A well-placed informant reports that the Guangzhou branch of the Bureau has its office in the back room of the Guangzhou GAC office (Cheung 1999). Indeed, the GAC considers the Bureau to be a component of its organization. The GAC's own organizational chart lists the Bureau along with a number of other departments as a constituent unit.4

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4 See "Haiguan zongshu zuzhi jigou tu" [Organizational Chart of China's General Administration of Customs] at http://www.customs.gov.cn/zzjgt/ZZJG.htm. This is a web page from the "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo haiguan zongshu" [Customs General Administration People's Republic of China] web
It may seem unusual to Western eyes to have one administrative unit directly subordinate to two others but this is not unprecedented in China. The Commission in Charge of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) is a State Council unit so it is subordinate to the Premier. However, it is also directly subordinate to the Military Commission of the Party's Central Committee (State Council 1983ab). The reasons for such dual subordination are varied. One concerns competition by power centers within China's political system, in this case the State Council with its bureaucracy and the Military. The other is historical. There have been occasions in the past where a unit has been able to expand its jurisdiction and conquer others in order to gain resources to achieve its policy goals. A prime example was COSTIND's predecessor, the Science and Technology Commission for National Defense. This organ was tasked to develop China's first atomic bomb. In pursuit of this goal, it took over numerous other units by taking advantage of a lack of attention by its superiors in the Party Central Committee's Military Commission. They were preoccupied with trying to save their skins during the Cultural Revolution (Ostrov 1991). While in times of upheaval a system of dual hierarchy can help maintain administrative control, usually life is more orderly. During the normal periods of routine, dual hierarchy instead may impede efficient policy implementation.

Another type of bureaucratic control is currently being considered. Legislators are sensitive to the danger of corruption-fighters becoming corrupt. In the ongoing Thirteenth National People's Congress they were to consider revising customs legislation. One of the members, Chi Haibin, suggested that customs officials should not stay at one post for more than two or three years, but should "be rotated nationwide so that they are not tempted by the spoils of corruption (Meng 1999: 1)." Such practice already goes on regarding leading military officials. There it is intended to maintain the control of central State and Party authorities and prevent warlordism. Such a practice is also a revival of the traditional 'doctrine of avoidance' practiced during the Qing Dynasty, China's last imperial dynasty. Then it involved the rotation of top civil service officials (Mandarins) from locality to locality and the avoidance of stationing them in their home regions. The aim was to maintain the loyalty and integrity of the civil service. The practice worked until the mid-nineteenth century when, out of desperation, in order to put down the highly threatening Taiping Uprising, leading civil service officials were sent back to their home regions where it was hoped...
ey would be able to raise militias to aid in the defeat of the Taiping forces. Indeed they did, but this was the beginning of China's warlord problem. This was to afflict China until the Communists seized power in 1949.

Only after the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau had been in operation for nearly a year did the State Council propose a draft amendment to China's Customs Law. According to "China to Amend Customs Law," (People's Daily [Renmin ribao] Online, December 18, 1999) and Meng (1999), it would ratify the agency's establishment and recruitment of officers. This amendment was considered by the National People's Congress, was passed in July, 2000, and went into effect January 1, 2001. According to a Xinhua report on July 8, 2000, the amended law ensured that those fighting smuggling were given the same powers to investigate and arrest people as officers of other public security bodies. According to "Amendment of Customs Law Emphasizes Fight Against Smugglers," (People's Daily Online, July 3, 2000), it also freed anti-smuggling officers from interference by local governments.

It is not common in China for a law to come into being recognizing the establishment of a new government body after that unit has been functioning for some time. This can be interpreted at least as that the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau was initially experimental in nature. However, this view is belied by how ambitious and extensive the establishment of this organ was. A more likely interpretation is that the urgency of the need to attack smuggling and associated problems dictated the rapid establishment of the Bureau and commencement of its operations in advance of authorizing legislation.

Performance

The jurisdiction of the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau appears to be somewhat muddled. According to the January 6, 1999 South China Morning Post report as well as Yu (1999) and Kurtenbach (1999), the Bureau was formally charged with fighting tariff-related crime only. It was to work with local Public Security bureaus to fight tax evasion and tariff-related smuggling by carrying out investigations, arresting suspects, and conducting preliminary hearings. The Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau was explicitly excluded from concerning itself with other crimes such as the smuggling of drugs, guns, and other commodities. Nor was it to concern itself with the general maintenance of social order (Kurtenbach 1999 and Yu 1999). However, the Bureau's actual performance suggests otherwise.

A general picture is provided from "China: Anti-Smuggling Efforts Fruitful," (China Daily, April 26, 1999) and "Quanguo haiguan kuoda dasi zhangguo [Expanded attack again
st smuggling by General Administration of Customs victorious," (Renmin ribao [People's Daily], April 25, 1999). In its first four months of existence, the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau did solve a number of tax evasion cases involving 277 million yuan (US$33.4 million). Yet 81% of smuggling cases uncovered during this period by the Bureau involved freight transportation. These cases accounted for around 95% of all smuggling cases at this time. Another 120 cases during this period, worth 555 million yuan (US$ 67 million), involved the processing trade.

According to "China: Huge Amount of Oil Seized," (China Daily, July 22, 1999), a major anti-smuggling operation involving a coordinated effort by a number of government departments took place in June and July of 1999. Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau officers took part in this major operation run by the GAC at the mouth of the Pearl River and nearby waterways. Also taking part were units from the State Economic and Trade Commission, Ministry of Public Security, and the State Administrative Bureau of Industry and Commerce. Water-borne staff in 17 boats from the Guangzhou, Gongbei, Shenzhen, Haikou and Jiangmen offices of the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau took part in seizing 33,077.51 tons of oil and a batch of electric appliances with a total value of 70 million yuan (US$ 8.4 million) that was suspected to have been smuggled. In addition, GAC staff in 33 boats from offices in these cities participated in the operation. In the course of this effort, 2,964 vessels were searched and 462 boats that were suspected of being involved in smuggling activities were found. This was the second time that these government departments carried out a joint operation against smuggling. Their first anti-smuggling campaign was carried out between February and May, 1999.

The difference between the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau's formal jurisdiction and its actual operational behavior is clear. The reasons for this difference cannot be known with certainty at this early stage. One can only speculate that the formal subordination of the Bureau to the GAC has allowed the latter to command resources of the former for enforcement operations when it desires. In practice, the GAC overrides jurisdictional limitations of the Bureau as it feels the need.

Published reports including the one already mentioned in the April 26, 1999 China Daily and "Quanguo haiguan kuoda dasi zhanguo [Expanded attack against smuggling by General Administration of Customs victorious]," (Renmin ribao [People's Daily], April 25, 1999) indicate that Chinese authorities have claimed that this anti-smuggling force has made a significant contribution to reducing the incidence of smuggling. According to these reports, anti-smuggling investigation units across the country have handled 360 cases in the first quarter of 1999, and solved 192, which involved a total of 950 million yuan (US $ 114.5 million). Some 560 traffickers were given penalties by the anti-smuggling police.
This occurred in a general context where the number of smuggling cases solved overall during the period was 994, representing a decline of 19% from the corresponding period last year. However, these cases were valued at 1.46 billion yuan (US$176 million), representing an increase of 36% over the figures for the previous year.

In the specific case of one of these Bureaus, that of Xiamen, the claim has been made in "Eastern Chinese Province Stopping Smuggling Initially," (Xinhua News Agency, July 12, 1999) that in the first half of 1999 94 cases have been investigated and 187 people have been arrested. These 94 cases involved goods worth 99.75 million yuan (US$12.02 million).

Reports also indicate increases in tariff income due to the efforts of the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau. For example, according to "China: Customs' Anti-Smuggling Efforts Pay Off," (China Daily, July 21, 1999), the Qingdao office of the Bureau investigated five smuggling cases in the first half of this year, involving 41.3 million yuan (US$5 million). Due to the efforts of this office of the Bureau, Qingdao Customs has increased its tariff income. In the first half of this year, it received a record 3.3 billion yuan (US$400 million). As this case directly (and others less directly) illustrates, a significant benefit of these law enforcement activities is income generation for state agencies.

Reports have also credited economic benefits to the anti-smuggling drive in general. According to "China's Output of Electrical Appliances Up" as reported in China Business Information Network (CBNET) on January 25, 2000 Chinese market sources attribute an increase in sales of Chinese manufactured household electrical appliances to the anti-smuggling drive. For example, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, the production of color TV sets from January to November hit 39.01 million, increasing by 28.1% on an annual basis. In addition, China's production of air conditioners reached 12.51 million during this period, increasing 30.6% on an annual basis and the production of washing machines went up 9.5% to 11.73 million.

Furthermore, according to the General Administration of Customs, Chinese customs personnel in general discovered 9,268 smuggling cases in the first 11 months of 1999, representing a 46% increase in smuggling cases being solved over the same period for 1998. China's customs revenue hit a record high of 158.96 billion yuan (US$19 billion) in 1999, increasing 80.8% over the previous year and almost doubling the annual target because of the crackdown on smuggling as well as an increase in imports and customs revenue. Officials from the customs administration said the government's campaign against smuggling and increasing domestic demand, have effectively stemmed illegal imports and greatly increased legitimate trade (Wu, 2000).

To credit these increases to the anti-smuggling drive presumes that the increase i
n supply in such commodities reflects an increase in demand. Furthermore, this increase in demand would be attributed to the decline in supply from competing goods originating across the border. The validity of such assumptions remains unproven.

Assessment

In evaluating the performance of the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau, one must first be cautious. The unit has been in existence a short time. The previous discussion suggests that in this brief period its activity has been operating extensively and highly successful. However, one should approach such reports with some skepticism since Chinese authorities have been overzealous in making claims for the success of the Bureau and, as expected, the targets have been limited. The following cases will serve to demonstrate this.

It was reported in "HK Oil Smugglers Sentenced in Guangdong," (Xinhua News Agency, May 6, 1999) that the Guangzhou office of the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau had been credited with handling the case of two Hong Kong seamen. These men were employees of Hong Kong's New World Shipping Company and reportedly had tried to smuggle diesel oil across the border into Guangdong province. The two were found guilty of smuggling 314.7 tons of diesel oil, from which they gained 58,000 yuan each and sentenced to one year's imprisonment and fined 120,000 yuan by the Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court. If successful, they would have evaded 112,000 yuan in tariffs.

The two were arrested on January 6 while in the process of carrying out their illegal activity. However, the Guangzhou office of the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau was not established until January 8. Indeed, according to the May 6, 1999 Xinhua release, it was officers of the Panyu Customs unit near Shenzhen that caught and arrested the two men. It is likely that this operation was aided by the establishment of anti-smuggling checkpoints by Guangdong authorities prior to the establishment of the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau. These checkpoints were at Sam Men island, off Shenzhen at the border with the eastern side of Hong Kong, and Wan Chai and Kwai Shan islands, off Zhuha i at the border with Macau (Agence France-Presse, January 2, 1999). The vicinity of these islands has been well-known for smuggling.

Clearly, the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau did not carry out any investigative work leading to the arrest of the two Hong Kong seamen. At most, after the men were caught, the Bureau might have played a role in aiding the prosecutorial work of the Procurate and Court. Yet, the Guangzhou office of the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau has been credited with handling the case. Indeed, the May 6, 1999 Xinhua release cites t
his as its first case. Here is one example of claims being made for the Bureau's success which appears to be extravagant and casts doubt upon the credibility of other such claims.

The Xiamen smuggling scandal also shows that the campaign has limits and that the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau's performance amounts to less than what has been claimed. According to various reports including "Chinese Official Becomes First to Speak Out on 'Biggest Smuggling Case'" as reported by the Kyodo News Service, Tokyo, on March 9, 2000 in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, a number of leading figures in Xiamen have been implicated in alleged smuggling activities carried out by the head of the Yuanhua (Farewell) Group, Lai Changxing, since investigators were sent there in August, 1999. They include two Xiamen deputy Party leaders, the local Customs chief, the son of recently retired leading general Liu Huaqing, a former vice-chairman of the Military Commission, and Lin Youfang, the wife of Politiburo member, Jia Qinglin. Jia is an intimate of China's leader Jiang Zemin (Chu 2000 and O'Neill 2000). Initially, Lin appeared to be in difficulty and Jia reportedly divorced her in December, 1999 (Chu 2000). However, she now is out of difficulty, is apparently still married to Jia, and has been seen at official functions with him publicly (Guo 2000).

I have been unable to find a single report mentioning the involvement of the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau in this investigation. This silence is significant since the regime has been eager to trumpet the successes of the Bureau to reassure the public that it is cracking down on crime. Opportunities for positive propaganda have not been neglected. Silence concerning the role of the Bureau in this investigation suggests, at a minimum, that the Bureau has had no role. That would be embarrassing enough. However, a more damaging possibility exists. Just as the local Customs chief has been implicated, perhaps even personnel of the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau have come under a cloud. Indeed, a Xinhua report states that Lai used a seven-story edifice informally called 'the Red Mansion' to create an ambiance conducive to corrupting numerous officials including those responsible for anti-smuggling operations ("China's Xinhua Reports on Xiamen Smuggling Case," August 9, 2001).

On the other hand, one must also be concerned about the professional integrity of the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau. There is already evidence that this force of untouchables is not entirely incorruptible. In March this year, Wang Jianzheng, former deputy director of the anti-smuggling investigation team of Jinhua city in Zhejiang Province, was sentenced to 17 years for taking 316,750 yuan in bribes at the behest of which Zhao Lijuan. This 'Chinese Cleopatra allegedly seduced him and two other high officials (O'Neill 2002).
Besides, it is possible that the force might be too zealous in its operations and even abuse the rights of China's citizens. By the term 'rights' here, I refer not to a concept of transcendent human rights but a more limited notion of rights even as understood according to China's constitution. (Technically, it would be more accurate in the Chinese context to speak of privileges than of rights.) There is a built-in incentive to be too aggressive in the enforcement of anti-smuggling regulations or even to manufacture evidence. *The South China Morning Post* (January 6, 1999) reports that 35% percent of the proceeds from confiscated goods would go back to the anti-smuggling units. The rest of the funds would be split between provincial governments and the Central Government. Prior behavior of other Chinese organizations presented with the opportunity to gain wealth gives cause for concern. The military, as already cited, is a clear example of this danger. As presently constituted, the supposedly incorrupt and incorruptible Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau is endowed with a money-making privilege that presents the danger of corruption.

Consider a very recent operation of the force. This past June, Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau police together with Shantou Customs officials chased and then seized a ship carrying 3.2 million compact discs. Smugglers had been attempting to bring them into China. Somehow, the smugglers escaped before the officers could board the ship ("In Brief", June 12, 2002). Certainly, hauls like this present a great temptation to law enforcers.

**Conclusion**

Other than removing the monetary incentive for prosecution, China has already taken most of the steps possible to combat corruption. If nothing else, this suggests the leadership has demonstrated the will to end smuggling. However, enduring success is unlikely. The Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau has itself already been tainted by corruption. According to a report on July 20, 2000 in *Tai Yang Pao* (Taiyang bao) Zhang Jingrong, holding positions simultaneously as the deputy director of the Huidong Customs Office under the Shenzhen Customs Bureau and the head of the Huidong branch of the Anti-Smuggling Investigation Bureau, has come under investigation. He was accused of selling information to smugglers and taking bribes from them and has been ordered to confess. The unit Zhang headed had previously been singled out for praise by China's Premier Zhu Rongji for the exceptionally good job it had been doing. Granted, the proximity to Hong Kong and the repeated blandishments of smugglers made temptation overwhelming for Zhang. However, if the leader of such an outstanding unit can go bad, one has to wonder about the ability of the rest of the Bureau and its leadership to resist corruption. Presumably in
response to this debacle, according to "China Customs to Implement New Anti-Corruption Measures," (People's Daily Online, February 22, 2001), starting March 1, 2001 new measures aimed at monitoring supervisory Customs staff took effect. All such officials will be audited by superiors prior to any change in position. However, this reform fails to address the fundamental problem. Corruption is rooted in the monopolistic character of the regime. China's government can do little more, short of transforming itself, to fight smuggling at its roots.
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Investigating Risk Factors among Correctional Inmates in Korea

by

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ABSTRACT

This study intends to explore variables to predict inmates' behaviors during imprisonment and to explain violence of the crimes they committed. As a result of statistical analyses, various predictors effectively explained variance of dangerous behaviors in prison; attitude during pre-convicted detention, a number of rule violations during previous imprisonment, risk evaluation of correctional officers, psychological characteristics such as abandonment and delusion. Also, variance of offensiveness of a current crime was significantly explained by previous criminal records, a number of criminal convictions including delinquencies, an interval of being employed, psychological tendency of aggression and self-abandonment, attitude during pre-convicted detention, involvement to gangsters, family support, and educational levels. At last, it was discussed how to apply these significant predictors for inmate classification and risk assessment.

Introduction

Dramatic increases in adult, male prison populations and dangerously overcrowded conditions in Korea pose an urgent need for a methodologically sound procedure of offender classification. Although several psychological classification systems, broadly used in western countries, were introduced in Korea, the majority of adult inmates still continue to be assigned into correctional units based on the demographic factors such as gender and the content of offenses they currently convicted. Such a strategy appears to ignore potential risk factors such as meaningful personality and behavioral precursors of physical assaults, sexual victimizations, suicides, escapes, and additional dysfunction behaviors.

In contrast, a worldwide trend is that risk assessment is pervasively performed and takes an important role not only for conviction procedures but also for parole decisions. As Bonta (2002) nicely summarized, conducting risk assessment has developed so fast during last 20

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6 This study was supported by the Grant of Korea Research Foundation (KRF- 2002- 013- C00141).
years that it becomes a part of regular work routine especially at correctional settings.

The turning point to debilitate the antagonistic disputes against constitutionality of violence prediction was validity evidences of risk factors including actuarial researches (Monahan, 1996). Violence prediction studies could be categorized into predictive, concurrent and postdictive ones. In general, criterion measures of these studies are violent recidivism or institutional violence (e.g. Gendreau, Goggin, & Smith, 2002). The most commonly included predictors in these studies could be actuarial measures of criminogenic factors and clinical assessments. Even though psychological standardized tests such as Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) might be popular in this area, Bonta (2002) reported the validity indices of actuarial risk scales were superior to any clinical assessments.

This study is designed to explore to find out which predictors are significantly related to inmates’ risk behaviors. Risk behaviors are assessed by several indices in this study. First of all the number of disciplinary code violations and the degree of violence included into these rule violations were rated as criteria of misbehaviors. Second, the number of past crimes and the degree of violence included in a current crime were assessed as another criteria of risk behaviors. The former criteria of risk behaviors could be regarded as concurrent measure to predictors and the later ones could be thought as postdictive measure of risk factors.

In order to investigate potential risk factors more comprehensively, data on psychological inventory developed by Korean researchers (Lee & Byun, 2001) and a standardized evaluation score of correctional officers were also gathered with all the criminogenic variables. Most of the crimonogenic variables came from of ficial records of Korean Bureau of Corrections. The main purpose of this study was to investigate the significant predictors for risk behaviors defined as misbehaviors in prison and previous criminal behaviors.

METHOD

Subjects.

Data collection was made in cooperation of Korean Bureau of Corrections. Stratified random samples were selected based on the districts all around the country. 7 prisons in Kyonggi area, 11 prisons in Kyongsang area, 6 prisons in Choongchung area, and another 6 prisons in Julla area participated in this research. These prisons were selected to maximize the diversity of prisoners with regard to variables that were suspected a priori to have associations with risk behaviors. 1500 prisoners from these prisons were first asked for data collection but data from 1337 inmates and officers in charge of them were gathered finally.
Among data from 1337 inmates, 77 data had incomplete and invalid responses on self-report inventory. Additionally, 102 inmate responders rejected the use of their data for research purpose on the consent form given at the end of data collection. Among the final data set of 1148 inmates, data from 231 female inmates were excluded in this study. Therefore, 917 valid data from male inmates were analyzed in this research.

Table 1. Demographic and Criminogenic Characteristics (N = 917)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>frequencies(%) or mean(SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 29</td>
<td>385(42.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 – 39</td>
<td>353(38.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 49</td>
<td>147(16.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 – 59</td>
<td>27(.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 60</td>
<td>5(0.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contents of crimes currently convicted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny</td>
<td>76(8.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>armed robbery</td>
<td>192(20.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>93(10.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>25(2.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>275(30.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sexual assault</td>
<td>181(19.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drug trafficking</td>
<td>20(2.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintentional</td>
<td>27(2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>28(3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sentence</td>
<td>mean(SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>135.5 months(214.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>criminal records</td>
<td>mean(SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.82 (1.37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Korean inmates are currently divided into four groups based on crimes convicted and their previous criminal records. Among these four groups of inmates, third and fourth groups used to be sent to prisons with maximum security. Among responders included in this study, inmates ranked into the first group were 115 (12.5%), those ranked as the second group were 157(17.1%), those assigned to the third group were 304(33.2%), and those evaluated into fourth group were 341(37.2%).

Based on the crime recently convicted, 76(8.3%) inmates committed larceny, 192(20.9%) inmates robbed with weapon, 93(10.1%) inmates were engaged in violent crimes such as
physical assault, 25(2.7%) inmates committed fraud, 275(30.0%) inmates were murderers, 181(19.7%) inmates committed aggravated sexual assault, and 20(2.2%) inmates were drug-trafficking. Average duration of sentence was 135.5(214.39) months since relatively more murderers included in this sample. Average criminal record was 1.82(1.37) times. Among these inmates, people previously sentenced once were 56.5%, and people previously sentenced twice were 26.5%, and people previously sentenced more than three times were 17.0%.

Risk Assessment Variables. First, all of participants were interviewed and evaluated by correctional officers in charge of them. 8 items of four point Likert scales were rated to assess prisoners’ risk of dangerous behaviors during incarceration. The reliability of these 8 items was .85. Questions were about various inmates’ attitudes against punishment, correctional treatment, etc (Table 2).

Table 2. Correctional Officers’ Risk Assessment Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item-total correlation</th>
<th>coefficient α if an item deleted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>attitude against punishment</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guilt feeling for the victim</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attitude against correctional treatment</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attitude against correctional officers</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>probability of dangerous behaviors</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>probability of recidivism</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attitude to deceive</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attitudes against correctional counseling</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, inmates’ crime–related psycho-behavioral data were gathered by applying Korean Correctional Psychological Inventory(KCPI). The factors, this inventory of 175 items measuring(Lee, Lee, & Kong, 2000) were found to be delinquent behaviors, aggression, illegal thoughts, self-abandonment, suicidal risk, and possibility to deceive. The internal consistency of subscales was .90, .90, .89, .89, .89, and .87 respectively(Lee et al, 2000). Exemplary items are presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Exemplary Items of Korean Correctional Psychological Inventory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>subscales</th>
<th>item total correlation</th>
<th>factor loadings</th>
<th>contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delinquent history</td>
<td>My close friends used to be arrested by the police.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I have been very close to peers with criminal records.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I have involved in a gang fight.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I got suspended or expelled from school.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I have burglarized in groups.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I instantly confront the person who talks against me.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anybody deserves to be beaten if he or she make annoyance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If someone get angry, it is okay to hit the person who make him or her upset.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I would instantly throw a fist back if somebody might attack me.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I inclined to yell whenever a dispute begins.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>illegal thoughts</td>
<td>The only way to be rich is to thieve.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sometimes it's okay to breach the law if I need something desperately.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I cannot help even thieving in order to survive this hard world.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It's okay to take others’ property if someone is in absolute poverty.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Only poor people are punished even though they commit same wrong-doing.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abandonment</td>
<td>My life is hopeless.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nobody loves me.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I feel myself useless.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>My family and friends abandon me.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There’s nothing I can do.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suicidal attempts</td>
<td>I have thought how I commit suicide.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I have thought if I have courage strong enough to commit suicide.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I have wondered what I would write down on my suicide note.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I feel like crying to think of my suicide.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A scene of my funeral often flashes in my mind.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delusional</td>
<td>I used to commit bizarre things without recognition.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thoughts</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>I used to lose myself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>All day long I am daydreaming.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>I feel something terrible happen.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>I used to make an uproar without any reason.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Third,** besides these risk assessment variables, actuarial factors were also gathered. These variables were the number of duration of total custody, duration of total imprisonment, the number and contents of violations against prison discipline, attitude during pre-convicted detention, number of rule violations during past incarceration, and success of plea bargaining. **Fourth,** idiosyncratic data related to crime commitment were also searched; gender, age, education, SES, number of family, period of employment before present conviction, presence of family members dependent on a prisoner, the number of times of family visitation, and educational level of parent. **Fifth,** a small questionnaire was given with a psychological test battery in order to investigate inmates’ criminogenic needs; trials to commit self-injury or suicide, history of abscondence, drinking problems, whether to be tattooed, involvement into gangsters.

**Criterion Measures.** Inmates risk behaviors were assessed by two categories of variables. One was dangerousness during institutionalization and it was assessed by the number of disciplinary code violations and the degree of violence of rule violations. Violence of contents of misbehaviors was rated based on the aggressive characteristics of violation codes. For example physical attack to other inmates or correctional officers was given highest score, 3. **Second,** the number of past crimes and the degree of offense contents were rated as postdictive criteria of criminal risk behaviors. The heinousness of current crimes was recoded into 1 to 3. Homicide or armed robbery were coded the highest score and larceny or simple rape were coded next and then car accident or other misdemeanor was coded as 1.

**RESULTS**

Regression Analyses were applied to explore significant predictors of criterion measures. At first, as criterion data of management problems, the number of discipline violations and seriousness of reason to get penalties during incarceration were selected among various variables. Table 1 and table 2 summarize the results.

Table 4 shows which predictors explain seriousness of penalty reasons effectively. Inmates’
bad attitudes during pre-convicted detention ($\beta = .34$, $t = 11.46$, $P < .001$), the number of penalties during past incarceration ($\beta = .27$, $t = 9.62$, $P < .001$), negative ratings of correctional officers ($\beta = .17$, $t = 5.95$, $P < .001$), trials to commit self-injury or suicide, a subscale of KCPI ($\beta = .12$, $t = 4.34$, $P < .001$) were significantly predicted the violence of code violation. About 37% of variance were explained by these variables. Besides these predictors, history of abscondence from home was positively related to seriousness of rule violations and prisoners’ educational level, the number of visits, plea bargaining, not having deliberate intention to commit a current crime were negatively related to disciplinary breaches. The total amount of variance explained of this regression model was 41%.

Table 4. results of stepwise regression analysis on the violence of penalty reason caused by discipline violation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>predictors</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE of b</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta R^2$</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-.85</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-3.76***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>.230</td>
<td>273.91***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attitude during pre-convicted detention</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>11.46***</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>226.92***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of penalties during past incarceration</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>9.62***</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>167.58***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ratings of correctional officers</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>5.95***</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>98.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suicidal attempts(KCPI)</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>4.34***</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>113.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention of a current crime</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-3.89***</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>85.81***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-2.78**</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>76.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of visits</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-3.02**</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>68.91***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>running away from home</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.66**</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plea bargaining</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-2.35*</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 presents variables to explain significantly the number of penalties during present incarceration. Likewise table 4, prisoners’ attitude during pre-convicted detention ($\beta = .35$, $t = 11.43$, $P < .001$), the number of penalties during past incarceration ($\beta = .20$, $t = 6.95$, $P < .001$), suicidal attempts of KCPI ($\beta = .10$, $t = 3.43$, $P < .001$), ratings of correctional officers ($\beta = .14$, $t = 4.67$, $P < .001$) were highly significant. Besides these predictors, intention of a current crime, history of abscondence, and the amount of delusive thoughts from KCPI were positively related to the number of code violations. In contrast, not having deliberateness to a current crime, the
number of visits by family members, inmates’ educational level, and making plea bargaining were negatively related to the number of penalties given owing to code violations during present imprisonment. The total amount of variance explained of this regression model was 36%.

Table 5. results of stepwise regression analysis on the number of disciple violation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>predictors</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE of b</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>ΔR²</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-3.70***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attitude during pre-convicted</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>11.43***</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>256.79***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>detention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of penalties during</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>6.95***</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>183.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past incarceration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suicidal attempts(KCPI)</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>3.43***</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>133.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ratings of correctional officers</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>4.67***</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>106.95***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intention of a current crime</td>
<td>-.279</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-4.23***</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>90.72***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>history of running away</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>2.67**</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>78.64***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of visits</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-2.73**</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>69.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-2.30*</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>61.50***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plea bargaining</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-2.44*</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>55.59***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delusion</td>
<td>.0007</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.19*</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>50.72***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results from table 4 and table 5 could be summarized that actuarial predictors such as misbehaviors during detention and misbehaviors during past incarceration are relatively more effective to predict present code violations than psychological predictors of KCPI and officers’ evaluation.

As criteria of vulnerability to crimes, the number of criminal records and heinousness of current offenses were recoded and selected among various potential criterion measures related to past and current illegal acts. Table 6 and table 7 summarize the results of stepwise regression analyses to find out useful predictors explaining these criterion variables.

Table 6. results of stepwise regression analysis on the criminal records

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE of b</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

63
Table 6 presents predictors to explain significantly the number of criminal records. Variables such as self-reported number of crime commitment (\( \beta = .47, t = 19.59, P < .001 \)), duration of past imprisonment (\( \beta = .27, t = 11.07, P < .001 \)), the number of penalties during past incarceration (\( \beta = .14, t = 6.38, P < .001 \)), duration of being employed (\( \beta = -.11, t = -5.28, P < .001 \)), duration of being kept in custody (\( \beta = .12, t = 5.30, P < .001 \)), and the degree of self-abandonment (\( \beta = .10, t = 4.74, P < .001 \)) were positively related to the number of inmates' criminal records. Also, prisoners with frequent criminal records, had involved into gangsters (\( \beta = -.07, t = -3.27, P < .001 \)), and relatively small number of visits by family members (\( \beta = -.06, t = -2.90, P < .001 \)) and deliberate intention to crime (\( \beta = .05, t = 2.55, P < .001 \)). The total amount of variance explained of this regression model was 62%. If previous crime related variables excluded, self-abandonment of KCPI was a fairly useful predictor of repetitive crimes.

Table 7: results of stepwise regression analysis on the seriousness of a current crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE of b</th>
<th>( \beta )</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>R^2</th>
<th>( \Delta R^2 )</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.38***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of armament</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>10.22***</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>143.37***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sentence duration</td>
<td>.0008</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>7.22***</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>107.57***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7 shows variables explaining much variance of seriousness of current crime. Predictors such as use of armament ($\beta = .30$, $t = 10.22$, $P < .001$), intention of a current crime ($\beta = .14$, $t = 4.66$, $P < .001$), aggression ($\beta = .17$, $t = 4.23$, $P < .001$) were positively related to the seriousness of a current crime. In contrast, educational level ($\beta = -.14$, $t = 4.50$, $P < .001$) and degree of delusive thoughts ($\beta = -.10$, $t = 2.53$, $P < .05$) were negatively related to the criterion variable. It was found that self-reported personality measure, KCPI had significant expected relationship with the heinousness of a crime in spite of low explanatory power. The more aggressive and the less delusive inmates were the more heinous the contents of their crimes were.

Based on the results of regression analyses, the predictors were only selected, which had significant power of explanation. Some of these variables were recoded to have coherent directions and all variables, standardized, were then correlated with criterion variables of risk behaviors inside of prison.

Table 8. correlation between predictor variables and management problems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>number of discourse violation</th>
<th>seriousness of penalty reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bad attitude during pre-convicted detention</td>
<td>.48***</td>
<td>.47***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of penalties during past incarceration</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.37***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education (reversed)</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of visits (reversed)</td>
<td>.15***</td>
<td>.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delusion</td>
<td>.21***</td>
<td>.34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ratings on risk by correctional officers</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>running away from home</td>
<td>.18***</td>
<td>.18***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
suicidal trials  .23***  .21***
intention of a current crime  -.01  -.02
agreement with victims(reversed)  .03  .02
number of disciple violation  .11**

Table 8 summarizes correlation indices and the relationship among variables produced by regressions was confirmed again. Two observational variables of criteria were positively correlated and its correlation index was statistically significant. Other predictors except a variable, deliberate intention of a current offense, present to be positively related. Therefore, a causal model seemed to be proper to be explored.

An application of AMOS 4.0 for causal modeling confirmed expected relationship among endogenous and exogenous variables. The corrected model with mutual interaction between criminogenic data and psychological characteristics (Figure 1) had better fitness indices than an original model proposed without any interactions among latent variables. GFI of the corrected model was .98 and its TLI was .97. CFI was .98 and RMSEA was .07.

Figure 1. A causal model of risk behaviors during incarceration
Table 9 presents variables explaining inmates’ vulnerability to criminal acts. Since two criterion measures, which should be internally consistent, were negatively related, many correlation indices among predictors were hard to be interpreted. Therefore, consistent relationship among observational variables couldn’t be guaranteed and it seemed improper to pursue exploration of a causal model.
DISCUSSION

This study is a preliminary research to explore risk factors of offensive behaviors among Korean inmates. The first implication of this study is that data in correctional facilities such as misbehaviors first analyzed by a social scientist in Korea. Also, it seems meaningful that empirical endeavor should be given to develop a classification system of Korean inmates. Besides these facts, this study presents that a significant relationship between risk factors and violent illegal acts does exist and almost over 30% to 40% of variance of criterion measures are explained by predictors included. However, additional analyses should be performed in order to confirm predictive power of risk predictors more precisely. Some predictors such as the duration of juvenile custody or drug experience were self-reported. Therefore, the accuracy of inmates’ responses can be always questioned. Also the inmates’ time passed in incarceration varied. Therefore, statistical analyses more sensitive to the data with long-term duration should be applied. In spite of these all deficits, it may be concluded based on the regression weights obtained in this study that it is very plausible for these risk factors to enable to develop a useful prediction model of inmates’ violent behaviors.

Additional data analyses are in progress.
REFERANCE


Introduction

Public safety is being considered as one among several important core functions of government, like public health, public education. The criminal justice system poses a threat of punishment to law breakers-through the power of police to arrest and investigate, through the power of courts to adjudicate and sentence, and through the power of corrections to administer the punishment handed down by the courts (Nagin, 1997). However, the extent to which police, courts and prison can effect the crime problem is a matter of great debate in both politics and social science.

It is evident that current policing model has been ineffective in reducing crime and disorders. Police report indicates that violent crime such as murder, extortion have increased significantly in recent years. The growing crime rates thus raises serious questions about police effectiveness in our country. Between 1996 and 2001, a total of 20,336 murders occurred in the country. In 2001, there were 3,412 murders. The number of murder has increased over the year by 23 percent (Janakantha, Feb. 3, 2002). As of December 2001, according to the latest figures released by the Police Headquarters a total of 125,000 crimes were committed which is ten thousand more than the previous year. The report indicates that violent crime such as murder and rapes have increased significantly since 1996. What it appears that the current policing model has been ineffective in reducing crime and disorders.

Social scientists can play a major role in determining which recent innovations in policing, court and corrections are effective and in what circumstances. By making policing more effective, more responsive, and more just we can improve the quality of life in our cities. The interaction between the police institution and the social environment in which it functions may provide explanations for variations in police behavior. In other words, the importance of the social context in understanding and explaining police behavior is very important. Organizational and political factors appear to matter more in choosing police priorities in Bangladesh. In this context, Turk (1982) has made a persuasive case for his characterization of all policing as being political, even in those countries that are considered to be among the
more “enlightened” democracies in the world (Britain, Canada, and the United States). Examining the styles of policing in Bangladesh during the post-independence period (1971-present) it can be argued that variations in the strategies adopted by the police in combating crime and maintaining public order clearly indicates the influence and control of the police by the state apparatus. Therefore, political control of law enforcing agencies is the major dilemma of policing in our country.

This essay examines police efforts to control crime in Bangladesh. Section I begins with the current state of crime-control research in Bangladesh. Section II examines the public trust in the police and the problem of police brutality. Section III reviews police strategy in attacking crime. Section IV suggests some policy choices in preventing crime. It then considers some strategic options such as War on guns, reviews the importance and evidence on police legitimacy in preventing crime. Also, examines the role of community policing in achieving police legitimacy. Section V concludes by suggesting how research could help to improve police strategy and tactics for crime control.

Crime-Control Research in Bangladesh

The paucity of research in criminal justice is one of the major impediments to formulating effective crime control strategies in Bangladesh. That is, systematic knowledge for the formulation of policies and the improvement of social institutions and practice for controlling crime are virtually absent in Bangladesh. Police officials are not conversant with this kind of research and suspicious of outsiders. To the best of our knowledge, police departments in Bangladesh do not evaluate its performance. As a result, we know very little about the effects of current crime control strategies. This is because published data on crime and criminal justice are not readily available in Bangladesh. The Home Ministry periodically releases summary data, which means that data are presented in highly aggregated form and cannot be used to directly analyze the individuals from or about whom information was originally collected. In other words, summary data could not, however, be used to reveal anything about individual victimization. Also, there are no national statistics that describes how often police misuse force or even how often they justifiably use force. Social science research on this topic is nonexistent and no meaningful attempt to measure the incidence of police brutality (for example, shot and killed by police) on a national basis had been undertaken. The police report published by the Home Ministry does not allow to make meaningful judgement about the performance of the police agencies.

One major difficulty with using official data for research purpose is the quality and
completeness of crime data recorded by the police station. In our country, there are widespread allegations that very often police do not take a crime report from the complainant especially from the lower-SES. We believe that public confidence in police would enhance if police began to assess their activities on a regular basis.

Interviews with police officers revealed that recent technological advances in police record keeping (for example, use of computers) yet to be introduced in our country. That is, offense and arrest reports are kept on paper records. Therefore, it is very hard for the police department to use these data to conduct their epidemiological analyses. Sherman (1992) contended that the epidemiological method helps to identify crime-control targets. It helps distinguish between low-risk and high-risk units in the jurisdiction, whether people, places, or activities. As Sherman (1992) argues “in a military analogy, it identifies key military targets for precision bombing as an alternative to indiscriminate bombing of an entire city” (p. 162). Given the scarce resources of our police departments however, it can be argued that use of epidemiological method will help to identify targets very efficiently and yield highest return on an investment of resources.

II. Public Confidence in the Police: The Problem of Police Brutality

The major problem for the police in our country is the lack of public confidence in police work. It has been argued that public confidence in the police is integral to social order, economic development, and sound government processes. Citizens view the quality of police service as an indicator of the quality of government. Police who are untrustworthy create fear and anxiety in citizens (Vicchio, 1997). Unfortunately, Bangladeshi citizens viewed the police as the arms of an “establishment” that is, police has been playing a partisan role by serving the ruling party. This is primarily due to political interference in police work. A recent study suggests that the public did not give the favorable ratings of Bangladeshi police (Kashem, 2001). In the words of Decker (1981) to be more effective both quality services and positive images must be maintained. As Redlet (1986:280) contend that negative attitudes toward the police result in, “mutual ill feelings, lack of respect, disorder, and inefficient police functioning.” Evidence suggests that citizens who are satisfied with the police are more likely to support the police (e.g. reporting crimes, providing information to the police about suspects, engaging in crime prevention activities (Brandl et al., 1994:132). According to Goldstein (1987) citizens with more favorable attitudes presumably are more likely to become “co-producers” of crime prevention. Given the very low confidence in the police in our country many crime victims

8 Official counts of crime are useful indicators but suffer from a number of shortcomings. For example, all crimes are not reported to the police, not all reported crimes are recorded.
never call the police for various reasons such as: i) don't believe police can help that is, many believe that calling the police would make no difference since police can neither capture the offender nor recover stolen property ii) cause too much inconvenience, that is, fear of harassment by the police iii) they are corrupt and would not help the victim(s) without paying bribe to them (Kashem, 2001). Recently, two police Sergeants were arrested while they attempted to grab about 2.5 million Taka after recovering from snatchers. The lost of public confidence in the police can be best illustrated by the fact that more than 50 offenders were beaten to death by the angry mob.

There is a widespread belief that in our country, most police officers are not dedicated, honest public servants that is, lack of professional integrity is a major problem in police organization. In 1997, while addressing a seminar on “Police Integrity” the Attorney General of the United States Janet Reno points out, being a police officer is probably the single hardest job. There are bad lawyers, bad doctors but why it was the bad police officer that caught the attention of the public more. He points out “I think it is because there is probably no such expectation” (NIJ 1997:18).

Recent findings suggest that in many case police themselves create a risk factor for crime because of their bad manners. Research consistently supports the hypothesis that the less respectful police are towards suspects and citizens generally, the less people will comply with the law. In a democratic societies the government is expected not only to enforce the law but also, in doing so, to obey the law itself. In other words, the government is obliged and accountable to certain constitutional guarantees of individual rights. But frequently our law enforcing agencies have ignored and violated these rights in the process of achieving their crime control mandate. Also, crimes by our government such as violation of human rights, civil liberties, and constitutional privileges as well as illegal behavior that occurs in the process of enforcing the law and maintaining the order, illegal police surveillance have greatly shaped the police image in the society. For example, police behavior during the political demonstration and strikes against the government. The way the police actively intervene (using force) and restrict public meetings and political demonstration by the opposition political party clearly undermines people’s legitimate political rights that in turn motivates public to defy the laws. In the name of preserving national security here police actions are intended to protect the government from the probable danger of disruption or overthrow. Bayley (1994) in his Police for the Future identified several options for the police. One of the options he points out, is “honest law enforcement.” Under this approach police should be honest with themselves and the public about it.

The abuse of authority is one of the most controversial aspects of police work in Bangladesh. Use of excessive force, rape and killing in the police custody and other
questionable practices raised serious questions about the legitimacy of the police in recent years. In the Western world, lawsuits against police agencies are one way to reduce police brutality. While the court systems in Bangladesh rarely entertain any civil liability case against the police department. The killing of Shameem Reza Rubel in the summer of 1998 by the detective police and more recently the killing of a businessman in Dhaka provided an excellent example of the problems of police brutality. Coerced confessions are being extracted from the suspects frequently. Rather than bother taking offenders to court, many police dispensed corporal punishment at the point of apprehension or at the police station.

A. Role of the Media

It has been argued that individual and social factors play a part in the formation of personal beliefs. According to Flanagan and Vaughn (1998) attitudes toward the police and opinions on police excessive use of force, police brutality originate in a complex interaction of many forces, including the media. Bangladeshi police officers believe that media portrayals of illegal or unfair methods of enforcing the law, including police brutality, corruption, led many to believe that police agencies are staffed by brutal and corrupt individuals. They argue that negative media campaign (newspaper) and film portrayal of police activity have seriously undermined the public image of the police. Despite the fact that to some extent media perception of the problem is exaggerated, however, it is important to realize that physical brutality toward suspects, harassment and threats, misuse of authority and inappropriate use of force, lack of courtesy, led to dissatisfaction with the police services. As a result, the nature and quality of police-citizen relationships did not improve in Bangladesh.

B. Police Corruption

Police have generally enjoyed little respect and public trust in Bangladesh. This is because they are heavily involved in corruption. A recent survey by Kashem (2001) reports that more than 80 percent of the people believe that police is the most corrupt institution of Bangladesh. Police corruption is an illegal use of organizational power for personal gain (Sherman, 1974). The abuse of police authority has seriously undermined the image of the police agencies in Bangladesh. Though police administrators admit the existence of corruption but there has been little or no effective effort for controlling this major form of police misconduct.

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9 A jury in New York on March 8, 1990 awarded two Brooklyn men more than $76 million in damages in a police brutality suit, demonstrating that five plainclothes officers fired at the men and beat them for no reason in 1986 on a Coney Island street. It was believed to be the highest award in a police brutality case in New York State (Crime Control Digest, March 19, 1990).
A national daily *Janakantha* in its issue of December 2, 2000, gave first lead treatment to the report that between January to November 2000, there were more than fifteen thousand allegations of brutalities, torture, abuse of power and other irregularities against the members of police. The daily in a separate story on the same day reports that probe into the source of eighty police officers possessing fabulous amount of two hundred crore Taka has started.

There are widespread allegations that existing punishment system fail to adequately investigate complaints and discipline officer. A recent press report (Rashid, 2001) revealed that though lower echelon of the officers are being punished for corruption and abuses of power, unfortunately, senior level officers manage to avoid punishment. The paper in its lead news pointed out that responding to many charges of corruption against four top police officials the authorities recommended forced retirement to accused officers. And the decisions made by the Police Headquarters were forwarded to the Home Ministry for necessary approval. Even after 16 months, Home Ministry did not respond. It is important to mention that there is no independent mechanism for reviewing complaints against police officers in Bangladesh. Police Security Cell deals with the complaint against the police officer.

To remedy these problems people have demanded the reform of the police department. In the United States many cities and counties have established external (or citizen) review procedures as alternatives to traditional internal complaint procedure. Police Security Cell received complaints against 1,01,490 police personnel between 1995 and 2000. Of them only 1490 officers received punishment during that time. The nature of punishment includes demotion in ranks, removal and forced retirement from the job.

In many cases citizens are coerced into participation or simply they are victimized. Many blame political environment, corrupt politicians controlling police departments are main contributing factors for corruption. As Wagner and Decker (1997: 303) notes: “When the police are subjects of complaints, the process of law enforcement begins to break down. The perception of the police as violators of the law and public trust inhibits their ability to carry out their instrumental functions, as well as limits public confidence.”

### III. Police Crime-Control Strategy

How police can most effectively control crime? Most police action is either “proactive” or “reactive.” In proactive strategy police action is self-initiated, that is, police select their own targets while in reactive strategy police mobilization is initiated by a specific citizen demand or police allow citizens to select police targets (Reiss & Bordua, 1967). Police agencies around the world vary widely in the extent of their use in crime control tactics. However, in the Western World (for example, USA) we see the more emphasis on proactive strategies. Research suggests that police have historically used proactive strategies most often with certain
crimes, such as street prostitution, public intoxication, drunk driving, gambling, street-level drug dealing (see, Sherman, 1992 for more discussion). However, the major disadvantage of this strategy is that it has great potential for systematic discrimination against certain ethnic or political groups (Sherman, 1992). Similarly, reactive policing is also vulnerable to racial, class, religious, sexual, and ethnic prejudices (Black, 1973). Given the very low confidence in the police in our country many crime victims never call the police for various reasons such as fear of further retaliation or harassment by the police (Kashem & Bhuyian, 1998). Also, many people falsely accuse enemies and relatives and thus use police in their private dispute. Here is the danger of reactive target selection by the police.

There has been no structural change in the police methods even after the 30 years of independence. In other words, many of the most innovative police approaches such as community and problem-oriented policing did not emerge in Bangladesh. Over the last two decades, confidence in the reactive approach has been eroded. The accumulation of empirical evidence suggests that these tactics have a limited effect on crime (Sherman, 1997). In recent years community policing was effective means to achieve crime prevention in many countries. As Leighton (1994: i) notes “prevention of crime and the solution of crime problems could only be accomplished by a partnership between the police and the community.” Sherman (1995:339) contends that community policing efforts are generally geared toward the control of “short-term” risk factors that are associated with higher rates of crime such as the control of guns, known offenders, and juveniles.

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Considering the success of community policing in the Western World police department in Bangladesh began to “experiment” with community policing strategy and three districts: Mymensingh, Jamalpur, and Chandpur currently implementing this project. It may be noted that this program is the first of its kind in Bangladesh and implemented in December 2000. The objectives of the program are: i) reduction in crime and victimization thus maintaining public safety, ii) improving the quality of police service. Police departments in conjunction with Town Defense Party (TDP) implemented this new form of community policing in Bangladesh. They are just like community watch group who are responsible for patrolling their neighborhood especially during night. The TDP has a formal committee having close contact with the local
police station and police beat. The unique feature of this project is that the entire financial expense of TDP is borne by the community itself by way of raising subscription from the community people.

In the face of deteriorating law and order situation in the capital city Dhaka police recently started a new program entitled "Rapid Action." Accordingly, forty-eight check post have been set up in the city. Police are now interrogating strangers, vehicle owners, passengers and suspicious person. It is learnt that 500-600 people are arrested each day. One of the reasons as stated by the police is to catch most wanted criminals of the city. However, 80 percent of them are innocent having no criminal record.


The growing crime rates in recent years raises serious questions about police effectiveness in our country. In 1999 (as of Dec 15), according to the latest figures released by the Police Headquarters a total of 115,000 crimes were committed which is ten thousand more than the previous year. The report indicates that violent crime such as murder and rapes have increased significantly since 1996. For example, the number of murders has increased over the year by 519 to reach 3,227 in 1999 (an increase of 19%) (Janakantha, Dec. 24, 1999). In another press report it was found that a total of 7,225 murders occurred between June 1996 and November 1999. In 1999 alone there was 2,191 murders. What it appears that the current policing model has been ineffective in reducing crime and disorders.

A 1997 report (Sherman et al.) by the University of Maryland, USA, identified seven institutional settings for preventing crime. These are: 1) communities, 2) families, 3) schools, 4) labor markets, 5) places (specific premises), 6) police agencies, and 7) the other criminal justice agencies. The report indicates that police are only one of several institutions with some impact on crime, and cannot be expected to bear the primary responsibility. According to Sherman (1997) the effectiveness of crime prevention in each of the seven institutional settings depends heavily on local conditions in the other institutions. The report also emphasizes the interdependence of the different institution.

As Sherman (1997: 8-1) contends "police can prevent robbery, disorder, gun violence, drunk driving and domestic violence, but only by using certain methods under certain conditions."

Review of police crime control strategies suggest that police managers in Bangladesh have been paying more attention on visibility rather than attacking risk factors such as gun, drugs.

10 A “setting” is a social stage for playing out various roles, such as parent, child, neighbor, employer, teacher, and church leader (Sherman, 1997).
The present crime control strategies include random preventive patrol, postcrime investigation, reactive arrests, and crackdowns, hiring more police, and establishment of additional police stations. As Sherman (1992) points out, the effectiveness at crime control may depend more on specific tactics than on general strategy. Interviews with the Bangladeshi police managers suggest that in terms of crime prevention they rely heavily on preventive random patrol which are mostly unfocused. The most famous study of the random preventive patrol, the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Kelling et al., 1974), found no difference in crime from assigning increased and reduced patrol to fifteen different patrol beats. Many criminologists thus conclude that there is no crime prevention effect of conducting more random patrols.

In Bangladesh, observations of police work suggests that police actually spends very little time in dealing with criminal activity. According to the Police Commission Report 1988, only 38 percent of the total force was actually involved in functions like crime prevention, detection and investigation of crimes, prosecution of criminals and law and order maintenance that concern the general public. A press report revealed that a total of 434 police officers were assigned for home and personal security of 62 ministers of the present government. In addition to that police are constantly engaged in providing escort services and security of visiting ministers and other VIPs throughout the country. As a result, everyday huge amount of police hours are being spent for the protection of the ministers (Azadi, October 28, 2001). non-crime related functions such as protection of the VVIPs, VIPs, and other dignitaries, escort and other miscellaneous functions.

**Police Crackdown**

In nationwide crackdowns on crime, police arrested more than 70,000 (as of December 2001). According to police, of them 1,125 are career criminals. Now, the question is how the police process these offenders. Given the current level of overcrowding in our prison system and overburdened court dockets this proactive arrest policy may not be a cost-effective strategy in preventing crime. According to a press report presently there are 500,000 cases awaiting trial in the various courts across the country (Purbokon, Aug. 17, 1999). Most importantly, the report revealed that about 80 percent of the criminal cases do not result in conviction. However, the impact of that mass arrests in high crime areas of northern region of the country yet to be assessed.

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11 Between 1980 and 1997 jail population grew from 21,178 to 43,736, an increase of 52 percent, which is twice the combined rated capacities. The average daily population of the largest jail of the country (Dhaka Central Jail), on 31st December 1998, was 6,860 against the rated capacity of 2,116 (Kashem, 1999).
Recently, in a major policy initiative on drug enforcement police demolished squatic settlements in Dhaka which are considered to be drug marketplaces. Press reports revealed that this pro-active policing strategy had a very little effect in reducing drug use and crime associated with drug use and dealing. Similarly, police crackdowns on sex workers in Narayangonj did not reduce the street prostitution rather it created civic problem as the sex workers are now dispersed into different localities of the Dhaka City (displacement effect). Furthermore, the sex workers consider the eviction of prostitutes from their business as violation of their civil rights. Interestingly, many human rights organizations are now providing legal assistance to protect their rights.

In an effort to control crime and maintaining order the government has recently decided to hire twenty thousand more police. And in 1999 five thousand police has already been hired. But growing evidence suggests that the number of police on the street is far less important than the task police perform (Sherman, 1995). A review of 36 studies found little evidence that more police reduce crime (Marvell & Moody, 1996). Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990:270) for example, conclude that “The idea that a substantial effect on the crime rate can be achieved simply by increasing the number of police – and thereby restricting opportunities (for crime) – is … contrary to … empirical research. But more police attacking the risk factors for crime (for example, guns on the street, and “hot spot” street corners) could make a substantial difference in crime (Sherman, 1995:327). As Sherman (1997:8-33) concludes, “the more focused the police strategy, the more likely it is to prevent crime.”

IV. Controlling Crime: Some Policy Choices

There is widespread agreement that the institutions of family and community are critically important to crime prevention. For example, basic family practices in child rearing, marriage, and parental employment appear to matter enormously in the criminality of both children and fathers (Hirschi, 1995; Sampson, 1986). Also, the opportunity for legitimate work can prevent the onset or persistence of criminality among young people (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Empirical support for the crime preventive value of employment is generally quite strong in the longitudinal analysis of individual criminal careers (Sampson and Laub, 1993; also see Shannon, 1982; and Gottfredson, 1985). Experimental studies of the effects of criminal sanctions also found that criminal sanctions can deter offenders who are employed but backfires on offenders who are unemployed (Sherman, 1992).

Research suggests that there are many police practices that reduce crime, and some that even increase crime (Sherman, 1992). Many scholars and police executives suggest that
“the police can, do, and should do little about reducing crime. While many crime victims and their advocates, however, claim that police have great powers, opportunity, and moral duty to prevent crime but often fail to do so out of negligence or ill-chosen priorities. The government should consider following strategic options for preventing crime in Bangladesh.

A. Increasing Certainty of Punishment

In many countries, the most favored political strategy for reducing crime in recent years has been requiring convicted offenders to serve longer terms. It seems that sentences are not harsh enough in our country for most of the offenders who are responsible for the vast majority of crimes. Interviews with the police officers suggest that if these groups of offenders could be arrested and adjudicated crime rates will substantially decrease. Given their linkage with ruling parties and the absence of fairness on the part of the police in most of the cases police are unable to arrest them. In addition to that if arrested prosecution fails to win conviction against these offenders because of extra-legal factors.

The crime control policies must be formulated in a way that will substantially increase sentence lengths for people convicted of violent crimes. We need to increase the certainty of punishment rather than severity. For example, in the face of growing crime rates many American states have passed a variety of laws such as “three-strikes” laws, mandatory minimum sentence laws, and truth-in-sentencing laws in the 1990s. It is natural to assume that rational people weigh the costs and benefits of their actions, and that increasing the costs of crime by rising penalties should reduce its incidence. However, the most authoritative examinations of the evidence conclude that penalty increases sometimes have some, but generally modest, deterrent effects (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin, 1978; Cook, 1980; Nagin, 1998).

We need to increase the costs of crime by rising penalties. However, in our context penalty enhancement is not the solution because the vast majority of the high profile offenders are not adjudicated or our justice system is unable to prosecute them even though many of them got arrested several times on specific charges. The most cited reasons are lack of sufficient evidence, weaknesses in the police case preparation, non-cooperation from the victim and witnesses in the trial process.

Does penalty enhancement work? In an effort to control crime in 2000, the previous

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12 The intent of three-strikes is to incapacitate selected violent offenders for very long terms. For example, California’s three-strikes law requires that offenders who are convicted of a violent crime, and who have had two prior convictions, serve a minimum of 25 years; the law also doubles prison terms for offenders convicted of a second violent felony (Parent et al., 1997).

13 The truth-in-sentencing laws abolished parole release and require inmates to serve 85 percent of their announced sentences.
government passed a major piece of anti-crime legislation called “Public Safety Act 2000.” The Act provides enhanced penalties for certain types of crimes such as extortion, snatching, armed robbery. Meanwhile, the law generated wide controversy among the public because they believe the law will identify political opponents of the government as target. It may be pointed out that the previous government had enacted a similar anti-crime law in 1992. But this legislation has had little practical effect in combating crime and disorder. that generated wide controversy among the public because to some extent the law identified political opponents of the government as target. Therefore, the challenge is to identify policies that can make a positive contribution by preventing or reducing crime in a cost-effective way.

In Bangladesh, current sentencing practices seem to be an ineffective tool in reducing rising crime rates and public fear of crime. Many argue that the enactment of Public safety Act is completely vulnerable to “selection bias” that is, it has added disadvantage of systematic discrimination against political opponents of the government. In my view, mandatory sentencing scheme\textsuperscript{14} should be introduced for serious crimes-those committed with guns (e.g. armed robbery, extortion) aggravated rape, and murder. It can be argued that no crime is prevented when large numbers of criminals are on the streets with guns. Since under the existing punishment system the majority of the offenders manage to escape the punishment, enactment of mandatory penalties can be justified. One advantage of mandatory sentencing law is that it will ensure certainty of punishment. Therefore, mandatory jail terms for possession of an unlicensed handgun should be implemented. An evaluation of Massachusetts (USA) law that imposed mandatory jail terms for possession of an unlicensed handgun concluded that the law was an effective deterrent of gun crime ((Pierce & Bowers, 1981). Although deterrent effectiveness of penalties do not work because of more costs than benefits (Tonry, 1995) but it does not mean that rational social policies might not incorporate serious penalties for “habitual offenders.” What is more important here is that fair procedures and equal enforcement of the law.

In order to deal with the career criminals and repeat offenders development of special police and prosecutor units are needed. Scientific advances such as the research and development of DNA analysis to positively identify suspects and eliminate the innocent from suspicion will expedite the trial process. Interviews suggest that in our country clearance rates particularly for violent crimes are extremely low (15-20 percent).

B. War on Guns: Firearm Regulation

\textsuperscript{14} In the face of growing crime rates between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, every American State enacted at least one mandatory penalty law.
It can be argued that no crime is prevented when large numbers of criminals are on the streets with guns. The proliferation of illicit firearms and violence associated with those firearms during the last decade demands the regulation of the ownership, possession, and use of firearms in Bangladesh. As the Inspector General of Police (IGP) points out that crimes and terrorist activities have gone up due to availability of sophisticated guns in recent years. He argued that the criminals have now easy access to AK-47 rifle, which is not even in the possession of police. To our knowledge, there is no clear estimate about the number of household that possesses a gun in our country. Although a permit or license is required to obtain a handgun but due to corrupt practices of the police and other agencies involved in the process they manage to obtain the license despite the fact that they have prior criminal records. The best example is Ershad Sikder the top most wanted criminal of the country who used to possess several licensed guns. Evidence suggests that gun carrying by the high-risk groups contributing to increasing homicides and gun crimes in a community. A study in the United States by Cook (1991) reports that: firearms are used in 61 percent of homicides, 33 percent of robberies, and 21 percent of aggravated assaults. Sherman et al. (1995) in their Kansas City Gun Experiment have shown that seizing illegally carried weapons reduced the gun crimes by 49 percent in the target area (high homicide patrol beat). Given the high rates of violent crime a stringent policy on firearms is essential. We need to reduce the overall supply and availability of guns.

How can we control gun? One way to do this is to limit unsafe and criminal uses of guns through sentencing enhancement provisions. According to Zimring (1990) gun control generally encompassed three basic strategies: i) deprive dangerous people of guns, ii) restrict high-risk uses (carrying concealed), and iii) forbid commerce in certain kinds of firearms. One study shows that a 10 percent reduction in the prevalence of gun ownership in a city is associated with about a 5 percent reduction in the gun robbery.

One strategy could be enhanced penalties (mandatory “add-on”) for the use of a gun in committing crime. Although the Bangladesh Penal Code prescribes stringent punishment for possession of illegal weapons but the conviction rate is extremely low. Police officers blame the inherent weaknesses of the Arms Act. They pointed out, under the existing laws, seizure of illegal guns from a person/house by the police officer requires additional testimony (witness) from a third person who needs to testify in the court that he/she has seen that guns were confiscated by the police officer on that particular day and time. Now, here we do not trust our law enforcing agents. Otherwise, why do we need to involve a third a person’s testimony in the legal process who may or may not be willing to disclose the truth at the risk of his/her life? In contrast, many argue given the corrupt practices of the police officers provision of additional testimony in the trial would protect the innocent persons from harassment. Interviews of police
officer and judicial officers suggest that in the majority of the cases prosecution fail to win the conviction against a known criminal simply because of lack of evidence. One officer states: “more than 80 percent of the witnesses do not support the police officer in the adjudication process even after signing the seizure list, which result in dismissal of cases” (Personal Interview). The cited reasons for non-cooperation from the witnesses are: i) fear of further victimization ii) judges and judicial officers feel that police should be given more power. As Packer (1968) crime control and due process as polar opposite. However, many blame police reports as the key to low conviction. In other words, the results of the present policy that is, the threatened sanction seems to be a paper tiger.

C. Police Legitimacy Prevents Crime

It has been argued that to enforce the laws and to exert its authority, the police had to first gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public. A growing body of research suggests that police legitimacy—the public acceptance of police practices as fair and reasonable—prevents crime. According to Sherman (1998:433) “legitimacy is the willingness of the public to accept police authority without protest, the public consent to coercion by the agents of all the people.” Research suggests that police-community relation is the key to developing and determining appropriate models of policing. Increasing the quantity and quality of police-citizen contact reduces crime (Sherman, 1997). As Sherman (1998:434) notes: “Public support is central to police accomplishing their core mission of preventing crime and achieving justice. Their success in that mission depends heavily on their legitimacy.”

Further, evidence suggests that people generally obey the law not just out of fear of punishment but because they perceive the law and its agents—especially the police—as fair and just (Tyler, 1990; Paternoster et al., 1997). Tyler (1990) finds a strong correlation across a large sample of Chicago citizens between perceived legitimacy of police and willingness to obey the law. The legitimacy was measured by citizen evaluations of how police treated them in previous encounters. The reanalysis of the Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment by Paternoster et al. (1997) support this hypothesis. The study reveals that repeat domestic violence was lowest among arrestees who thought police had treated them respectfully. The Milwaukee evidence reveals that controlling for other risk factors among some 800 arrested offenders, those who felt they were not treated in a procedurally fair and polite manner were 60 percent more likely to commit a reported act of domestic violence in the future. At the same time, there is even evidence that the police themselves become less likely to obey the law after

15 For example, listening to suspects’ side of the story before making arrest decisions, and treating suspects with courtesy and politeness (Sherman, 1998).
they have become disillusioned with its apparent lack of procedural justice (Sherman, 1974). As Sherman (1997) points out, to the extent that police themselves symbolize justice and obedience to the law, there may be less crime. On the other hand, to the extent that police symbolize injustice and defiance of the law, the public may imitate the police by breaking the law (Sherman, 1993). Modest but consistent scientific evidence supports the hypothesis that the less respectful police are towards suspects and citizens generally, the less people will comply with the law (Sherman, 1997). In sum, a legitimate police institution fosters more widespread obedience of the law itself (Sherman, 1997).

Community Policing: One way to increase police legitimacy

What it appears that reactive approaches dominate law enforcement strategy in Bangladesh rather than adopting a more prevention oriented view of the policing. Evidence suggests that reactive strategies are not sufficiently effective at impacting crime and disorder (Sherman, 1995; Bayley, 1994; Skolnick & Bayley, 1988). Thus, a focused crime reduction strategy is essential in order to control the current level of crime and disorder in Bangladesh. Police agencies, their chiefs, politicians and the public alike have been greatly attracted to the concept of community policing in recent years. Considering the success of community policing in the Western World police department in Bangladesh began to “experiment” with community policing strategy and three districts: Mymensingh, Jamalpur, and Chandpur currently implementing this project. It may be noted that this program is the first of its kind in Bangladesh and implemented in December 2000. The objectives of the program are: i) reduction in crime and victimization thus maintaining public safety, ii) improving the quality of police service. Police departments in conjunction with Town Defense Party (TDP) implemented this new form of community policing in Bangladesh. They are just like community watch group who are responsible for patrolling their neighborhood especially during night. The TDP has a formal committee having close contact with the local police station and police beat. The unique feature of this project is that the entire financial expense of TDP is borne by the community itself by way of raising subscription from the community people.

According to Goldstein (1990) many of the most innovative police approaches to crime control employs methods other than punishment. Thus, in the Western World, policing has been changing in fundamental ways. The most important new development in policing in the 1980s and 1990s was the advent of community policing. The basic idea of community policing is that police department should work closely with neighborhood residents, developed programs tailored for specific problems, and give rank-and-file officers more decision-making power (Greene & Mastrofski, 1991). Research suggests that the police could not fight crime by themselves, but were very dependent upon citizens, and that the police could reduce fear by
concentrating on less serious quality-of-life problems (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).

The development of new technologies and techniques, the growth of problem-solving approaches and community policing, expansion of police authority and the sharing of that authority had a significant impact in controlling crime and disorders (Weisburd & Greenspan, 1997).

At the same time, significant changes in the management and practice of policing have been observed over the last decade.

Research suggests that effective feedback mechanisms, both formal and informal, are the most important vehicle for improving police-community relations (Bordua & Tifft, 1971). Police should be more responsive to the communities they serve. Community policing sought to increase the quantity and quality of contacts between police and the public (Sherman, 1998).

Professor Herman Goldstein (1979, 1990) proposed a big idea called “problem-oriented policing” that is policing for results. Goldstein argued that instead of treating crime and disorder as general categories, the police should identify and focus on specific problems. This big idea of policing is reflected in the New York approach of 1995. According to Sherman (1998) the highly selective focus of the NYPD (New York Police Department) enforcement efforts on high-crime places, times, and places substantially reduced the crime problems in New York City.

In the words of Sherman (1998): “Police were directed to specific locations with specific tasks to undertake, and not sent out to roam the streets at random with a general mandate to arrest.” (p. 7).

The strategic risk the NYPD took was a radical change from a low-arrest to a high arrest policy for public order offenses, such as noise, public urination, public drinking, jaywalking, fare beating (jumping over the subway turnstiles to avoid paying the fare). From 1993 to 1996, misdemeanor arrests rose from 133,000 to 205,000 (Sherman, 1998). As Kelling and Coles (1996) argue that tough enforcement on minor crimes directly contributes to a significant reduction in serious crime. The crime rate in New York City began to fall dramatically in 1992, and by 1997 was at the lowest level in 30 years.

V. Conclusion

Introduction of community policing thus seems to be a promising option for the Bangladeshi police practitioners in achieving legitimacy in their work and to win the trust of the citizens they serve. Community and problem-oriented policing demand new skills among

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16 The impact of community and problem-oriented policing are found in Eck and Spelman (1987), Skogan (1990, 1996), Skogan and Hartnett (1997).

17 New York City’s approach later evolved into zero-tolerance policing, which involved aggressive enforcement of laws against minor crimes: public urination, graffiti, and so on. Serious crime in New York City dropped significantly in the mid-1990s. George Kelling argued that the attack on minor offenses was directly responsible.
police and provide for much greater autonomy for street-level officers in carrying out the police function. Can such skills be developed among our police officers? Can methods of control be developed that will adequately supervise the new freedoms provided to street-level officers, or must such issues be taken into account in initial selection criteria? Must there be new types of training for supervisors? To answer such question, we need to increase the accountability of the police departments. A basic principal of a democratic society is that all government agencies including the police are accountable to the public. Police should be public servants with a professional obligation to serve the entire community on a nonpartisan basis. In other words, police should be accountable both for what they do and how they do it (Alpert & Moore, 1993).

One major conclusion can be made from this study is that we need to increase the legitimacy of the police. Research suggests that fair procedures can reduce recidivism (Tyler, 1990; Paternoster et al., 1997). Police behavior should be determined by the rules of law. To gain acceptance in the eyes of the citizen the manner of the police officer is very important.

Improving the existing technology would enable the police to move toward professionalism, which in turn, would improve the quality of police work in our country. For example, the patrol car, two-way radio, and telephone altered the way in which the police operated and the manner in which citizens made use of the police in the Western World. Increased use of motorized patrol meant more efficient coverage of the city and quicker response to calls for service. Also, the two-way radio dramatically increased the supervisory capacity of the police (Walker, 1984).

Unfortunately, we have not observed any meaningful structural changes in the police departments in Bangladesh. In the absence of professionalism in the police work separating the police completely from politics could not take place. Samuel Walker (1999) has suggested a list of reform agenda for police professionalism: i) elimination of political influence ii) appointment of qualified chief executives iii) nonpartisan public service iv) raising personal standards v) introduction of scientific management vi) development of specialized units, and vii) introduction of modern technology. To deal effectively with serious crime and dangerous criminal offenders, specialized skills are required. So, police have had to learn how to use legitimate force and they have to improve their ability to investigate and solve crimes. The quality of police work can be measured in terms of the number of arrests, the importance of a particular arrest (for example, an arrest related to highly publicized crime) and the percentage of arrests resulting in conviction (Sanders, 1977).

Given the paucity of research on police practices, police departments in Bangladesh should employ criminologists who would be responsible for evaluating the results of police crime control strategies and tactics. We need to develop research on the relationship between
performance in carrying out new police roles and the backgrounds of police officers and supervisors. Social scientists can play a major role in determining which recent innovations in policing are effective and in what circumstances. Thus in order to meet the challenges facing policing today and into the future this research agenda will serve to guide the direction to policymakers in introducing the recent innovations in policing and sentencing. In addition to that better recruitment, selection, and training of police officers are essential.
References


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COMMUNITY POLICING IN HONG KONG:

LIMITS TO REALIZING A VISION

by

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Abstract

Community policing was first introduced in Hong Kong in a first wave of police reforms in 1974. In 1995, in a second wave of reforms, the Hong Kong Police (HKP) embarked on a ‘cultural revolution’. Achievements of both waves of reforms have been modest. This paper examines the reforms and account for its modest achievements by means of an integrated approach. A number of objective limits, both internal and external to the HKP, to realizing the community policing vision are identified. First, an analysis from the neo-institutional perspective shows that the HKP’s paramilitary traditions provide an internal limit that militates against community policing. Second, a political and politico-economic analysis of Hong Kong’s unique position explains why there is an external demand placed upon the HKP to make public order maintenance and law enforcement its dual priority at the expense of civilian police work. This external limit reinforces the above internal limit. Third, a socio-cultural perspective is employed to show why certain features of Hong Kong society and the local population, as an external limit, are not conducive to community policing. A final external limit is the community policing vision itself, which is interrogated to show that the idealized form in which some of its advocates have couched it is both utopian and premised upon mythical assumptions, hence is unrealizable. The paper concludes on the note that despite the modest achievements of the HKP’s community policing reforms, that does not necessarily entail a lack of credibility of the HKP in the public’s view.

Community Policing in Hong Kong: Limits to Realizing a Vision*

Since it originated in the US in the 1970s, community policing has spread internationally as a creed of enlightened police thinking and policy. It has been described as a Kuhnian paradigm shift (Pelfrey, Jr. 1998). No police service/force, particularly in the economically more developed world, can afford not to pay service to it, lip or real. As Skolnick & Bayley (1988)
confidently stated, community policing had become (and still remains today) a growth industry. Not only have Western countries adopted it, non-Western countries such as Singapore (Quah & Quah 1987, Bayley 1989) have also jumped on the bandwagon.

After Britain colonized Hong Kong in the mid-1800s, the Hong Kong Police (HKP) developed along paramilitary lines. This remained until the early 1970s. Be-devilled by endemic syndicated corruption, the public ‘hated’ the HKP. In 1974, a first wave of reforms was undertaken. On the one hand, the investigation of corruption was taken away from it and entrusted to a newly formed commission. On the other, community policing initiatives to improve police-public relations and to engage the community in crime prevention were implemented. 28 years on, police-public relations are now much better than before 1974, though a large part of this may simply be attributable to the uprooting of syndicated police corruption. To engage the community in crime prevention, Neighbourhood Police Units were established in 1974, and the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme begun in 1985. Both schemes have failed.

In 1995, in a second wave of reforms, the HKP began a ‘cultural revolution’ in order to establish a customer-service culture. New values were promulgated, ‘Living-the-values’ workshops held, the recruit training syllabus revised. However, achievements so far are limited to the superficial such as the refurbishing of police stations. There are indications of silent resistance, doubts concerning the viability of consumerism in policing, and feelings that the notion of service is difficult to sink roots among police.

Why have achievements been so modest? This paper argues that despite the HKP top management’s best intentions, there are a number of limits to the realization of the community policing vision in Hong Kong.

The attempt to engage the public in crime prevention has been severely constrained by (1) the specific cultural ethos of the local population, and (2) the discrepancy between the mythical ‘the police are the public and the public are the police’ assumption underpinning the more utopian interpretations of the community policing vision on the one hand, and on the other, the realities of a socially divided and fragmented society such as Hong Kong.

There is an internal (to the HKP) limit and an external limit to the establishment of a service culture. The internal limit is analyzed in terms of the neo-institutionalist perspective. It is argued that the HKP’s paramilitary traditions have been institutionalized into premises (public order and law enforcement as the dual priority and seen as ‘real’ policing), structures (e.g. the relative organizational decline of community relations positions as soon as the 1974 reform

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18 The full name is The Hong Kong Police Force. After helping to suppress the riots in 1966-67, the Queen bestowed the ‘Royal’ title/prefix on it, which was abolished in July 1997. For convenience, the short-form HKP and the term ‘the Force’ are used throughout. Likewise, the head of HKP has been known by various titles, but the post-1937 ‘Commissioner’ is used throughout.
wave had cooled down), processes (e.g. recruit training and on-the-job ‘initiation’ into the Force), practices (routine use of hard law enforcement tactics), and attitudes (that of a hard law enforcer), all of which are antithetical to the establishment of a service culture.

The external limit is the government’s and public’s demand that Hong Kong maintain its political stability and low crime rate as top priorities. This limit reinforces the HKP’s institutionalized features described above.

However, the modest achievements do not mean that they HKP lacks credibility among the public. What the Hong Kong public want from the HKP is that it is corruption-free, professional and effective in helping to keep Hong Kong stable and safe. Greater accountability and transparency, as well as polite manners (which is easily achievable on the superficial level) are welcome, but that is very far from a demand to be taken as an equal partner or served like customers by the HKP.

This research is based upon the existing literature, official documents, published and internal police data, personal communication from several police sources, and interviews with ten police informants, three having recently retired, who will have to remain anonymous. The author has opted for arranging these anonymous interviews through personal networking instead of requesting the HKP to make officially arranged interviews in view of the nature of the research subject. For the same reason, and not because little was known about the subject beforehand, the interviews were loosely structured. The anonymous informants range from constable-turnedinspectors to senior management officers. They do not constitute a statistically representative sample, but such a sample is neither achievable (without compromising the authenticity of the interviews) nor would it be particularly useful (given the nature of the subject).

1. Defining Community Policing

The notion of community policing is decidedly vague. It has been known by various names, such as Neighbourhood Policing, Community-Oriented Policing and the like. Manning (1998) discerns at least four meanings for the notion, and the label has been attached to the most disparate initiatives and programmes. Even militarized tactics have been justified in community policing terms (Kraska & Kappeler 1997, Kappeler & Kraska 1998). As Bayley (1988: 225) noted, community policing ‘means different things to different people’.

For our purpose, we define community policing firstly as a philosophy. Skolnick & Bayley (1987) state that what constitutes community policing is not so much the programme or practices, but the philosophy, whose common themes include problem solving of non-crime

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19 For instance, see the exchange between the author and informants concerning the checking of nightspots in section six.
issues; police-public partnership; power sharing between community and police in police decision-making, and emphasis on service and customer-responsiveness. Trojanowicz et al. (2001) identify seven ‘core ideas’ of this philosophy: broad police function and community focus; citizen input; working together; developing trust; sharing power with the community on deciding the policing agenda; creativity; and neighbourhood variation.

Community policing advocates frequently define its philosophy in an ideal form, which is really counter-productive. For instance, community policing is often justified (e.g. Sparrow 1988: 8-9, cited in both Trojanowicz et al. 2001: 28, and Miller & Hess 2002: 16) as a return to Robert Peel’s principle of ‘the police are the public and the public are the police’ (cited in Reith 1952: 154). There is, of course, considerable controversy in the interpretation of the origins and history of Peel’s London Metropolitan Police or the Met (Reiner 1992), in which many consider the claim that the Met was based upon ‘policing by consent’ to be mythical, and Peel’s above-cited principle an ideological mystification. If so, and we tend to think it is, it would be foolish to measure real police organizations against a mythical yardstick.

Hence, this paper adopts a more realistic definition of the community policing philosophy as comprising the following principles. (1) To establish a closer police-community relationship in general to serve the following. (2) To engage members of a community (meaning those living, working or otherwise associated with a specific geographical area) in the policing function of crime prevention, reducing fear of crime and improving the quality of life in relation to crime-related and peacekeeping matters. This engagement implies community input in some form without assuming that equal partnership in the sense of power sharing is possible. (3) To establish a service culture at the expense of the culture of a coercive law enforcer. Considering the limited scale of the present research, (2) is further limited to crime prevention alone.

Community policing is also defined, for our present purpose, as any schemes, initiatives or programmes designed in the spirit of the above principles, whether or not they are implemented under its label.

2. The Character of the Pre-reform Hong Kong Police

In order to understand why community policing initiatives have been introduced in Hong Kong, as well as why their achievements have been so modest, it is necessary to examine the character of the pre-reform HKP.

From 1841 to 1997, Hong Kong was a British colony. In Jeffries’ (1952) orthodox thesis, colonial police forces go through three phases: (1) improvised arrangements to secure basic law

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The term ‘public order’ in used in the political sense in this paper. Thus maintaining public order means putting down strikes, protests, riots, etc. Non-political public order maintenance such as settling neighbour disputes is referred to as peacekeeping.
and order, (2) establishment of a paramilitary force modeled upon the Royal Irish Constabulary, and (3) development into a civilian force converging upon the Met model. Jeffries’ third phase is derived from the mythical Peelian interpretation of the Met, but that does not concern us here.

The paramilitary model is based upon the recognition of a hostile (usually indigenous) population ruled (usually by an alien colonial power) primarily by coercion with the threat of armed force. The police is meant for the purpose of suppressing disorder without the use of the military. Being armed, it is directly accountable to the head of the state executive. The principle of policing strangers (the indigenous population) by strangers (the police staffed and controlled by aliens) is practiced. Police live mainly in barracks, and police stations are heavily fortified. With public order maintenance as the primary function, law enforcement becomes secondary (Tobias 1972, Andrade 1985, Anderson & Killingray 1992).

Policing arrangements began haphazardly upon colonization with the recruitment of British and Indian rejects from the local garrison. In 1944, the HKP was formally established. The Commissioner was directly accountable to the governor in operational matters. Its officers’ ranks were filled with Europeans, while the rank and file was recruited mainly from the Indian sub-continent (up until India’s and Pakistan’s independence in August 1947) and, for a period after the 1890s, Northern China. Local inhabitants were also recruited into the rank and file, but not until the mass departure of the South Asian contingent in 1947 did they constitute the majority. For decades, only European officers carried firearms. Unmarried European officers as well as the alien rank and file were housed in fortified barracks. Police stations were built like fortresses with high walls and barbed wire.

In the wake of 1925-26’s communist-led general strike, the Emergency Unit (EU) and the Anti-Communist Squad (a political police unit which became the Special Branch [SB] in 1938) were formed. The EU’s function was to deal with civil disturbances, and to take control at the scene of major incidents. A Deputy Commissioner headed the SB, who reported directly to the governor instead of the Commissioner (Schloss 2001). Besides the EU, the Police Training Contingent (PTC) was later created to provide anti-riot/civil disturbance training. All new recruits underwent PTC training early in their career, and refresher training was provided periodically to serving police. PTC graduates returned to serve at local Divisions, but in an IS (Internal Security) situation, Divisions could instantly mobilize PTC graduates into an anti-riot squad. Police stations underwent regular ‘station attack’ dry runs. After the 1966-67 riots, the Police Tactical Unit (PTU) replaced the PTC. Instead of returning to local Divisions, graduates were deployed to a PTU company for a period of time. Thus, PTU became a permanent anti-riot unit, with the

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21 On the HKP’s history from 1841 to 1945, see Crisswell & Watson (1982), on its ethnic composition, see Gaylord & Traver (1995).

22 Officers refer to the inspectorate and above, rank and file to their subordinates. The latter are now called junior police officers (JPO).
EU as a further backup. ‘Station attack’ dry runs continued. Divisions continued to be instantly mobilizable into IS Structure (with the formation of a PTU company instead of the previous anti-riot squad). Training at both the Police Training School (PTS, for new recruits) and at PTC/PTU was militarized. Trainees were bare-chested, subject to physical punishment, and held collectively responsible for colleagues’ infractions. Discipline, loyalty and group solidarity were emphasized (author’s interviews).

Up until the early 1970s, crime was generally not a prime concern of the HKP (Munn 1995). This is strikingly evidenced in the tolerance of the police-triad symbiosis by the HKP’s top brass (Sinclair 1983, Gaylord & Traver 1995), in which police kept crime ‘under control’ by protecting triad-operated vice trade and establishments in return for bribes paid in an organized manner and shared by locals and Europeans alike, a practice that had begun from the very first days of the HKP’s founding and reached its peak in the 1950s to 1960s.

Over the decades, some changes to the above did occur, such as the replacement of barracks after the departure of the South Asian rank and file, and the gradual increase in the local ratio of the officers’ ranks (especially at the inspectorate level). Furthermore, since a long-term, mass-based insurgent movement had never emerged in Hong Kong, much of the daily activities of the HKP, except in politically turbulent times, were civilian in nature, especially since Hong Kong’s industrial take-off that began in the early 1950s. But all the other paramilitary features remained, such as in structure and organization (e.g. direct operational responsibility to the governor, EU/SB/PTC/PTU), processes (e.g. militarized training), and practices (e.g. ‘station attack’ dry runs). It will be seen in section six how these pre-1974 paramilitary features bear upon the HKP’s reform efforts.

3. Background to the First Wave of Police Reforms

In 1952, the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) was created within the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), but despite this, as seen, organized police corruption reached its peak in the 1950s to 1960s. In both 1960 and 1971, the government intended to set up an independent (from the HKP) anti-corruption body. On both occasions the HKP vigorously objected. Official enquiry into the 1966-67 riots revealed to the government that official corruption (with the HKP’s being most publicly visible) was a social time bomb. Hence, despite acceding to the HKP’s objection in 1971, the

23 How high this reached is uncertain. The highest-ranked officer subsequently charged with and convicted of a corruption offence was an Assistant Commissioner who was commander of one of the three land Districts the colony was then divided into (author’s interviews).

24 We define civilian police work negatively to include all work that is not related to public order and crime.
HKP was made to separate the ACB from the CID, and upgrade it to become the Anti-Corruption Office (ACO) headed by an Assistant Commissioner, which was given three years to produce results. The ACO did show much greater investigative determination than its predecessor, and in 1973, it investigated into Chief Superintendent Peter Godber, then Deputy District Commander of Kowloon. But Godber managed to flee Hong Kong, sparking massive public outcry and street protests (Lo 1993).

The governor then was Murray MacLehose, appointed since 1971 with the mission to undertake major reforms to shore up the colonial regime's legitimacy after the turbulence of the late 1960s (Lo 1993). In 1972, the management consultants McKinsey & Co. were engaged to look into civil service (administrative) reform. The McKinsey Report revealed that a sizable portion of the community ‘hated’ the police (cited in Grant 1992: 70). Reform of the HKP was clearly overdue. MacLehose proceeded on two fronts. First, as a result of the Godber scandal, he set up the Independent Commission Against Corruption in 1974 despite the HKP’s continued objection (Lo 1993). Second, several major reform schemes (borrowed from the Met) were implemented by the HKP in 1974.

4. The First Wave of the HKP’s Reforms

In the HKP’s own evaluation, the goal of the 1974 reforms was to ‘cultivate and develop public support for the Force in the execution of its duties’ (cited in Grant 1992: 71). As will be seen, the spirit behind pertains to the first and second principles of community policing stated in section one.

The Police Public Relations Branch (PPRB) was formed from the previous Police Public Information Bureau, commanded by a Chief Superintendent, consisting of two bureaus, which today are the Community Relations Bureau (CRB, the one that concerns us) and the Information and Publicity Bureau.

The Police Community Relations Officer (PCRO) at the Division (now District) level25 was also established in 1974 at Chief Inspector rank, responsible to the District Commander for liaising with the community and improving police-public relations by taking into consideration ‘public opinion’, and to ‘advise, assist and guide’ the community (Appendix A). Establishing the PCRO post at Chief Inspector rank indicates the importance then placed upon it. At that time, the Divisional Commander was of Superintendent rank, besides the PCRO, only the Sub-

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25 In the 1970s, the HKP’s territorial structure comprised District (of which there were four), Division and Sub-Division. In the early 1980s, the structure was overhauled to comprise of Region (of which there are now six), District (equivalent to previous Division), and Division (equivalent to previous Sub-Division). For uniformity, we use the current nomenclature hereinafter, except when specific terms in the past are used. The following account of the HKP’s community relations posts and functions are based upon official documents listed in the bibliography, unless indicated otherwise.
Divisional Inspector and the Divisional Detective Inspector (head of the Division’s CID) were of Chief Inspector rank. For several years after its establishment, the PCRO was a ‘promotion post’, meaning that officers posted to it were groomed for promotion (author’s interviews).

With the ACO taking a more determined effort to investigate police corruption in the early 1970s, the police-triad symbiosis began to break up. For this reason, among others, the violent crime rate soared (Traver 1991). In 1973, the government set up the Fight Violent Crime Committee, which was re-established as the Fight Crime Committee (FCC) in 1975. In 1976, District Fight Crime Committees (DFCC) were formed, with members appointed by the government from local leaders. Both the FCC and DFCC remain functioning today with representation from the HKP. The FCC is a high-level steering group whose decisions have policy implications. The DFCC monitors the state of crime and law enforcement locally, coordinates anti-crime campaigns, and promotes police-public relations in the fight against crime. It can be seen that while the original Fight Violent Crime Committee was formed apart from the yet-to-be-introduced police reforms, subsequent developments, especially at the local level, have provided a channel for the police to liaise with local leaders, both to promote mutual relationships as well as to engage them (and through them, the community) in crime prevention activities.

Also in 1974, Neighbourhood Police Units (NPU) were set up. It should be noted that unlike the American practice of randomized motor patrols, the HKP had long established foot beats, and experienced police became ‘beat owners’ (author’s interviews). The NPU was to serve two purposes. First, it was felt that the police were under-strength to deal with the soaring violent crime, hence NPUs were set up in areas of high population density and high crime rate but which lacked a police station, hopefully to facilitate the engagement of the public in the fight against crime. Second, NPUs would hopefully bridge the police-public gap and promote mutual relations. A small team was attached to the NPU for a minimum tour of duty of 12 months to undertake both constabulary and community relations duties. The NPU area was divided into foot beats, with a 24-hour reporting center. By 1983, 90 NPUs were in operation taking up 5.8% of the total Force strength (HKP 1983, Grant 1992).

In the early 1980s, the NPU scheme was reviewed, which revealed extremely low public use, with 42% of the reporting centers receiving fewer than 3 miscellaneous reports daily and over half receiving fewer than 2 crime reports weekly. The scheme was deemed to be ‘an overwhelming success’ in public relations, but resource intensive and inflexible, and hence detrimental to ‘effective’ policing. Its community relations work also seen as overlapping the PCRO’s. With the beat radio coming into use in July 1977, the need for a physical presence in the form of the NPU diminished (HKP 1981 and 1983, Grant 1992, Cartwright 1994, author’s interviews). As a result, the scheme was revised in 1984. NPU staff were re-integrated into local
sub-units. A Neighbourhood Police Coordinator (NPC) was created to serve the whole District under the PCRO. The NPU itself was abandoned and its premises renamed Neighbourhood Police Offices (NPO). District Commanders had absolute discretion as to how to maintain the NPO. As it turned out, it was either abandoned or became defunct. Today, the few NPOs that still remain have been turned into ‘Reporting Centres’ used for operational, not community relations, purposes (author’s interviews).

Today, police-public relations work is carried out by the PPRB/CRB and the PCRO (Appendix B). Under the PCRO are several posts. The School Liaison Officer (SLO, Appendix C), whose function is to promote police-school children relations, warn school children against crime and triads, and gather intelligence of triad and gang activities at school. A sergeant is responsible for Junior Police Call (JPC) and youth work. The JPC was established in 1974, with the multiple functions of promoting police-youth understanding and relations, organizing youth activities to help them stay away from crime, and to engage youths as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the police to fight against crime, the last of which was subsequently de-emphasized for being potentially and dangerously misleading (HKP 1991). Membership in recent years has declined, from 183,247 in 1999 to 157,607 as of early 2002 (figures supplied by PPRB), but it still remains one of the largest youth organizations in the world.

The NPC (Appendix D) performs similar functions to the SLO but towards all local community/residents’ organizations and business operators. It also facilitates liaison between the Regional Crime Section and local residents and business operators, assists the PCRO to organize police campaigns, transmits local opinion on Force policies up the police hierarchy, organizes local recreational activities, pays comfort visits, and so on.

The PCRO operates independently of the PPRB’s CRB. The CRB’s role is to provide policy guidelines, organize training and bimonthly ‘ideas-exchange’ sessions for PCRO staff, coordinate inter-District PCRO activities, and disseminate best practices (personal communication from Chief Staff Officer, PPRB).

With the effective demise of the NPU scheme in 1984, the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme (NWS) was transplanted from Britain in 1985 upon the FCC’s endorsement, with a threefold objective: to draw residents’ attention to the importance of communal surveillance; to organize mutual aid groups; to report suspicious characters and activities to the police.

The PCRO, in consultation with the DFCC and the (government’s) District Office, selected locations to set up Neighbourhood Watch Units under police guidance. By 1989, a total of 8,000 building blocks involving 14,000 households had been involved. Yet, the HKP had found the scheme resource-demanding but providing scant returns. As a result, the scheme’s steering and coordinating role was transferred from the PCRO to the DFCC in 1990. Soon afterwards, the scheme became defunct. In September 1994, the FCC initiated a revival on a
trial basis for six months in three Districts. The trial period has subsequently been extended indefinitely. Nominally still under review, the scheme has again become defunct (Grant 1992, FCC Report various years, author’s interviews). 26

On balance, it seems certain that compared to the pre-1974 situation, the public’s opinion of the HKP has much improved. For instance, in surveys carried out in 1999 and 2001 (to be examined in due course), the majority of respondents expressed confidence in the HKP and satisfaction with its performance. How much of this is actually due to the HKP’s own community relations work, however, is less certain, for it seems reasonable to attribute part of the improvement to the uprooting of syndicated police corruption.

The Force’s youth work is hard to evaluate. Has it improved youths’ perception of the police? Has it succeeded to heighten youths’ crime prevention awareness? Has it helped youths stay away from crime and the triads? These and other similar questions are, by nature, difficult to answer, and there is a singular lack of relevant research and data. The same applies to the crime prevention work of the PPRB/CRB-PCRO. Hence, it seems advisable to leave these issues aside here.

In contrast to the improvement in police-public relations (corresponding to the first principle of community policing in section one), the NPU and NWS schemes (corresponding to the second principle) have failed. We will examine why in due course.

5. The Second Wave of the HKP’s Reforms

In a public speech on 9 March 1995, the Commissioner (Hui 1995) launched what one insider has christened the HKP’s ‘cultural revolution’ (So 1999), vowing to transform the HKP from a colonial police force into a ‘service of quality’. Among a couple of other goals, the aim (corresponding to the third community policing principle in section one) was to develop a customer-service culture. 27

Back in 1994, the HKP created the Service Quality Wing (SQW). In tandem with the ‘cultural revolution’ announcement, SQW launched the Force Strategy on Quality of Service in May 1995 (Hui 2001).

A series of ‘Awareness Roadshows’ was organized and attended by 4,000 officers at the inspectorate rank and above, followed by video presentations at each police formation. In December 1996, two documents, Force Vision and Statement of Common Purpose and Values (HKP 1996 – Appendix E), collectively known in the Force as ‘the Values’, were promulgated. In 1997, some 1,800 ‘Living-the-Values’ workshops were held. Two more Force-wide series of

27 On the background to this development, see Hui (2001).
such workshops have since been held (Jiao 2002).

In October 1997, a one-year Customer Service Improvement Programme (CSIP) was launched with a view to change the Force’s culture. It was subsequently extended to 1999. However, as the Commissioner (Hui 2001: 189) subsequently admitted, CSIP resulted in no more than ‘a major Force-wide initiative to improve the physical environment within police stations’.

To instill ‘the Values’ in new recruits, the Recruit Police Constable (RPC) syllabus, which had remained unchanged since the early 1980s, was revised in 1998 (HKP 1998, 1999). Previously, as Grant (1992) points out, the focus was on legalistic education, weapons training, internal security training, and drill. Only a few percent of the syllabus was devoted to subjects such as ‘Promoting police-public relations’ and ‘Effective mutual communication [with outsiders]’, and training such as volunteer community work and current affairs discussion. With reference to our present concern, in the new syllabus, 2 sessions of a new subject on ‘the Values’, 2 sessions of a new subject on the ‘Bill of Human Rights’ (a new ordinance enacted in the early 1990s), and 2 extra sessions of an existing subject (‘Current Affairs Discussion’) are added (out of a total of 1,053 sessions). As the officer responsible for the review (hereinafter SP FTO [Superintendent, Force Training Officer]) agreed, the other changes mainly represent a rationalization of the syllabus and redesign of the instructional-assessment structure-methods. Furthermore, the initial focus was on teaching ‘the Values’ rather than emphasizing the concept of customer service. After taking over as Commissioner in early 2001, the current Commissioner has adopted the slogan of ‘We Serve with Pride and Care’. As a result, plans as of early 2002 are to add one session on ‘Customers we are facing, internal and external’ and another on ‘Conflict management’. The subject ‘Communication skills’ will also be revised to ‘focus on practicing customer service’ (HKP 2002).

Opinion surveys on the public’s perception of the HKP were carried out in 1995, 1999 and 2001. Furthermore, ‘customer satisfaction surveys’ were carried out in 1998 and 2000 (HKP 2000, 2001, c.2001). The 1999 survey evaluated the level of confidence in the Force, satisfaction with its performance, appearance and physical fitness, recording positive response in all areas. 58% of the respondents also viewed the police as generally ‘willing to offer assistance’. However, respectively only 34% and 23% regarded the HKP as accountable and transparent.

The 2001 survey revealed similar positive views vis-à-vis confidence in the HKP and satisfaction with its performance. Respondents were most satisfied (apparently in descending order of degree) with the Force’s professionalism, efficiency, modernized image, freedom of corruption, and being ‘caring’. Respondents also considered ‘manners of police officers’ as the most important service attribute.
Respondents were sampled through five channels of contact with the police for the 2000 Customer Satisfaction Survey: Report Room, dialing the emergency 999, crime office, contact at scene, and dialing police station. They were generally well satisfied with the services provided at these contact points.

Interesting, the political party the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (2002) or DAB conducted its own surveys on the public’s perception of the HKP and other disciplined services in both 2000 and 2001. On both occasions, the HKP had far and away ‘the worst impression’ on the public (in 2001, rated so by 47% of respondents, compared to 20.5% for the second worst). Of the pre-set reasons (in both years) for the bad impression, ‘bad attitude towards the public’ and ‘less than satisfactory ethical conduct’ were by far the most often cited.

It would be unwise to rely too much upon these surveys. For instance, in the DAB survey, it was also inconsistently found that the HKP ranked second instead of last in having ‘the best impression’ on the public. As another example, if in the HKP’s 2000 customer satisfaction survey, instead of the above contact points, it was conducted with motorists given fixed penalty tickets for minor infractions due to a new change of road signs, the results would likely be very different. This is not to say that such things as ‘clarity and accuracy of signage leading to crime offices’ are not part and parcel of service quality, but it does seem that the five chosen contact points are not very instructive.

What do the public care about concerning policing? In both 1999 and 2001, respondents in the police surveys were asked, without prompting, to mention three most important policing areas. The top five areas mentioned in both years all relate to law and order, public order and crime. Hong Kong has long had one of the lowest official crime rates among big cities in the world. Of course, the extent to which the police anywhere can either claim credit or be blamed for the crime rate is limited. But that does not stop the public from making the link. Also, since the 1960s, Hong Kong has enjoyed relative political stability. It is, hence, unsurprising that both the HKP’s and the DAB’s surveys show the public being satisfied with the HKP’s performance (professionalism and efficiency are similar). But whether or not this satisfaction indicates a successful ‘cultural revolution’ on the police’s part will now be explored.

6. Limits to Realizing the Community Policing Vision in Hong Kong

Why have the NPU and NWS failed? First, the mythical assumption of ‘the police are the public…’ depicts a utopian harmonious, consensual community as the basis of policing (Klockars 1999). A common research finding is that community policing initiatives have failed most conspicuously in a socially divisive and fragmented environment (Irving et al. 1989, Skogan 1990, Grinc 1994). As Waddington (1999: 213) notes, ‘the sad conclusion is that
neighbourhood watch works best where it is needed least [e.g. wealthy suburbs], and vice versa’. In fact, even those who hold little or no distrust or hostility towards the police are seldom attracted to neighbourhood watch. As McConville & Shepherd (1992) observe, today’s increasingly domestic lifestyle militates against such projects. To suppose that neighbourhood watch could foster a sense of community is wishful thinking (Bennett 1989).

Hence, the NPU’s and NWS’s failure is not an exception. Socio-economically, Hong Kong’s gini coefficient in 1996, for instance, stood at a staggering 0.520, in comparison to Latin America’s 0.490, the US’s 0.456 and Britain’s 0.346 (cited in Mingpao, 25 Aug 2000). Though Hong Kong is ethnically homogenous, in the past two decades, there have been severe problems with the integration of new immigrants from mainland China and their children into the ‘indigenous’ population. A rough calculation based upon the post-1980 daily quota shows some 800,000 (of a population of 6.7 million in 2001) new immigrants having settled in Hong Kong since then. Considering that much of the population’s natural increase over the same period is due to the new arrivals, the extent of the integration problem is clear. Significantly, new immigrants are residentially dispersed. In recent years, close to half of all new arrivals live in public rental housing estates with family or relatives (Home Affairs Department, various years).

Further, Hong Kong is a rapidly changing society. Developments required for economic, social and other purposes regularly disperse inhabitants to various other parts of the territory. Clearly, the population’s high geographical mobility is not conducive to building a sense of community. Moreover, as many of the displaced are offered public rental housing, this means that the residents of these housing estates contain a mixture of resettled people coming from different parts of the territory in addition to the new immigrants. Cartwright (1994) found this to be an important contributory factor for the NPU’s failure in his case study.

Colonial Hong Kong was described as a ‘borrowed place’ living on ‘borrowed time’ (Hughes 1976). As noted, the population has always consisted of a large proportion of mainland immigrants. As a result of these and other factors, short-termist thinking and behaviour are rife and materialistic interests (for self and immediate family) reign supreme. Lau & Kuan (1988) characterize ‘the ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese’ as a socially apathetic ‘utilitarian familism’ or ‘egotistical individualism’, which is certainly a major reason for the absence of a feeling of neighbourhood and community, on which success in realizing the second principle of

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28 A substantial proportion of Hong Kong’s population has always been mainland immigrants. Up to 1980, the government had allowed illegal immigrants to stay. Since then, they were repatriated and the number of new legal arrivals has been subject to quota. For our purpose, ‘indigenous’ population is loosely understood as those born in Hong Kong or pre-1980 immigrants.

29 Over the years, public rental housing estates house between one-third to one-half of Hong Kong’s total population (Census and Statistics Department 2002).

30 It may be thought that this will change with Hong Kong’s return to China. Space forbids an analysis of why this will not occur for a long time to come.
community policing depends.

With regard to the limits to achieving better police-public relations and the ‘cultural revolution,’ we adopt the neo-institutionalist framework. March & Olsen (1984) see institutions or organizations as productive of actions that can neither be reduced to the ‘contextual’ (e.g. class) nor individual/group levels. They reject the ‘utilitarianistic choice’ theory of action, in which the interests of organizational members are seen as exogenously given. Instead, they see past policies, past outcomes, etc. becoming institutionalized into structures and procedures, which endogenously shape members’ interests. Members are ‘co-opted’ into the organization’s beliefs and commitments, and ‘socialized’ into its norms (rules of thumb), rules, procedures, and aspirations-expectations.31

In speaking of ‘co-optation’ and ‘socialization’, March and Olsen share Selznick’s (note 15) normative interpretation of members’ commitment to the organization’s beliefs, norms, etc. The neo-institutionalism in sociology (Powell & DiMaggio 1991), in contrast, de-emphasizes this normative aspect. Inspired by social phenomenology, sociological neo-institutionalism regards organizational members’ taking up of the organization’s goals, etc. and following of its rules, norms, etc. as being non-reflective, without any normative commitment or evaluative attachment.

In our own fieldwork, we discerned different degrees of normative and non-reflective commitment, hence integrating the above two approaches, we argue: an organization’s past (policies, outcomes, experience, etc.) is institutionalized into premises (goals, values, beliefs), structures, processes (e.g. rules, procedures), practices (e.g. customs, informal norms), and attitudes. Organizations shape their members (in terms of beliefs, goals, norms, etc.), hence members’ actions are primarily not derived from individualistic calculation based upon exogenously given factors. The process of institutionalization severely constrains the possible trajectory of an organization’s future development.

The HKP’s new direction is embodied in ‘the Values’, but ironically the Force’s vision is stated as: ‘That Hong Kong remains one of the safest and most stable societies in the world’. It can be seen that from the pre-1974 public order priority, the HKP has since acquired the dual priority of law enforcement and public order. That the programmatic statement of the ‘cultural revolution’ should completely ignore civilian police work illustrates a fundamental premise (historically derived from the HKP’s paramilitary tradition and the break-up of the police-triad symbiosis) that such work is not ‘real’ policing. This premise permeates the entire Force. Thus, in the early 1990s, there was ‘a virtual consensus [among senior commanders] that … the Force should reduce its commitments in the Community Relations field’ in order to economize

31 March and Olsen were partially predicted by Selznick (1949, 1957), for whom institutionalization creates customs, precedents, etc., with organizational members being socialized into commitment to institutional values as ends in themselves and to the associated norms and attitudes.
The above premise has also been institutionalized structurally. It will be recalled that in 1974, the PCRO was established at the same rank as the Sub-Divisional Inspector and Divisional Detective Inspector. However, the latter two posts (rather, their equivalent after re-structuring) have later been upgraded to the Superintendent rank, whereas the PCRO’s rank has remained unchanged. It will also be recalled that the PCRO was once a ‘promotion post’. However, it soon became a sinecure. Today, the post carries heavy duties, but little promotional prospects (Grant 1992: 121, author’s interviews). This brings us to the next point.

As part and parcel of the above premise, there is an informal distinction between ‘core’ and non-‘core’ duties. Frontline operational duties such as PTU/EU (public order-related), crime (law enforcement-related), etc. are ‘core’; non-operational duties such as training, police-public relations, etc. are non-‘core’. This distinction is institutionalized into a vital practice. Officially, there is no distinction between ‘core’ and non-‘core’ experience in promotion, but it is general knowledge in the Force that informally ‘core’ duties count for much more (author’s interviews).

The above premise is also institutionalized in the training process. In the old RPC syllabus, there were 39 sessions for C & J (children and juvenile) subjects. In the 1998 revision, these were cancelled and integrated into the new syllabus elsewhere. With the total number of sessions remaining unchanged, this means that there was room to add new subjects and/or sessions. But, as seen, a total of only 6 sessions were added for existing/new subjects related to service and police-public relations. Hence, the previous focus on legalistic education, weapons training, internal security training, and drill remains intact. This clearly shows, as several informants agree, that while a service culture and police-public relations are seen as desirable, they are not allowed to interfere with the dual priority.

The HKP’s paramilitary public order priority has been institutionalized in its organizational structure and processes. As a result of this institutionalization, the HKP adopts a coercive or hard approach in law enforcement. This approach in turn has been institutionalized. It is argued below that this double-fold institutionalization process is antithetical to establishing a service culture.

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32 Despite for community policing work is also widely reported elsewhere (Phillips & Cochrane 1986, Dixon & Stanko 1993, Fielding 1994).

33 SP FTO remarked that ‘the Values’ are integrated into the overall training process itself. For instance, in the handling of domestic violence, in the past, police arriving at the scene focused on whether or not criminal acts had been committed, if not, the case would be closed. In the new syllabus, RPCs are taught to be ‘compassionate’ and be prepared to work with other agencies (such as the Social Welfare Department and NGOs). The author enquired whether or not this kind of teaching might simply result in police making referrals as a routine in order to avoid complaint (now a major concern of street-level police in Hong Kong’s present socio-political climate of a highly critical media – author’s interviews), instead of having a real service orientation. SP FTO agreed that police might indeed simply be ‘complying with the fixed acts’, but added that the HKP’s surveys should be able to tell whether or not service level is indeed enhanced.
Organizationally, with the exception of the dissolution of the Intelligence Wing of the former SB in 1995, all the public order-related structures remain: PTU, EU, and the ready mobilization of the Force into full Internal Security Structure. In terms of processes, ‘station attack’ dry runs are still regularly (quarterly or biennially) conducted (author’s interviews). The RPC’s process of on-the-job ‘initiation’ into the Force is even more telling. Upon graduation from PTS, the RPC is assigned to a Division. S/he first works in the Report Room under close supervision, and is then assigned on ‘double beat’ under experienced guidance. Within a couple of years, s/he undergoes PTU training for 3 months. Until the establishment of the Border Division several years ago, s/he is then deployed to do a tour of duty first attached to the Field Patrol Detachment (FPD), a purely paramilitary unit dealing with illegal immigration, and then to a PTU company in urban areas. Upon completing the tour of duty, s/he returns to a Division and the smarter ones are immediately attached to the local vice squad.

Hence, a constable’s ‘initiation’ focuses on frontline operational duties. Moreover, PTU training and deployment constitute a police’s real ‘baptism’ into the Force (author’s interviews). The sense of group loyalty and solidarity is established much more strongly in PTU training/deployment than at PTS. All police recall with pride and delight of their PTU class and the company to which they were deployed. While the FPD has now been disbanded, and PTU deployment in urban areas normally does not involve dealing with disorder, the sense of coercive power gained from group street policing, the routine resort to militarized tactics such as sweeps and searches, and the like are highly instrumental in sustaining the coercive public order mentality among police. ‘PTU is not about service at all’, states one informant. Another agrees: ‘PTU is antithetical to the service ethos’. Hence, it is clear that the institutionalization of the public order priority in the organizational form of the PTU and in the processes especially of rookies’ ‘initiation’ is inimical to the ‘cultural revolution’. It is true that since the death of a trainee several years ago and the incorporation of women police into PTU, PTU training has become less militaristic than previously, but the change is only of a minor degree, and does not affect the above observations (author’s interviews). From the 1980s to today, the number of PTU trainees has remained steady, averaging 1,845 yearly from 1984-90 and 1,827 from 1995-2002 (calculated from HKP Annual Report, various years and data supplied by PTU).

The HKP’s paramilitary traditions have also been institutionalized into hard law enforcement practices. The Force has long relied on the routine, widespread use of hard anti-crime tactics such as PTU saturation policing, stop and search procedures, and roadblocks. I conveyed to several informants my own experience of mid-night roadblocks which converged three lanes of traffic into a single file with cars exiting the roadblock one by one at snail’s pace,

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34 Ip (1990: 68-9) found that police having gone through PTU training are more likely to opt for the use of ‘power/authority’.
thereby causing huge traffic jams. Unless a major incident has occurred, I don’t see how the social cost of hundreds or more of inconvenienced motorists can be justified. My informants grudgingly accepted my point.

One hard anti-crime tactic used is ‘carpet-searches’ of nightspots, in some cases involving hundreds of police. In 1990, in response to a triad-related multiple arson/homicide case, such operations were scaled up and code-named ‘Levington’ (Grant 1992: 125). The Commissioner reported: ‘The highly successful series of Operations “Levington” … thousands of premises have been visited by Police, and numerous people have been checked … The crime preventive and deterrent value of such measures is incalculable’ (HKP Annual Report for 1990: 5). These operations are still regularly conducted today, usually at the District level, though they now come under various code-names in addition to ‘Levington’ such as ‘Jubilee’ to signify the different targets aimed at.

Discussing these operations with one informant, recently retired from the Force, I remarked that many thousands of ordinary patrons are being affected. He replied that from a retrospective vantage point, he now regards that much of what the Force does is ‘legal but often not very reasonable’. Thus, in checking nightspots, police often command ‘men on the left, women on the right’ and then proceed with identity checks, as though everybody is a potential suspect. My discussions with a couple of informants on hard tactics are worth citing in detail. One informant who’s had extensive personal experience in checking nightspots was initially very defensive. ‘When we visited a nightspot in Tsim Sha Tsui [an expensive nightspots area], we were very polite’. I responded: ‘Might this not be because you wanted to avoid complaints, given the kind of patrons [of high social status] there? Were you as polite in visits to [low class] nightspots in Shum Shui Po?’ He admitted my point, but went on: ‘sometimes, we had information that certain particular patrons had drugs on them, and if we did not take control of the situation [by means of hard tactics] right from the first moment, it would be very easy for them to dispose of the drugs’. I replied: ‘I can accept that, but surely you did not have prior intelligence every time, but even when you didn’t, did you adopt the same practice?’ He eventually agreed that hard tactics might not always be reasonable.

In contrast, another informant defended hard tactics from start to end. In connection with the above operations, he concluded: ‘if the police are able to pick up some criminals, I don’t think inconveniencing the other innocent patrons is a big deal’. As can be seen, like the Commissioner who claimed successes for ‘Levington’ in 1990, he adopted the crime control model. Hard tactics may sometimes be justified, but their institutionalization in the HKP derives not from rational justification, but from its paramilitary traditions. Further, Hong Kong has enjoyed one of the lowest official crime rates in the world. While this may have little or nothing to do with hard anti-crime tactics, from the neo-institutionalist perspective, there exists no external
stimulus that might trigger a reconsideration of them. Needless to say, like the institutionalization of paramilitary structures and processes, the institutionalization of hard law enforcement practices is antithetical to the service ethos. This finally brings us to police’s institutionalized attitudes.

So (1999: 75-7) reports from an insider’s vantage point ‘skepticism about the viability of consumerism in policing’ and the ‘cognitive inability to change among some high ranking and experienced police officers’, which result in ‘half-hearted effort[s]’ in implementing the ‘cultural revolution’, an observation confirmed by my informants.\(^{35}\) Such resistance is not peculiar to the HKP as ingrained police attitudes are hard to change (Guyot 1991, Dixon & Stanko 1993, Bennett 1994, Lurigio & Rosenbaum 1994). ‘The Station Improvement Project is only cosmetic’, observed one informant, ‘that’s the easy part, but police attitudes towards the public is very difficult to change’. Another stated: ‘we are now polite towards ordinary citizens, that’s mainly to avoid complaint. But that’s on the surface. Deep down, there’s no concept of service at all. That’s very hard to acquire’. The attitude of most police, according to a third informant, is that ‘the police are the police, if we have to arrest you, we arrest you, nothing more needs to be said’. This last remark illustrates how hard anti-crime practices are manifested at the individual attitudinal level. My informants all agree that superficial politeness in civilian work is easy to achieve, and in Hong Kong’s present socio-political climate accepted as necessary, but I discern no belief in the necessity of basic attitudinal change towards the public.

There is also an external limit to the vision of enhancing police-public relations and establishing a service culture. It is generally held, justifiably or not, that Hong Kong has thrived economically on the basis of its post-1960s political stability and comparatively low crime rate. Thus, both the public and the government demand the HKP to continue to keep Hong Kong safe and stable. Moreover, when ‘the Values’ were formulated, Hong Kong’s return to China was impending. Political stability in the run up to the return until now is a top priority for the government. It should be noted that this external limit reinforces the institutionalized internal limits.

### 7. Concluding Remarks

The HKP’s community policing efforts have achieved very modest results. Its failure to engage the public in crime prevention is due largely to external (to the HKP) limits. The enhancement of police-public relations has been successful to a degree for both external

\(^{35}\) In addition to this, there is silent dissatisfaction at the middle management (Superintendent and Chief Inspector) level with what is regarded as an over-emphasis on ‘democratizing’ internal communication, which has been seen as having detrimental effects on discipline. This internal ‘democratization’ is the one, single area in which the HKP’s paramilitary tradition has changed significantly (author’s interviews).
reasons (the uprooting of syndicated police corruption) as well as internal ones (the HKP’s own efforts), but it is constrained by an internal limit: the institutionalization of the premise of what constitutes ‘real’ policing, and in turn, the institutionalization of that premise into structures (the relative decline of the PCRO’s ranking), processes (RPC training), and practices (the distinction between ‘core’ and non-‘core’ policing duties and its promotional implications). The ‘cultural revolution’ has just begun, but other than some rather superficial changes, one must say that prospects are not particularly encouraging. The limits are both external (the demand that Hong Kong remains safe and stable) and internal (the various institutionalized limits detailed in section six).

These limits to achieving the community policing vision in Hong Kong are of an objective nature. This is so not only with regard to the external limits, but also the internal ones, for the institutionalization of the HKP’s traditions is an objective process that occurs largely irrespective of the subjective will and outside the awareness of both the HKP’s top management and other members of the Force.

In this paper, we point out the limits that constrain change. There is no implication that change is absolutely ruled out. That is certainly not the case, but the issue is beyond our scope.

Does the lack of success discredit the HKP in the public’s view? We do not think so, for that depends on what the public expect from the HKP. Just as it is very difficult to change police’s attitudes toward the public, the public’s social psyche vis-à-vis the police developed over the decades does not change easily either. It is true that there are youths who do not respect police and sometimes deliberately provoke them. This is common among adolescents observed in many places. But other than that, many members of the public, especially among the lower strata of society, still hold a submissive deference towards police. There is no space to analyze this here, but as one informant remarked, ‘in Britain [here he is idealizing the British bobbies in accordance with the Peelian myth] the police address the public as “sir”, here, to the contrary, it is the public who address the police as “ah [a Cantonese way of speaking] sir”.’

If that is the case, being taken as an equal partner in the police-public relationship and being treated like customers may be very far from what the public expect from the HKP. Moreover, the public’s main concerns with respect to policing are with law and order, public order and crime, and they credit the HKP for performing well in these areas. Of course, in the present socio-political climate, the public wants the HKP to be more accountable and transparent, while they would certainly welcome polite manners (which is easy to attain on a superficial level). But these demands do not require the realization of the community policing vision – itself stricken with utopianism – to be satisfied. Whereas there are limits to achieving this vision in Hong Kong, they do not pose dangers to the HKP’s credibility so long as Hong Kong remains safe and stable.
**List of Abbreviations**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>Community Relations Bureau</td>
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<td>DFCC</td>
<td>District Fight Crime Committee</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>Emergency Unit</td>
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<td>FCC</td>
<td>Fight Crime Committee</td>
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<td>HKP</td>
<td>The Hong Kong Police</td>
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<td>NPU</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Police Unit</td>
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<td>NWS</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Watch Scheme</td>
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<td>PPRB</td>
<td>Police Public Relations Branch</td>
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<td>PTS</td>
<td>Police Training School</td>
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<td>PTU</td>
<td>Police Tactical Unit</td>
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<td>RPC</td>
<td>Recruit Police Constable</td>
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<td>SB</td>
<td>Special Branch</td>
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References


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Homes Affairs Department, ‘Survey on new arrivals from the mainland’, various years.


Hong Kong Police, Commissioner’s annual report, various years.
----------(n.d.) ‘Neighbourhood Police Coordinator (NPC)’.
----------(n.d.) ‘Neighbourhood Police Unit (NPU). Neighbourhood Police Office (NPO)’.
----------(n.d.) ‘Organization chart of the Police Community Relations Officer (PCRO) Office’.
----------(n.d.) ‘Police Community Relations Officer (PCRO) scheme’.
----------(n.d.) ‘School Liaison Officer (SLO)’.
----------(1983) ‘Public usage of neighbourhood police units (NPUs) and police report centers (NRPs)’.
----------(2000) PPRB press release of 23 Feb 00 on public opinion survey carried out in 1999.
----------(2002) Training Development Bureau’s summary of planned amendments to basic courses for recruit police constable and probationary inspector.


Appendix A

POLICE COMMUNITY RELATIONS OFFICER (PCRO) SCHEME

2-01 POLICY AND CONTROL

1. The PCRO Scheme, introduced in 1974 and now extended to cover every District, is aimed at promoting community relations at District level and making direct contact with local communities.

2. The appointment of PCRO is the responsibility of Regional Commanders who will ensure that officers of suitable temperament and ability are selected for such post, and that continuity in post is achieved.

3. Chief Superintendent, Public Relations (CSP PR), assisted by the Senior Superintendent, Public Relations (SSP PR), is responsible for the dissemination of Force policies and priorities and the day-to-day direction and monitoring of community relations activities. He is to co-ordinate Force resource requirements and provide information and other material as may be required.

4. The Deputy District Commander of a District will supervise his PCRO and will co-ordinate community relations efforts which involve the Divisional Commander and Assistant District Commander/Crime in his District.

2-02 AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

The PCRO is responsible to his District Commander for the following:

(a) establishing and maintaining close contact and liaison at the District level with community organisations;

(b) projecting a positive police image and advising, assisting and guiding the local community;

(c) operating and organising JPC, HKAYP, and other youth activities within the District;

(d) educating and briefing District police personnel and CSP PR on all 3/2000 aspects of Community relations; and

(e) advising his District Commander of local public opinion in regard to the service provided by the police.

2-03 SPECIFIC DUTIES

The duties of a PCRO include:

(a) Liaison with the Public
(i) District Board

The District Commander is the official police member of this Board, and in the absence of the District Commander, the Deputy District Commander will be his representative. The PCRO will be the representative on any relevant committees and working groups formed by the District Board.

(ii) Area Committee.

The PCRO will normally be the police representative on any Area Committee but in his absence, APCRO or any Inspectors or NCO as nominated by the District Commander, will attend on his behalf.

(iii) Mutual Aid Committees/Owners’ Corporations/ Estate Management

The PCRO will establish routine contact with the chairmen and officials of Mutual Aid Committees and Owners’ Corporations in his district as well as the staff of Estate/Building Management. In respect of NT Districts, the Liaison network will cover Rural Committees.

(iv) Kaifong Association

The PCRO will establish and maintain contact with the chairmen and officials of the local kaifong associations.

(b) Liaison with Schools

(i) The PCRO will maintain close contact with the heads and senior staff of schools within his District.

(ii) The day-to-day liaison with school authorities is the responsibility of the School Liaison Officer (SLO). The SLO meets members of the school management, delivers lectures to students and advises the PCRO and the Divisional Commander concerned on school matters which require police attention.

(iii) The contents of school talks will be carefully considered and structured, commensurate with the age and maturity of the intended audience. The subject officer concerned in the District should be consulted beforehand if necessary.

(iv) The PCRO will work closely with the District School Team in all aspects concerning schools. In the event of the team operating under his command he will ensure that the personnel are properly briefed and gainfully employed.

(c) Advice and Assistance to the Public

(i) District Office.

In response to requests from the District Officer or his staff, PCRO will offer advice and
assistance on any matter concerning the police. He will also ensure that the District Officer is appraised of any police programmes and campaigns which take place in the district.

(ii) Youth

He will organise and co-ordinate all district Junior Police Call activities. He will establish regular contact with schools and youth organisations to provide them with support and assistance by, for example, assisting in giving lectures on police related topics, or organising sports events, etc. He will not become directly involved in the setting up and running of any youth groups other than JPC. In carrying out these duties, he will maintain a close liaison with Social Welfare Department's District Social Work Officer (Youth and Community).

(iii) Road Safety

SSPs in consultation with District Commanders (DCs) will have overall responsibility for identifying traffic accident black spots; recommending road safety themes and maintaining community liaison for these aspects through the Regional Road Safety Officer (RSO) and the Police Community Relations Officer (PCRO) respectively.

In launching Road Safety Campaigns, each District will form a Road Safety Campaign Organising Committee which will normally be chaired by the Police Community Relations Officer (PCRO) who will provide the secretarial service required. Members of the Committee will generally comprise the RSO (as adviser) and local community leaders.

Support should be sought from District Offices, District Boards, other government departments and interested organisations such as the Road Safety Association. The RSO and his Road Safety Teams will assist by providing educational displays and exhibits, road safety games, promotional materials and the necessary specialist support.

(iv) Crime Prevention

He will liaise with the Assistant District Commander/Crime in regard to the work of the Regional Crime Prevention Section, and help co-ordinate the District Crime Prevention Officer's visits to Mutual Aid Committees, Owners Incorporations, shop-keepers, businessmen and other property owners in the district. He will also assist in carrying out the Criminal and Law Enforcement Injuries Compensation Scheme in that he will advise the victims on the procedure of application.

(v) Visit to Police Formations

He will arrange visits to various police formations, for members of the District Boards, Areas Committees, Mutual Aid Committees, Kaifong Associations, schools, reputable associations and business organisations.
(vi) Local Publications
In conjunction with the District Officer he will, from time to time, arrange for police matters which are of interest to the public to be published in District Office's publications and local newspapers.

(vii) Police Public Relations Branch
He will be responsible to compile the PCRO Monthly Report in the format as per Annex B and other reports as required and ensure that all PR related information is passed to the Police Public Relations Branch for appropriate action.

(d) Briefing of Police
(i) The PCRO will regularly brief the District Commander and CSP PR on the attitude, opinion of individuals/organisations and matters of contentious nature with which he comes into contact concerning the Force.
(ii) He will ensure that police personnel in the District are lectured and briefed on matters which affect police public relations.

(e) Running the Hong Kong Awards for Young People Scheme (HKAYP)
The PCRO is the head of the HKAYP District User Unit who will be responsible to the SSP Admin of the Region for running the HKAYP Scheme in the District. Details of his responsibilities are at Annex C.

(f) Assistance to PPRB
The PCRO will assist CSP PR and the staff of PPRB in the organisation and execution of various public relations events throughout the year.
Appendix B

Organisation Chart of Police Community Relations Officer (PCRO) Office

PCRO (CIP)

APCRO (SSGT)

Community Liaison
(Neighbourhood Police Co-ordinator Scheme)

School Liaison
(School Liaison Scheme)

JPC & Youth Liaison
JPC & Youth Liaison Officer (SGT)

NPC (SGT)

SLO (SGT)

(Junior Police Call Scheme)

JPC Activities Co-ordinator (PC)

(Hong Kong Awards for Young People Scheme)

HKAYP Liaison Officer (PC)

CIP Chief Inspector
SSGT Station Sergeant
SGT Sergeant
PC Police Constable
ORGANISATION CHART OF POLICE PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

Chief Staff Officer Public Relations

Information & Publicity Bureau

Chief Information & Publicity Officer

Media Division

Public & Publication Division

Community Relations Bureau

Senior Staff Officer Community Relations

Staff Officer Community Relation I

Staff Officer Community Relation II

News and Press Enquiries Section

Off Beat & Campaign Section

Publicity & Research Section

Editorial & Research Section

Administration Support Section

Reception Section

JPC & Youth Liaison Section

TV & Films Liaison Section
Appendix C

SCHOOL LIAISON OFFICER (SLO)

The SLO is directly responsible to the District PCRO for close liaison with local schools, youth organisations/clubs, Boy Scout Associations.

1. The duties of the SLO are to:
   (a) establish and maintain, through regular visits, close liaison with teachers and school youth organisations and to maintain indices and records for the PCRO;
   (b) give talks in schools and conduct discussions with school children on matters such as the dangers of becoming involved with triads, and the consequences of committing crime;
   (c) initiate and co-ordinate school visits to Police formations; and
   (d) assist the JPC LO in the promotion of JPC activities in schools;
   (e) to identify known bad elements and potential gang activities in schools and to report promptly to District Intelligence Section by way of Intelligence Report Forms and personal contact.
   (f) to perform any other duties as directed by the PCRO.

2. He will normally work six days a week and take his weekly leave on Sunday. This is however subject to any changes as directed by the PCRO.

3. He will maintain an official diary in which he will record all the official functions and duties performed in brief detail: He will submit this diary to the PCRO or APCRO once a week for perusal.

4. He will report to PCRO or APCRO every working day prior to commencement of his duty.

5. He will record his movements in the OB kept in the PCRO's office and leave his availability during his working hours.

6. He will usually perform his duty in uniform.

Appendix D

NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICE CO-ORDINATOR (NPC)

1. A Neighbourhood Police Co-ordinator will be an experienced, tactful officer of the rank of Sergeant whose primary duty will be to enhance police-community relations in his assigned area. In carrying out his responsibilities, he will:
(a) establish and maintain close contact with the chairmen and officials of local community organisations including kaifong associations, mutual aid committees, owners and resident associations and rural committees, and to maintain indices and records of these organisations for the PCRO;
(b) visit community organisations, residents and business operators regularly to discuss any matters of police concern and, if necessary, arrange visits for them to police formation;
(c) attend official meetings with local community organisations as directed by PCRO;
(d) assist the Regional Crime Prevention Section in liaising with residents and business operators;
(e) assist the PCRO in organising District Police involvement in Government campaigns such as Fight Crime, Narcotics, Road Safety etc.;
(f) provide feedback to the Divisional and District HQs, through the PCRO, on the attitudes of residents towards some aspects of Force policy;
(g) assist the DVC and PCRO in identifying policing problems, known bad elements and potential gang activities in his area and to report such promptly to his District Intelligence Section by way of Intelligence Report Forms and personal contact;
(h) organise such recreational activities as the PCRO may direct;
(i) conduct himself, and the business of his office, in such a way as to favourably project the image of the Force and enhance public confidence;
(j) to establish contact and liaison on an informal basis with the District Office in his area and to acquaint himself with its work and projects;
(k) pay comfort visits to selected victims of serious or violent crimes as directed by District Commander (PCRO);
(l) perform any other duties as directed by the PCRO.

2. He will work six days a week and report to PCRO/APCRO every working day for briefing prior to commencement of his duty.

3. He will normally perform duty in uniform. He may, however, wear plain clothes when attending community organisation meetings and on such other occasions as the PCRO directs.

4. He will maintain an official diary of all his official activities. This will be used in the preparation of weekly return to the PCRO and DVC. The requirement of such returns will be at the discretion of the DC.

5. If there is Neighbourhood Police Office in his District, he will spend the majority of his time there. He should consider establishing a routine consultation schedule at certain NPOs in the same way as doctors organise their clinics. He will publicise locally, where
and when he is available for consultation. In areas without NPOs, the NPC should consider organising routine consultation time at premises of community organisation.

6. A NPC shall not normally be restricted to a maximum tenure of office in anyone area.
Appendix E

Vision Statement

Vision
That Hong Kong remains one of the safest and most stable societies in the world.

Our Common Purpose

- The Hong Kong Police Force will ensure a safe and stable society by:
  - Upholding the rule of law
  - Maintaining law and order
  - Preventing and detecting crime
  - Safeguarding and protecting life and property
  - Working in partnership with the community and other agencies
  - Striving for excellence in all that we do
  - Maintaining public confidence in the Force

Our values

- Integrity and Honesty
- Respect for the right of members of the public and of the Force
- Fairness, impartiality and compassion in all our dealings
- Acceptance of responsibility and accountability
- Professionalism
- Dedication to quality service and continuous improvement
- Responsiveness to change
- Effective communication both within and outwith the Force

by

Pyo, Changwon
Associate Professor, Korea National Police University

Abstract

This research tries to examine how the Korean public perceive police service and the various police reform initiatives aimed at raising police image, in an effort to evaluate how successful the Korean police are in terms of achieving their goals. Data obtained from structured interviews with 534 citizens at the exit of 24 police stations and 10 sub-stations in Seoul immediately after being serviced by the police are reviewed and analyzed.

The research findings show more than 60% of the general public are satisfied with overall police service. However, many citizens recently experienced police service suggest that the police need more education and training especially in the areas of attitude and professional skills. Also, the result showing very low degree of public awareness of the special policing initiatives and programs cast questions over the police policy making procedures and public relations ability.

1. Background of research

(1) A brief history of Korean Police and “The Grand Reform”

Until the end of the 20th century, the Korean Police had been largely distrusted and hated by the public for its unwashed remains of the oppressive Japanese colonial policing, deep rooted corruption problem, sporadic human rights violation cases and inefficiency caused by generally low morale. In November 1999, in order to overcome the legacy of police history and create new positive police image, the newly appointed Commissioner General of the Korea National Police Agency - Lee, Moo-Young - declared to make fundamental changes to the system, culture and practice of the police with the effect of the ‘Operation Grand Reform 100Days’ and following reforms.

The blueprint and master plan of the reform were carefully prepared with the pilot trial in the Seoul Metropolitan Police. The strong and powerful charisma and leadership of Commissioner General Lee swept all the streets and corners of the country with the message of "To survive, you must change". Actually, the ‘Grand Reform’ consists of 221 initiatives and programs. Among the 221, 9 were directly aimed to raise the public image of the police and main subjects of publicity

0. The corporate-image-style marketing using friendly looking animated Police Characters (Podori for male and Posooni for female)

![Podori and Posooni](image)

0. Police Service Charter announcing what citizens can expect from the police when they need service.

0. Crime Prevention Recall Policy which is offering tailor-made police service according to what citizens requested by returning stamped postcard distributed by beat officers during their patrol.

0. No CS Gas Policy minimizing CS gas use during civil disturbance situations in an effort to avoid violent clashes with demonstrators.

0. Women Police Public Order Response Team which is to lead police line in order to calm the crowd down during public order situations.

0. Women Mobile Crime Squad targeting crimes against women and children.

0. Citizens’ Police Academy offering citizens a chance to experience and understand police work.

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0. **Volunteer Community Patrol Scheme** which support members of voluntary community patrol activities.

0. **‘Drive Out 3 Bad Attitudes’ Campaign** making educational and managerial efforts to fight ‘Unkindness’, ‘Unfairness’ and ‘Unfaithfulness’ which are widely acknowledged as 3 main causes of public discontent with police service.

The public awareness of these 9 initiatives are examined and compared in this paper.

The heat and drive for the ‘Grand Reform’ has swiftly disappeared with the replacement of the charismatic commander Lee with another Lee (Lee, Pal-Ho) who sticks to the principles and avoids media spotlights, in November 2001.

The meaning and effects of this reform project can only be evaluated after a certain period of time. However, the effectiveness of individual programs and initiatives can be evaluated by empirical research on the public perception to some degree. Since the reform was all about raising police image through enhancing ‘customer satisfaction’, this research is focused on how the public see and evaluate the police service and reform initiatives.

**(2) The Effects of Grand Reform reflected in NCSI Survey**

There is not many ways to evaluate how successful certain policy implementations or managerial efforts are. Police-funded opinion polls carried out by research institutes reported a high degree of public perception of the ‘Grand Reform’ and high degree of customer satisfaction on police service.\(^{38}\) However, the objectivity and credibility of the survey has not gone through academic and outside examination. National Customer Satisfaction Index (NCSI) survey jointly carried out by The University of Michigan, Korean Productivity Center and The Chosun Ilbo (one of the major daily newspapers in Korea) since 1998 can act as a certified and credible measure, though. According to NCSI reports, customer satisfaction for police service has shown the sharpest increase among all surveyed industrial or governmental bodies in 2000 (30.2%) and 2001 (22.9%). NCSI for police service recorded 38.4 marking the lowest of all in 1998 survey (the average NCSI of all 176 corporate companies and government bodies surveyed was 58.8). In 2001, however, it marked 59.0 leaving other public service operators such as water service, environment service and 2-year-colleges behind.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{38}\) National Police Agency, Police Annual Report 2000, April 2000, Korea National Police Agency

\(^{39}\) National Customer Satisfaction Index Korea Homepage, [http://www.ncsi.or.kr/](http://www.ncsi.or.kr/)
Table 1. NCSI for public sector services 1998-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power service</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax service</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water service</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police service</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment service</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Education</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. NCSI for public sector services 1998-2001

The NCSI Quarterly Report emphasized the sharp increase of CSI for police service.
and pointed out the vigorous efforts made by the National Police Agency as the main contributing factor to this outstanding result.

There may have been effects of other variables than ‘Grand Reform’ to the increase of NCSI for police service. Considering the fact that the degree of increase of NCSI for police service outstands that of all other public sector services during 2000 and 2001, however, one can say that the ‘Grand Reform’ initiatives collectively contributed to the increase of police public image to a considerable extent.

2. Research Design and Sample

This research attempts to measure immediate effects of ‘Grand Reform’ by looking into how the public perceive the police service and comparing the degree of public awareness of the 9 much publicized police reform initiatives introduced during ‘Police Grand Reform’. Public perception may not exactly reflect actual effects of the ‘Grand Reform’ in general and each reform initiatives in particular. However, since the ultimate goal of ‘Grand Reform’ was about enhancing police image and those 9 programs especially targeted general public directly as mentioned earlier, ‘how the public feel about’ and ‘how well known’ can be very important factors in measuring the effectiveness of those reform initiatives.

The survey was carried out by structured interviews using trained interviewers for consecutive 3 working days. The sample was 534 adults who agreed to be interviewed at the exits of 24 police stations and 10 police boxes (sub-stations) in Seoul Metropolitan Police area. There are a total of 31 police stations and 464 police boxes in Seoul and the target places were selected according to the size and location. There was no arbitrary selection or omission exercised in the approaches to the possible interviewees at the exits of police facilities. Questions asked were about the nature of the visit to the police facility, degree of satisfaction for the police service received and awareness of police reform initiatives. Demographic information of the interviewees was collected as well.

Out of 534 interviewees, 74.4%(399) were male and 25.3%(135) were female. 28.5%(152) were in their 30s, 24%(128) were in their forties and 14%(75) were in their fifties. 60.1%(321) were married and 39.7%(212) were not married. 50.6%(270) were without degrees while 49.2%(262) received higher education. In terms of economic status of the interviewees, 2.4%(13) perceived themselves as belonging to ‘upper class’, 42.5%(227) as ‘middle-upper class’, 44.4%(237) as ‘middle-lower class’ and 8.6%(46) as ‘lower class’.

In terms of the nature of police service, 55.2%(294) of the interviewees visited police

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40 The survey was funded by The Police Science Research Institute of Korea and jointly carried out by Changwon Pyo, Wonhong Kim, Yang-hee Kim, Guan-jae Song and Young-a Jang.
facilities for traffic-related business (i.e. driving license, traffic penalties, traffic accident, etc.), 22% (117) for criminal matters (i.e. complaint, crime report, interviews, etc.), 7.1% (38) for licensing, 5.4% (29) for information (i.e. search for lost family members, administrative information, etc.) and 10.3% (55) for simple enquiries (i.e. directions, etc.)

Looking into the status of the interviewees, 24% (128) were victims in the cases that mattered, 20.3% (108) were the accused and the rest 55.5% (297) were not-victim-nor-the-accused but with police service requests.

As to previous experiences of visit to police facilities, 69.7% (278) said none, 20.3% (81) said once, 6.3% (25) twice and 2.0% (8) had three previous visits to police stations or boxes.

3. Research Results

(1) Evaluation of police service received

To the question of ‘how much satisfied after serviced by the police’, 19.1% answered ‘very much’, 42.9% ‘satisfied’, 6.2% ‘not satisfied’ and only 3% said ‘not satisfied at all’. That means more than 60% of the surveyed were ‘satisfied’ by the police service they received. While no meaningful differences were found between male and female subject group, older group reported greater satisfaction. It seems to reflect the lower degree of expectation in the older groups.

Table 2: The degree of satisfaction on police service received (by sex and age groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Unit : % (number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under29</td>
<td>30 - 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>11.2(20)</td>
<td>15.8(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21.5(29)</td>
<td>42.9(229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32.4(58)</td>
<td>30.3(46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>42.9(171)</td>
<td>43.0(58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>41.9(75)</td>
<td>47.4(72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not bad</td>
<td>28.3(113)</td>
<td>30.4(41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not satisfied</td>
<td>7.3(29)</td>
<td>3.0(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>3.3(13)</td>
<td>2.2(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0(399)</td>
<td>100.0(135)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\chi^2=4.07 \quad df=4 \quad p\leq.397 \]  \[\chi^2=33.05 \quad df=8 \quad p\leq.000 \]
Table 3: The degree of satisfaction on police service received
(by educational background)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very much</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Not bad</th>
<th>Not satisfied</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High school or under</td>
<td>21.5(58)</td>
<td>38.5(104)</td>
<td>31.5(85)</td>
<td>5.9(16)</td>
<td>2.6(7)</td>
<td>100.0(270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-year-college</td>
<td>14.9(14)</td>
<td>47.9(45)</td>
<td>28.7(27)</td>
<td>4.3(4)</td>
<td>4.3(4)</td>
<td>100.0(94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University or above</td>
<td>17.9(30)</td>
<td>47.0(79)</td>
<td>24.4(41)</td>
<td>7.7(13)</td>
<td>3.0(5)</td>
<td>100.0(168)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 7.91 \quad df = 8 \quad p \leq 0.442 \]

When asked to suggest things to be changed to improve the quality of police service, 32.1% said ‘none’, 16.4% suggested ‘kinder attitude’, 7.9% said police officers should show ‘more smiles’, 7.7% requested quicker service’ and 5.5% asked for ‘more gentle manner of talking’. Generally, most of the requests and suggestions were about ‘attitude’ of police officers rather than about ‘ability’ of them or the ‘system’. The details of the requests and suggestions raised by the open question are shown at the following table.

Table 4: Requests and suggestions for change to improve police service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>32.0(112)</td>
<td>33.3(40)</td>
<td>32.1(152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinder attitude</td>
<td>16.0(56)</td>
<td>17.5(21)</td>
<td>16.4(77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More smiles</td>
<td>8.3(29)</td>
<td>12.5(8)</td>
<td>7.9(37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quicker service</td>
<td>7.4(26)</td>
<td>8.3(10)</td>
<td>7.7(36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less oppressive attitude</td>
<td>7.1(25)</td>
<td>4.2(5)</td>
<td>6.4(30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinder verbal attitude</td>
<td>4.3(15)</td>
<td>9.2(11)</td>
<td>5.5(26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More detailed explanation</td>
<td>4.9(17)</td>
<td>2.5(3)</td>
<td>4.3(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More fairness</td>
<td>4.0(14)</td>
<td>2.5(3)</td>
<td>3.6(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More respect</td>
<td>3.1(11)</td>
<td>3.3(4)</td>
<td>3.2(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher professionalism</td>
<td>3.1(11)</td>
<td>3.3(4)</td>
<td>3.2(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better listening</td>
<td>3.4(12)</td>
<td>2.5(3)</td>
<td>3.2(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More officers</td>
<td>2.6(9)</td>
<td>3.3(4)</td>
<td>2.8(13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Same atmosphere is found in the answers to the question about ‘necessary changes to police training and education’. When asked which area of police training and education should be emphasized most, given four areas of police training and education such as ‘attitude training for kindness’; ‘professional skills training’; ‘human rights education’ and ‘general humanities education’, 69.8% of all interviewees picked ‘attitude training for kindness’. No meaningful difference was found between male and female subject groups as illustrated in the following table.

**Table 5 : Most important area of police training and education (by sex)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>kindess</th>
<th>skills</th>
<th>human rights</th>
<th>humanities</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>69.5(262)</td>
<td>22.0(83)</td>
<td>5.6(21)</td>
<td>2.9(11)</td>
<td>100.0(377)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>70.8(92)</td>
<td>17.7(23)</td>
<td>8.5(11)</td>
<td>3.1(4)</td>
<td>100.0(130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69.8(354)</td>
<td>20.9(106)</td>
<td>6.3(32)</td>
<td>3.0(15)</td>
<td>100.0(507)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 2.18 \quad \text{df} = 3 \quad p \leq 0.537 \]
These results suggest that the public perception of the police is still that of ‘oppressive’, ‘authoritarian’ and ‘unkind’ and that the public want kinder attitude. That is to say, even though NCSI for police service improved after ‘Grand Reform’ and more than 60% of the interviewees reported to be satisfied by police service they received, the efforts of the police should be focused on ‘customer satisfaction’ rather than more number of arrests. What should be noted with care is, however, the attitude of the interviewees toward ‘human rights education’. Concerning that the interviewees were those who had just visited police for not-serious matters and that ‘human rights’ regarding police is generally understood as serious and violent offence, the importance of ‘human rights education’ for police should not be ignored as a result of this survey.

(2) Awareness of police reform initiatives

The interviewees were asked if they were aware of 9 different police reform initiatives respectively, which were the main programs introduced during ‘Grand Reform’ period with a aim to appeal directly to the general public and to enhance police image by doing so. As mentioned earlier, the 9 initiatives were:

0. Police Characters (Podori for male and Posooni for female)
0. Police Service Charter
0. Crime Prevention Recall Policy
0. No CS Gas Policy
0. Women Police Public Order Response Team
0. Women Mobile Crime Squad
0. Citizens’ Police Academy
0. Volunteer Community Patrol Scheme
0. ‘Drive Out 3 Bad Attitudes’ Campaign

Overall, no meaningful difference was found between male and female subject groups in the awareness of police reform initiatives. The same applied to groups with different educational background. However, different age groups revealed meaningful differences in the awareness of reform initiatives. While the average degree of awareness in the ‘under 29’ group was 16.52; in the group of interviewees in their thirties it was 17.77 and in the group of interviewees in their forties, the average degree of awareness of the reform programs was the highest 18.33 (F(2,523)=9.98, p≤0.01).

About Police Characters (Podori for male and Posooni for female), while 48.7% of respondents said they ‘knew very well’, 43.3% told they ‘heard of but not know’ and only 8.0% replied that they ‘never heard of’.
Table 6: Awareness of Police Characters
(by sex)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never heard of</td>
<td>6.0(24)</td>
<td>14.1(19)</td>
<td>8.0(43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard of but not</td>
<td>40.9(163)</td>
<td>50.4(68)</td>
<td>43.3(231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>know about</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know very well</td>
<td>53.1(212)</td>
<td>35.6(48)</td>
<td>48.7(260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0(399)</td>
<td>100.0(135)</td>
<td>100.0(534)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2=16.65$  $df=2$  $p\leq.000$

About Police Service Charter, while only 8.1% of respondents said they ‘knew very well’, 37.5% told they ‘heard of but not know’ and 54.4% replied that they ‘never heard of’. Compared with Police Characters, the public awareness of Police Service Charter seems to be very low.

Table 7: Awareness of Police Service Charter
(by sex)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never heard of</td>
<td>54.9(218)</td>
<td>53.0(71)</td>
<td>54.4(289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard of but not</td>
<td>35.8(142)</td>
<td>42.5(57)</td>
<td>37.5(199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>know about</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know very well</td>
<td>9.3(37)</td>
<td>4.5(6)</td>
<td>8.1(43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0(397)</td>
<td>100.0(134)</td>
<td>100.0(531)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2=4.19$  $df=2$  $p\leq.123$

About Crime Prevention Recall Policy, while only 13.2% of respondents said they ‘knew very well’, 36.9% told they ‘heard of but not know’ and 49.9% replied that they ‘never heard of’. Slightly better than Police Service Charter, but still way behind of Police characters.
Table 8: Awareness of Crime Prevention Recall Policy (by sex)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never heard of</td>
<td>50.9(202)</td>
<td>47.0(63)</td>
<td>49.9(265)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard of but not know about</td>
<td>35.8(142)</td>
<td>40.3(54)</td>
<td>36.9(196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know very well</td>
<td>13.4(53)</td>
<td>12.7(17)</td>
<td>13.2(70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0(397)</td>
<td>100.0(134)</td>
<td>100.0(531)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2=0.89 \quad df=2 \quad p\leq0.641 \]

About No CS Gas Policy, while 33.6% of respondents said they ‘knew very well’, 42.3% told they ‘heard of but not know’ and 24.0% replied that they ‘never heard of’. No CS Gas Policy seems to be quite well known but not as much as Police Characters.

Table 9: Awareness of No CS Gas Policy (by sex)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never heard of</td>
<td>22.0(87)</td>
<td>29.9(40)</td>
<td>24.0(127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard of but not know about</td>
<td>42.0(166)</td>
<td>43.3(58)</td>
<td>42.3(224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know very well</td>
<td>35.9(142)</td>
<td>26.9(36)</td>
<td>33.6(178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0(395)</td>
<td>100.0(134)</td>
<td>100.0(529)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2=5.04 \quad df=2 \quad p\leq0.080 \]

About Women Police Public Order Response Team, while 21.2% of respondents said they ‘knew very well’, 42.9% told they ‘heard of but not know’ and 35.9% replied that they ‘never heard of’. The public awareness of this initiative seems to be relatively low.
Table 10: Awareness of Women Police Public Order Response Team  
(by sex)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never heard of</td>
<td>33.8(134)</td>
<td>42.2(57)</td>
<td>35.9(191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard of but not</td>
<td>42.8(170)</td>
<td>43.0(58)</td>
<td>42.9(228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>know about</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know very well</td>
<td>23.4(93)</td>
<td>14.8(20)</td>
<td>21.2(113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0(397)</td>
<td>100.0(135)</td>
<td>100.0(532)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 5.53 \quad \text{df}=2 \quad p \leq 0.063 \]

About Women Mobile Crime Squad, while 25.0% of respondents said they ‘knew very well’, 49.3% told they ‘heard of but not know’ and 25.6% replied that they ‘never heard of’.

Table 11: Awareness of Women Mobile Crime Squad  
(by sex)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never heard of</td>
<td>26.2(104)</td>
<td>23.9(32)</td>
<td>25.6(136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard of but not</td>
<td>49.4(196)</td>
<td>49.3(66)</td>
<td>49.3(262)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>know about</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know very well</td>
<td>24.4(97)</td>
<td>26.9(36)</td>
<td>25.0(133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0(397)</td>
<td>100.0(134)</td>
<td>100.0(531)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 0.45 \quad \text{df}=2 \quad p \leq 0.800 \]

About Citizens’ Police Academy, while 27.4% of respondents said they ‘knew very well’, 45.5% told they ‘heard of but not know’ and 27.1% replied that they ‘never heard of’.
Table 12: Awareness of Citizens’ Police Academy
(by sex)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never heard of</td>
<td>28.0(111)</td>
<td>25.9(35)</td>
<td>27.4(146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard of but not</td>
<td>44.6(177)</td>
<td>48.1(65)</td>
<td>45.5(242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>know about</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know very well</td>
<td>27.5(109)</td>
<td>25.9(35)</td>
<td>27.1(144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0(397)</td>
<td>100.0(135)</td>
<td>100.0(532)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2= .52$  df=2  $p \leq .771$

About **Volunteer Community Patrol Scheme**, while 38.6% of respondents said they ‘knew very well’, 50.5% told they ‘heard of but not know’ and only 10.9% replied that they ‘never heard of’. The degree of awareness of this program among general public seems to be relatively high but not much as that of Police Characters.

Table 13: Awareness of Volunteer Community Patrol Scheme
(by sex)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never heard of</td>
<td>10.6(42)</td>
<td>11.9(16)</td>
<td>10.9(58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard of but not</td>
<td>52.3(207)</td>
<td>45.2(61)</td>
<td>50.5(268)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>know about</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know very well</td>
<td>37.1(147)</td>
<td>43.0(58)</td>
<td>38.6(205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0(396)</td>
<td>100.0(135)</td>
<td>100.0(531)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2=2.04$  df=2  $p \leq .361$

About ‘Drive Out 3 Bad Attitudes’ Campaign, while 20.5% of respondents said they ‘knew very well’, 33.1% told they ‘heard of but not know’ and nearly half (46.4%) of the respondents replied that they ‘never heard of’.
Table 14: Awareness of ‘Drive Out 3 Bad Attitudes’ Campaign (by sex)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never heard of</td>
<td>45.1(179)</td>
<td>50.4(68)</td>
<td>46.4(247)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard of but not</td>
<td>33.5(133)</td>
<td>31.9(43)</td>
<td>33.1(176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>know about</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know very well</td>
<td>21.4(85)</td>
<td>17.8(24)</td>
<td>20.5(109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0(397)</td>
<td>100.0(135)</td>
<td>100.0(532)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 1.34 \quad df = 2 \quad p \leq 0.512 \]

Judging from the degree of awareness felt by the interviewees, 2 out of the 9 reform initiatives seem to be relatively successful in attracting public attention, other 2 look unsuccessful and the rest of 5 need more push in order to appeal to enough number of people. The successful ones are Police Characters, No CS Gas Policy and Volunteer Community Patrol Scheme.

There are several reasons for the high degree of public awareness of Police Characters known as ‘Podori’ and ‘Posooni’. First of all, the creator of the orginal image of Podori is the best known cartoonist, Hyun-Sei Lee. Also, the friendly looking cartoon-character-like image fits well with the digital age. But most of all, Podori and Posooni were virtually everywhere: at the gate of every police station, in every police notice board, in every crime prevention and road safety campaign materials, in all kinds of police stationary, in every police officer’s name card, and on and on and on. Actually, ‘Podori’ became the nickname of Korean police as ‘Bobby’ is for the British police and the ‘Copper’ for the American. However, the new police administration seems to downgrade and reduce the presence of Podori as if they wanted to wash away the vestiges of the former leader, Lee, Moo-Young.

No CS Gas Policy enjoyed heavy and frequent media coverage because it was believed to change the image of Korea from that of chaos and violence to that of peace and order. It’s success also owes a lot to the political and social changes that made violence unacceptable in most mass rally situations.

The unsuccessful programs are Police Service Charter and Crime Prevention Recall Policy. Both had no real impact in everyday policing. The Police Service Charter was made as a part of Government campaign in an attempt to import British style of service-oriented administration model. The Charter itself contains rosy promises of high standard service and pledge of dedication. But it was not followed by any enforcement schemes or evaluation process. Crime Prevention Recall Policy also looked great on the table but did not work on the street at all.
4. Conclusion

Korean police had long suffered from bad reputation and unpleasant legacies of Japanese colonial police. The ‘Grand Reform’ aimed to change all of these in a very short period of time. Surprisingly, it looked successful in some ways. NCSI for police service jumped from the lowest of ‘37’ to ‘59’ which is well ahead of college education and water service, in just 2 years. More than 60% of the respondents said they were satisfied with police service they received in several different surveys.

More thorough and minute evaluation of and investigation into the effects and impacts of the military operation style ‘Grand Reform’ drive are necessary to draw a meaningful picture of this phenomenon.

This research tried to find out how the public perceive the police service at the moment when the 2–year-long reform efforts have just finished and how well they are aware of the individual reform programs. About the degree of satisfaction on overall police service received, just over 60% of the respondents said ‘satisfied’. That confirms other previous survey results and implies that the customer satisfaction for police service has slightly improved than ‘before reform period’\(^{41}\).

Still, as many respondents suggested and requested, more efforts to be made to improve the attitude and communication skills of police officers dealing with complainants, enquirers and the interviewed. Real changes that can change the attitude of street level officers are urgently required than the bunch of window-dressing campaigns and programs.

About the effectiveness of individual reform programs measured by the degree of public awareness, not so many programs seem successful. Only such programs with real impact on everyday policing and striking the overt and covert demand of the public are widely known to the members of the public for certain period of time. The police should decide what to carry on, on what to put more resources and what to discard after careful and objective evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of each program and initiative. Political or emotional consideration should be avoided in police policy making process. In this context, downgrading of the Podori character (which was proven to be effective) should be reconsidered. The decision to keep Crime Prevention Recall policy\(^{42}\) should be re-examined.

Korean police is a big national organization with 90,000 sworn officers and 60,000 auxiliary officers who are doing 2 years’ military service in the police. The CEO of the Korean

\(^{41}\) At the survey of the degree of satisfaction for services provided by all government sectors in January 1999, that of police service was 55.5. See Kyoung Hyang Shinmun (Korean newspaper), 1999. 02. 22.

\(^{42}\) The Police announced that they will keep and develop the ‘Crime Prevention Recall’ policy. See 2002 National Police Agency Annual Report, p. 65
police – the Commissioner General – appointed without any contract or fixed terms of office is usually replaced after a year-long service. Implementation as well as change of a policy affecting the whole organization costs a lot of public resources. If every new Commissioner General tries his (no woman commissioner generals yet) own package of policies without careful and objective research and investigation every year, not only a huge waste of public resources will be caused but also the trust (from inside and out) in the continuity of police policy will be compromised. And that has been happening for a long period of time.

To conclude, I would like to suggest that more objective and minute evaluation of police policies and initiatives introduced during the ‘Grand Reform’ period be followed and that a fixed term of office for Commissioner General be introduced to normalize police policy making process.
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Kyoung Hyang Shinmun (Korean newspaper), 1999. 02. 22.

National Customer Satisfaction Index Korea Homepage, http://www.ncsi.or.kr/


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